Scottish independence and the future of Trident

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According to reports in the Financial Times (1 September 2021), the British government has “drawn up secret contingency plans to move its Trident nuclear submarine bases from Scotland to the US or France in the event of Scottish independence.”

The background to the formulation of these plans is that the Scottish National Party remains committed to pursuing independence; opposes nuclear weapons and was recently re-elected to head the devolved government with a strong mandate. In short, it is not out of the question that the people of Scotland will have the opportunity to vote again for independence and it seems possible that a majority will vote in favour.

Whatever your specific thoughts on independence, two things are clear: firstly, that the London government of Boris Johnson is deeply unattractive, reactionary and has pursued policies against the will of the majority of Scottish voters and to their material detriment; secondly, that an independent Scotland would pitch Britain’s nuclear weapons systems into crisis.

Writing in The National newspaper (6 September 2021), the SNP’s Stewart McDonald comments:

Negotiating Trident’s removal will be one of the most important tasks a newly independent Scotland will face, and capitals across Europe – indeed the world – will be looking to Edinburgh for assurance that we will be a reliable and trustworthy partner in this and in future international negotiations.

How we handle Trident’s removal will be our first big test on the international stage.

Building and maintaining strong international relationships is about more than stability, shared values and shared interests. It also relies on each state recognising and respecting the national interests of other states, even when they might diverge from their own.

Submarines armed with the UK’s nuclear weapons are based at the Faslane naval base at HMNB Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland. The base is also home to a number of nuclear-powered but conventionally armed ‘hunter killer’ submarines, which are used to escort the nuclear armed, Trident subs. Glasgow itself is Scotland’s most populated city and locals are very well informed about the fact that their city is itself a potential target for nuclear attack.

The FT article raises possibilities for alternative arrangements for Trident should Scotland become an independent state:

The first [option] would be to relocate the bases elsewhere on the British Isles, with the Royal Navy’s Devonport base cited as the most likely location to replace Faslane...

The second option would be to move the UK’s nuclear bases to an allied country such as the US, with one defence expert citing Kings Bay, Georgia, the base for the US Navy’s Atlantic fleet of Trident submarines. Officials also examined moving the UK’s submarine base to Île Longue in Brittany, France.

The third option is to negotiate a new British Overseas Territory within an independent Scottish state that would contain the Faslane and Coulport bases, dubbed by one insider as a “Nuclear Gibraltar”.

The late John Ainslie, of Scottish CND, provides an indispensable guide for the questions raised by the FT and the SNP’s commitment to removing nuclear weapons from Scotland, in his 2013 report Trident: Nowhere to Go. Ainslie’s report makes clear that incredible barriers exist to the relocation of Trident to an alternative location in the British Isles. He writes:

50 years ago the [Ministry of Defence] drew up a list of possible locations for Polaris [the old nuclear missile system], including sites in England and Wales. Today these papers will be dusted off. Officials may also revive an option that was raised in 1981 - basing the UK Trident fleet in the United States. A second overseas possibility would be Ile Longue in France. Building a floating support ship might be a further option.

There were three English sites on the Polaris shortlist. One was Portland, near Weymouth. This was dismissed because there was no suitable location for a nuclear warhead depot nearby. Today there are houses adjacent to the required area. The site was the venue for the sailing events in the 2012 Olympics.

A second alternative was Devonport. In 1963 the MOD considered transforming part of the Cornish shore, opposite the dockyard, into a nuclear weapons’ store. A modern equivalent would be far larger. It would be adjacent to a residential estate as well as being close to the city of Plymouth. It is inconceivable that this would be permitted.

The third location was Falmouth. The proposed submarine base would be on National Trust land close to St Just in Roseland. Acquiring this would be very difficult. The warhead depot would be North of Falmouth. Two villages would be so close to the depot that they would have to be abandoned. In 1963 the MOD concluded that the costs of acquiring and developing this site for Polaris would be so great that the project wasn’t feasible. A Trident depot would be much larger and even less viable ...

An existing nuclear site that might be considered is Barrow in Furness, where the submarines are built. This might be suitable if the Navy only deploys Trident when there is a full moon and a high tide. Otherwise it is a non-starter. Walney Channel is too shallow. The Barrow option was not seriously considered in 1963.

The one Welsh location on the old shortlist was Milford Haven. Siting Polaris here would have resulted in the closure of one oil refinery. Introducing Trident in this estuary today would end four major petrochemical facilities and cut off one of Britain’s main sources of gas. The grounds for dismissing Milford Haven, as with all the other sites, are even stronger today than they were fifty years ago.

In 1963 each of these options was rejected.

So it would seem that the first option listed by the FT and considered in the “secret contingency plans” looks like a complete non-starter.

What of option 2? What the British government still fancifully refers to as an “independent nuclear deterrent” is completely dependent on US nuclear operations. The FT refers to Kings Bay in Georgia, US, as being the base for the US Navy’s Atlantic fleet, but fails to mention that this naval base is also the first stop for subs in Britain’s nuclear submarine fleet on each voyages. As Commander Robert Forsyth points out is his book, Why Trident? (Spokesman, 2020):

When the government says UK Trident is ‘Independent’ they are being very economical with the facts. Whilst it is correct to say that RN missiles do not require specific US aid for targetting, launch or guidance in flight, with the notable exception of supply of missiles in the first case, the UK’s deep dependency on US technical and political support means that the US does have the tools to inhibit or frustrate launch if it so wished ...

The UK Parliament’s Defence Select Committee detailed report of UK dependency on US support shows that the level of dependency is significantly higher than the Government would lead the public to believe. Not included in the report is the fact that the UK is designing and building (with US assistance) a common 12 missile module for both USN and RN Trident successor submarines.

Britain’s ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ is wholly reliant on US missile capabilities, repair and renewal facilities. Not so ‘independent’. Relocating the fleet to the US would expose this fantasy once and for all. For this reason alone, the British government may be reluctant to pursue such an option. If such a relocation did take place, how would the development, renewal and transit of nuclear warheads from Britain to the US function? Major obstacles exist to such an option, even though it may be entirely logical and consistent with reality.

What of relocating the fleet to France? Any such move would be a major political humiliation for the British government and would doubtless meet fierce resistance from the French peace movement.

The ‘third option’ is, in fact, no option at all. A follow-up report in the FT makes clear that a future independent Scotland would not accept the creation of a ‘British Overseas Territory’ at the existing base:

“There is just not a snowball’s chance in hell of nuclear weapons being based here for any longer than is necessary,” said one senior SNP member familiar with the party leadership’s thinking on defence issues.

“It will become obvious to [UK policymakers] that madcap ideas like treaty ports from 100 years ago in Ireland will not be accepted and are unworkable for any state wanting to credibly operate a strategic nuclear deterrent,” the senior party member said.

Britain’s nuclear weapons may well have ‘nowhere to go’ in the event of Scottish independence. Such a possibility should cheer the hearts of all nuclear disarmers. The prospect of the British government going cap-in-hand to the US or France for assistance reveals the fragile nature of the nuclear infrastructure in the UK. John Ainslie struck an appropriately optimistic tone when he wrote:

Because there is no viable alternative site for Trident, Scottish independence could result in there being no nuclear weapons in Britain. This would be welcomed by all those around the world who seek disarmament, and it could encourage other countries to follow suit. A Scotland which votes for independence and then sustains a clear policy of banning these Weapons of Mass Destruction will also to set an example to the world.