German elections: what prospects for peace and disarmament?

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German voters go to the polls on Sunday, 26 September. The outcome of this election will determine not only who will replace Angela Merkel as German Chancellor, but the political composition of the Bundestag. Merkel is standing down from office after almost sixteen years, a period during which Germany has maintained and extended its position as Europe’s most influential nation. Consequently, Germany is an important voice in international affairs.

Polling in the first week of September suggests that Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), will not maintain control of the Chancellory. The polling may or may not change. The German electoral system has resulted in broad representation in the Bundestag. However, the much prized ‘stability’ of the German system has meant that the Chancellor comes from the party with the largest vote share: this will likely mean either the CDU or Social Democratic Party (SDP).

With a single party unlikely to achieve a basic majority of votes, a coalition government will be formed again. The political composition and dynamics of such a coalition is therefore important for determining the dimensions of future foreign, defence and security policy. If, for example, either the Green Party or Left Party were to join a coalition, what impact might this have? It is not possible to guess, but a brief survey of the stated positions of the main contending parties may provide some clues.

According to the ‘Alliance for Securing Democracy’, a US organisation with links to the security services and government:

The four centrist parties—CDU/CSU, FDP, Greens, and SPD—all have a strong commitment to the European and transatlantic orientation of German foreign policy. Despite varying policies, the parties all advocate for further European integration through the European Union (EU) and consider the transatlantic relationship and its defense alliance NATO to be integral to German foreign and defense policy. In contrast, the [Left] calls on the EU to make major policy changes and structural reforms, while the AfD [right-wing] demands a renationalization of European politics. Furthermore, the AfD calls for NATO to limit itself to defense measures and refrain from deployments outside member countries. The [Left] considers NATO a relic of the Cold War and advocates for a new collective security alliance that includes Russia.

So in terms of the basic approach to the ‘broad stroke’ foreign policy agenda, the main parties look likely to continue as before. It is unlikely that Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) will be invited to join a coalition but it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the Left might achieve some influence. What might be achieved if they get the opportunity?

German policy towards Russia and China has been more nuanced than in the USA and UK. With regards to Russia, a continual process of engagement has been balanced with the ‘containment’ approach pursued by NATO. The Left calls for further engagement whilst the Greens call for maintaining EU sanctions. The ‘Nord Stream 2’ gas pipeline is an issue where the parties differentiate themselves, with the Greens calling for an immediate end to the scheme in contrast to the other parties. Whatever the exact approach to Russia, those interested in peace and security will not want to see a deterioration in relations.

The CDU, Greens, SPD and others parties of the ‘centre’ call for a coordinated European approach to China. At the same time, the Greens and CDU characterise China as having ‘authoritarian, hegemonic aspirations’, as wanting to ‘divide Europe’ and call for a ‘transatlantic’ approach.

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies argues that the question of China is not a major concern for the German public. 53% of German’s see China’s growing influence as either ‘neutral’ (43%) or ‘positive’ (10%). The same poll indicates that 82% think that Germany should remain ‘neutral’ in “the case of a new US-Chinese cold war”. Will public opinion guide the new government or will existing alliances and demands determine Germany’s course? If the outcome of the election looks unlikely to usher in a new, much less confrontational and completely independent, approach, it should be hoped that some constructive nuance and partial independence is maintained.

How will the new government approach the question of the ‘militarisation of Europe’? The existing CDU/SDP coalition has failed to generate an overall strategic approach to defence questions but has been a key participant in the steady militarisation of the EU. Writing on the European Council on Foreign Relations website, Ulrike Franke speculates on what a ‘Black-Green’ (CDU-Green) coalition might produce in terms of defence policy. She writes:

[H]ow could a Black-Green coalition, of all things, improve this situation? After all, the Greens partly developed out of the peace movement of the 1970s, and they oppose most of the CDU’s views on military and defence. The Greens want to introduce highly restrictive arms export rules, and are critical of what they see as the “militarisation” of the European Union.

There are three reasons to be optimistic. Firstly, the bar is low. It would be difficult for a new coalition to do worse than the current one. For the last few years, the CDU/CSU and its current coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, have been at loggerheads with each other, especially over defence questions.

Whilst there is room for optimism for those keen to see greater European military integration and spending, those who oppose such developments have fewer options. It seems that only the Left Party, which has consistently opposed European militarisation and which has used its platform in both the Bundestag and European Parliament to coordinate opposition, provides hope.

Although Germany is not itself nuclear-armed, the question of nuclear weapons is a live public issue in German politics. The questions of ‘nuclear sharing’ and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are issues of debate. Germany hosts US nuclear weapons and under ‘sharing’ agreements the German armed forces are obliged to ‘deliver’ these weapons upon request. This arrangement is deeply contentious in the ranks of the SDP and in all political organisations to the left of it. Despite voices within the SDP being opposed to the continuation of this arrangement, the party itself has no settled view on the matter. Both the Greens and the Left are pledged to ending nuclear sharing as soon as possible. Such a move will be popular with the German public (see page 13). However, as Steven Pifer reports in a recent paper for the Brookings Institute (Germany’s Upcoming Election and the Future of Nuclear Sharing):

[Some] argue that the Greens would not want to cause problems with NATO; while maintaining the aspirational goal of withdrawal of US nuclear weapons, they would be prepared to “stomach” continued nuclear sharing for the time being.

The 2009 coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and FDP offers a warning. Guido Westerwelle, then leader of the FDP who went on to become German Foreign Minister, secured the following clause in the agreement:

[The German government] will work to support the conclusion of new disarmament and arms control agreements internationally ... In this context and in the course of developing a strategic concept for NATO, we will work in the alliance and with our American allies to ensure that the nuclear weapons remaining in Germany are withdrawn.

No progress was made towards the goal of withdrawing US nuclear weapons following this agreement. What stopped the progress? Westerwelle encountered very strong opposition within NATO. It looks unlikely that progress will be made in the future without the question of NATO being confronted in a serious fashion.

Both the Greens and the Left are pledged to Germany signing and ratifying the TPNW. The significance of Europe’s ‘leading nation’ taking such a move would be enormous. Writing a pledge to join the TPNW into any coalition agreement will be a massive step forward. However, Germany is likely to meet sharp resistance within NATO for any such move. NATO and Germany’s membership of it remains a key issue for peace and disarmament in Europe.