Peace, Power and Politics

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The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), signed in 1951, extended Washington’s ‘nuclear umbrella’ to two key states in the Pacific Region. Billed as a ‘collective security’ agreement, ANZUS clearly exposed the centrality of nuclear weapons in the US approach to foreign relations. One New Zealand government website describes the situation as follows:

Nuclear weapons played a major part in the United States’ military arrangements, and the possible use of nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered vessels was implicit in any United States response to an attack on New Zealand.1

Despite long-term objections to nuclear testing in the region, expressed from the 1960s onwards, the ANZUS agreement meant concessions on the part of the New Zealand government with respect to US nuclear weapons, military and naval operations and related issues.

By the early 1980s and following a determined campaign by nuclear disarmers, majority opinion in New Zealand was set firmly against the presence of US nuclear arms and nuclear powered ships in the country. The opposition Labour Party entered the 1984 election with the clear aim of introducing a ‘Nuclear Free New Zealand Bill’, campaigning throughout the election against nuclear weapons and propulsion but not against ANZUS itself.

Labour swept to victory and the new Prime Minister, David Lange, made clear that the electoral promise of a Nuclear Free NZ would be acted upon. The new government faced immediate problems. The US policy of ‘neither confirm nor deny’ with respect to nuclear weapons put a significant question mark over the future of ANZUS, which allowed for the presence of US Navy vessels in New Zealand harbours. How could the country be both nuclear free and tied to US military operations?

Lange’s attempts to renegotiate ANZUS were met with hostility. Writing of the reaction some years later, Lange pointed out that:

Far from developing an irresponsible national policy on the subject, as most of our Western allies found it expedient to insinuate, New Zealand was in fact acting in a rational and calculated way, in the name of the traditional concept of strengthening national security. We were, simply, safer without nuclear weapons in our defence than with them ... [T]he policy as expressed in law stands as a statement of the political will to eliminate nuclear weapons and a rejection of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.2

Robert Green describes the international reaction to New Zealand’s move towards nuclear free status:

With the US fearing that the ‘Kiwi disease’ might spread to other allies such as Japan, Australia, the Philipines and Denmark, New Zealand was demoted from US ally to ‘friend’; military co-operation under ANZUS was curtailed; the US and UK threatened trade; and New Zealand officials were ostracised from the Western group in the UN. Yet the government held firm, bolstered by massive mobilisation of public support by the peace movement in New Zealand and the US ...3

These moves against New Zealand by the US and allies would be more than your average political leader would be capable of withstanding. It is to David Lange’s enormous credit that he stuck to the policy. It is also to his enormous credit that he respected and acted in tandem with the majority opinion of his own party, the international peace movements and, vitally, the majority of New Zealanders. Politicians who are willing to stand up to the US are an all-too-uncommon species.

In 1985 the US attempted to stage a provocation against Lange’s government, in an attempt to test resolve. The previously cited government website takes up the story:

Following confidential discussions over the selection of an acceptable ship, in late 1984 the United States requested that the ageing guided-missile destroyer USS Buchanan visit New Zealand. The Americans hoped that a perception that it was not nuclear-armed would be enough for it to slip under the political radar, and believed they had Lange’s agreement. But on 4 February 1985 the government said no. ‘Near-uncertainty was not now enough for us,’ Lange later explained. ‘Whatever the truth of its armaments, its arrival in New Zealand would be seen as a surrender by the government.’ In response, Washington severed visible intelligence and military ties with New Zealand and downgraded political and diplomatic exchanges.4

The US Secretary of State at the time quickly confirmed that the security arrangements of ANZUS would no longer be maintained. This was the effective end of the Treaty. By 1987 New Zealand passed the ‘New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987’, legislation that is still in place and legislation accepted as the ‘norm’. The country signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the current prime minister is an important voice for nuclear disarmament.

What are the lessons of New Zealand’s approach to nuclear disarmament for those in Europe who wish to achieve the same? There are surely thousands of lessons and we should aim to absorb, learn and act on them but the following examples seem clear enough:

1. Military and ‘security’ agreements with the United States like ANZUS and NATO have nuclear weapons at their core. The US expects total adherence to the nuclear dogma in exchange for ‘security’ assurances. It is unlikely that Europe will become nuclear free as long as European states adhere to NATO.

2. Independent, courageous and consistent political support is essential. More than that, this support must endure when political power is attained. Positive sentiments should not be taken at face value. Enduring commitment is key.

3. The peace movements play an essential role in sparking, building and sustaining both political and wider public support for nuclear disarmament. Without strong, coordinated peace movements our aim of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe will not arise.

If more European states are to sign up to the TPNW, if the ‘nuclear-sharing’ states are to send the nuclear weapons back to the US and if we are to make progress towards a nuclear-free zone, then the points above will serve us well.

Notes

1. https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/nuclear-free-nz

2. Quoted from Green, Robert (2018) Security without Nuclear Deterrence, Spokesman, Nottingham

3. Ibid

4. https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/nuclear-free-nz