UK warhead announcement: Immoral, Illogical, Illegal

“We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons” claims the British Government in their ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’: Global Britain in a competitive age. It is unclear quite how this sentiment fits with a renewed commitment to Britain’s nuclear weapon system and the announcement that the overall ceiling on nuclear warheads is to be increased: “the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.”

From END Info 23 available here

If the empty pledge on disarmament and the alleged imperative of Britain retaining a nuclear capability came as no surprise, the announcement that the long-established intent to reduce the overall number of warheads was to be dispensed with sent a shockwave across the planet. A further shocking element of the report comes in the following passage: “we reserve the right to review this assurance [that the UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against NPT state parties] if the future threat of ... emerging technologies ... makes it necessary.”

Immoral

The British public, like the vast majority of the world’s population, opposes nuclear weapons. Repeated polling has not registered majority support for UK nuclear weapons, and a recent survey found that 77% of the population agreed that all nuclear weapons should be abolished.

The British government is massively out-of-step with the population on this question, yet unknown billions of pounds have been pledged to manufacture instruments of mass-murder just days after nurses were subjected to what, in effect, amounts to a pay cut.

The current British government is a serial rule-breaker and the scrapping of intent to reduce the overall number of warheads fits into this pattern of conduct. Far from providing increased ‘security’ the British decision to not only retain nuclear weapons but to increase the number of warheads can only increase tensions and generate greater risks.

Illogical

At the time of the announcement, the British government made no effort to justify its decision beyond general statements about “adversaries”, “threats to stability” and the “evolving security environment”. In subsequent interviews the Secretary of Defence, Ben Wallace, claimed that an increased number of warheads was a response to alleged changes to Russian missile defence. When questioned, Mr Wallace could not explain how 260 rather than a smaller number of warheads would make a difference.

As the Russian government has pointed out, the British decision comes weeks after agreement was reached between the US and Russia to extend New START for a further five years: an agreement that will reduce the overall numbers of nuclear weapons. How does the British decision fit with the global trends? What does the US, on which Britain is dependent for the vast majority of its nuclear capability, make of the announcement?

Could the failure to adequately explain the need for more warheads be linked to the fact that there is no good reason? Or could it be that the real story behind this decision is being deliberately withheld? How does Britain’s lobbying of the US Congress over the W-93 warhead fit into the picture? Might Britain be planning to increase the number of Trident submarines on ‘Continuous At Sea’ patrol, which might make it necessary to have more warheads?

Does the shift in nuclear posture embodied in “reserve the right to review” and in the direction of travel detailed in the wider report suggest a potential ‘war fighting’ nuclear posture, rather than an alleged ‘deterrence’ posture? Might Britain need more warheads if such warheads are to be ‘useable’?

The basic lack of transparency on nuclear questions and the illogical stance offered by the government generates large numbers of questions, all of which demand closer examination.

Illegal

Britain is not only a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which demands ‘effective measures’ to end the ‘arms race’ (Article VI) but it is one of three ‘Official Depositories’ of the NPT. This status demands exemplary conduct and action from such states.

The decision to increase the number of warheads appears to be in breach of Article VI and Britain’s status and could, therefore, be illegal under international law. It will be left to international lawyers and the other parties to the NPT to decide whether or not this is technically the case, and it should be noted that several NPT signatories are already in breach. Whatever the material legal status, Britain’s decision will clearly act against the interests of non-proliferation and will surely induce other states - both nuclear armed and non-nuclear - to assess their own positions.

The TPNW and the V2 Rocket

by Joachim Wernicke

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

On January 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) came into force 90 days after the 50th of 193 UN member states had ratified it. As part of international humanitarian martial law, the treaty prohibits its participating states from any activity related to nuclear weapons. Following a request from the US government, the German government stayed away from the negotiations on the treaty and has so far refused to sign it.

There is a fundamental historic connection between the TPNW projecting the end of the nuclear weapons age, and – hardly noted – its roots at the Baltic seaside village of Peenemünde (Germany), the ‘birth place’ of the V2 ballistic rocket of World War II. There, in 1937, a new Army Research Institute had been established with the task of creating a long-range artillery rocket named A4. This was a new development, namely the official repeal of international law: The Hague Land Warfare Regulations of 1907 – with the German Reich as a member state – which forbade the bombardment of undefended residential areas. When German warplanes bombed southern England in World War I from 1917, the victorious Allied powers then rightly demanded that those who carried them out be extradited as war criminals. With its firing range of 300 km, the A4 rocket was an innovation as an artillery weapon. But due to its kilometer-wide hit spread, it was obviously militarily useless and could only be used for terrorizing the civilian population, i.e. for war crimes, not criminal misconduct by individuals, but for the first time as an official state program. This fact led to the later propagandistic renaming of A4 as V2, ‘V’ standing for Vergeltungswaffe meaning retaliation weapon. The V2 rocket (as with its twin, the V1 cruise missile) was only used against residential areas, mainly in England.

In World War II, the bombing of cities was perfected, initially by Germany, but then increased by Great Britain and the USA. A new aspect was the total destruction of cities by the large- area fire storm, with thousands of dead and injured, initially achieved with incendiary and high-explosive bombs, then in 1945 for the first time with nuclear bombs. ‘Humanitarian law’ seemed to have been forgotten.

Initially, the US had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. An immense arms industry had grown up there during the war. After 1945 it continued unabated, with the nuclear sector as an additional business area. Military budgets increased year-on-year. The air force, the navy and – in the end – the army competed for the allocation of funds. The Soviet Union under Stalin, which had been a war ally shortly before, served as a new enemy because the old enemy Hitler had been defeated. In 1947 the US Air Force first planned nuclear attacks against Moscow and other Soviet cities. War crimes had become the core of military strategy.

Stalin countered this with his own development of nuclear weapons. With the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the USA lost its monopoly. A nuclear arms race began. The Soviet military, without air bases on American soil, relied on the replication and further development of the V2 missile as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons, with the aim of a nuclear ICBM. At the same time, the US strengthened its air force and its global airbases. It was not until years later that they too succeeded with the ICBM, also a further development of the V2.

The nuclear explosive yields were increased on both sides in the 1950s. From the range of thousands of tons of conventional explosives (TNT) – as in the destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 – they rose to millions of tons. Such a bomb would have been able to completely destroy a metropolis like Moscow or New York, with death tolls in the millions. More and more nuclear-armed rockets and missiles replaced the manned nuclear bombers.

Generations since then grew up with the basic uncertainty that a nuclear war could wipe out all higher life forms on earth. Governments, democratic or not, advocated the belief that victory in nuclear war is impossible, so it would never happen. At the end of the 1970s, the number of nuclear warheads had reached an irrational peak of over 40,000, with over 95% in the arsenals of the USA and the Soviet Union.

In this situation, the humanitarian international law of war spoke up again in 1977, in the form of an Additional Protocol to the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1949: Indiscriminate attacks, i.e. attacks that cannot distinguish between civilians and the military, became prohibited. This is especially true for nuclear weapons. But their owner states refused to recognize this, and their entourage followed.

By 1980, advances in electronics had drastically reduced the hit spread of long-range weapons, down to several meters, regardless of the firing range. This was a sensational innovation: every shot was a direct hit. It made it possible for the first time to reliably hit and destroy deep underground command bunkers with nuclear bombs. Unlike in the vast United States, the Soviet command structure was (and the Russian one now is) locally concentrated in the greater Moscow area. A surprise attack, known as a decapitation strike, by a salvo of a few dozen rockets from Western Europe seemed technically possible. It was about a so-called medium range of about 2,000 km firing range, with ballistic flight times of about 10 minutes. For the attacked victim, this would be too short for a reliable assessment of the situation, let alone for commanding the type and scope of a counter-strike. So victory in nuclear war seemed possible.

The corresponding new US Pershing-2 missiles were deployed in West Germany – and nowhere else – from 1983. Open and unprotected in mobile forest positions in the Federal Republic of Germany, the missiles, being the most important targets, in the event of a Soviet attack would have been destroyed within minutes. Obviously they were only good for a surprising first strike: “Use them or lose them”.

The Soviet side countered this US deployment in Central Europe with new short-range SS- 23 nuclear missiles in the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with a flight time of only 5 minutes. A nuclear duel was armed, with the full risk of destruction of Central Europe. Electronic warning systems watched each other. A computer failure could have started a ‘limited nuclear war’. In 1987 the US-Soviet treaty to ban land-based medium-range missiles (INF treaty) eliminated this danger. In 1991 the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russia as the legal successor and the heir to Soviet nuclear weapons.

The majority of states in the world were less and less willing to accept the threat to their existence from the nine nuclear-weapon states, including the USA in the lead, followed by Russia. In 1996 the UN Court of Justice (ICJ) declared the threat and use of nuclear weapons to be contrary to international law. The nuclear weapon states did not care. But in 2017 122 of the 193 states in the UN finally voted for a treaty (TPNW) that outlawed all activities related to nuclear weapons, including possession. As mentioned, this treaty has now entered into force, but only for those states that have ratified it. At that time there were 51 states, including Austria and Ireland. All nuclear weapon states and their entourage – including Germany – had stayed away from the UN negotiations. So far, the German government has refused to, against the will of the majority of its citizens. US nuclear weapons are still stored on German soil. With a German signature on the TPNW contract, that would be over.

The US military-industrial complex costs ten times more than the Russian one every year. Nevertheless, Russia is keeping up with the United States in terms of nuclear weapons, at the same absurd level of over 5,000 warheads, with the corresponding costs. That is difficult to understand, because the new US competitor, China, is declaredly not participating in the nuclear arms race. China considers its 20 times smaller number of warheads – around 300 – to be sufficient against the USA. Why doesn’t Russia do the same?

The nuclear duel of the 1980s is now returning to Central Europe. Since 1999 NATO has been advancing to Russia’s borders. In 2019, US President Trump quit the 1987 INF treaty banning land-based medium-range weapons. Since then, the US military has been procuring precisely such new long-range missiles in non-defensible hypersonic technology on a large scale, with ranges of at least 2,000 km, i.e. from Germany deep into Russia. The focus is on the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon of the US Army and the Conventional Prompt Strike missile of the US Navy. The US nuclear weapons laboratory Sandia is developing the model of a precise hypersonic warhead common to the Army and Navy. So how credible is the claim that the warhead will only be equipped with non-nuclear weapons? Is a decapitation strike against Moscow being considered again? The new US missiles should be ready for use from 2023.

From then on, the nuclear duel will probably be armed again.

In 2018 the American government published a new Nuclear Posture Review, with an emphasis on “low yield” (less than 20 kilotons, comparable to the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945). The US Defender Europe maneuver, the largest in 25 years, began in early 2020. It moved through Germany and Poland towards the Russian border. The corona pandemic stopped this marching earlier than planned. In another maneuver in August 2020, American B- 52 nuclear bombers flew over the non-NATO member Ukraine. A US naval base has been in operation in Ukraine on the Black Sea since 2017 (Ochakiv). All of this may be viewed as protecting Western Europe or as a preparation by the United States for war in Europe.

Russia reacted promptly to President Trump’s termination of the INF Treaty in 2019 by deploying SS-26 (Iskander-M) nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave. This area around the former German city of Königsberg in East Prussia was annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II. The small area is now sandwiched between the NATO states Poland and Lithuania. Why are the missiles not in the safety of the Russian heartland? Obviously because of the shorter flight time. A look at the map reveals what the rockets in Kaliningrad should be aiming at: The concentration of US military bases in West Germany around 1,000 km away, with a focus on Ramstein, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden and Bitburg, ballistic flight time from Kaliningrad around 7 minutes. The neighboring NATO states France, Denmark and the Czech Republic do not allow US military bases, as of course the neutral states Austria and Switzerland.

In order to destroy the deep underground US command bunkers, nuclear ground explosions at least “low yield” are required, because even the largest conventional bombs are too weak for this. In 2020, the Russian government published a new directive for the use of nuclear weapons. It can be read as a warning to Germany. In the German public, these facts have received little attention.

The SS-26 missile weighs 4.6 tons, with a 0.7 ton conventional warhead. The associated range is given as 500 km. A nuclear “low yield” explosive device weighs only a few tens of kilograms. A firing range of 1,000 km should therefore be possible from Kaliningrad – with the SS-26 or another type of missile from the Russian arsenal.

Will the American anti-missile system SM-3, which will be deployed near Slupsk (Poland) in the near future, be able to intercept rockets on the way from Kaliningrad to West Germany? No, this is not technically feasible, especially if the rockets maneuver only slightly during the flight.

At this point, Peenemünde comes into view as a symbolic place: Kaliningrad is located at the end of the former Baltic Sea test range for V2 rockets from Peenemünde to the east. It seems like an irony of history that over seven decades later Germany is threatened from there by nuclear missiles of a basically similar design to the V2, and not because of the German military, but on someone else’s account: namely because of the US Forces bases in the western part of the country.

The German signature under the TPNW, following the example of neighboring Austria, would end this threat. Not only will the 20 or so US nuclear airdrop bombs then have to be withdrawn from the Büchel airfield (Eifel): the US Armed Forces do not differentiate between conventional and nuclear components. With the German signature under the TPNW, the presence or transit of such conventional-nuclear forces on or over German territory would be prohibited in the future. This applies equally to the French and British military, because these two NATO states also maintain nuclear weapons. Incidentally, by the 2-plus-4 treaty of 1990 the area of the former (East-) German Democratic Republic has been declared a nuclear weapons free zone.

In the “heyday” of Peenemünde in the 1930s and early 1940s, there was still a general mood throughout Europe that a large state could not do without military defense. Today hardly anyone will deny that the densely populated Germany can no longer be defended militarily, not only in view of the state of the art of weapon technology, but especially in view of the highly centralized public supplies and, effective as “bomb amplifiers”, nuclear power stations and large chemical plants as well as the lack of any civil defense. Across all political forces in Germany today there has to be assumed accordance on one point: Under no circumstances any war weapon effects in Germany – by whomever, hostile or allied. Without the protection of the TPNW, however, this would not be achievable in Germany’s geographic location.

Peenemünde, located in what is now a holiday area, is home of a well visited technical-historical museum. The missile trail that once moved towards and which today might emanate from Kaliningrad presents meritorious occasion to make the restoration of humanitarian international law by the TPNW a public exhibition topic, precisely at the place where in 1937, as a worldwide precedent, the state organized dismantling of international martial law had begun.

Federal elections will take place in Germany in autumn 2021. The Green Party, which emerged in 1980 as a result of the wide public resistance against nuclear armament, is considered to be the likely coalition partner of the next German government. Will signing the TPNW be a non-negotiable coalition condition? Or will the temptation of ministerial posts be stronger than any principle?

Nuclear sharing: the facts

NATO isn’t particularly shy about stating the basic facts about its role with regards to nuclear weapons.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

The ‘NATO Nuclear Deterrence’ fact sheet, available on NATOs website, states the following:

Three NATO members - the United States, France and the United Kingdom – have nuclear weapons.

The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the Alliance’s security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.

NATO’s nuclear deterrence also relies on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and supporting capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies. A number of European NATO members have dual-capable aircraft dedicated to the delivery of these US nuclear weapons. The United States maintains full custody of these weapons at all times. These “nuclear-sharing arrangements” predate and are fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [emphasis added]

From characterising the combined nuclear forces of the US, UK and France as ‘NATO’s nuclear deterrence’ to confirming that supposedly non-nuclear armed states can ‘deliver’ - in the euphemism favoured by advocated of nuclear weapons - NATO is proud to confirm the basic extent of its ability to wipe life from the surface of the planet.

What NATO is less keen to reveal are the locations and extent of the US nuclear weapons in Europe. So where are they, how many of them are there, why are they there and what risks to they present to local populations and to Europe as a whole?

Where and how many?

The location of these US weapons has been an ‘open secret’ for some time. More recently, NATO itself revealed the locations after accidentally posting a report on its website. Here’s a run-down:

Netherlands: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in The Netherlands at the Volkel airbase.

Belgium: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in Belgium at the Kleine Brogel airbase. Belgium is also home to NATOs HQ.

Germany: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored at the Buchel airbase in Germany. Germany is also home to a large number of US armed forces.

Italy: Around 70 nuclear bombs are stored at the Aviano and Ghedi-Torre airbases in Italy. Some of these bombs were previously stored at RAF Lakenheath in the UK prior to their withdrawal in 2008.

Turkey: It is estimated that 50 nuclear bombs are stored at the Incirlick airbase in Turkey.

Total: up to 180.

Why are they here?

Dates and extent of deployment varies, but the presence of these weapons in Europe can be thought of in two ways: first, as a ‘hangover’ from the ‘Cold War’ and second, as a demonstration of the continuing centrality of nuclear weapons to NATO’s overall strategy for Europe and neighbouring regions.

In the case of Germany, it has been suggested that ‘nuclear sharing’ was initiated after threats from the German government to pursue their own nuclear weapon developments. The location of US nuclear bombs in Turkey is a clear consequence of the strategic importance placed on the region to the south of that country.

The presence of US nuclear bombs in Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy is clear demonstration that these states are closely tied into the US/NATO military alliance.

What are the risks?

Many people feel that the presence of such weapons creates a ‘target’ of potential aggressors. Moreover, nuclear material - in whatever form - is never ‘risk free’. The dangers of malfunction in an atomic weapons are all the more pronounced. This is why a growing number of people demand an end to ‘nuclear sharing’ and the removal of these bombs.

Such a move would be an important first step towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone across the whole of Europe.

NATO 2030: United for a new era

By Rae Street

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

NATO recently commissioned a report on the future of NATO from ten experts appointed by the Secretary- General, Jens Stoltenberg. It opens with congratulations to themselves, as according to the authors, NATO is the ‘most successful alliance in history’. I guess it depends on how you define ‘success’. Provoking conflict by expansion? Not short on arrogance, the report claims that it is ‘indispensable’ with its ‘peace ensuring role’ in a world of ‘competing great powers’. Throughout the document there are references to ‘shared principles among the democratic institutions of the Atlantic community’. You might ask yourself about these shared values which include say from the USA positioning military bases in almost every country on the globe or looking to develop weapons in space or internally still in many states carrying out the death penalty.

The report identifies 13 challenges and threats of which top of the list are Russia and China. The whole report is steeped in Cold War thinking. Russia is a ‘declining power’ by ‘economic and social measures’ but it takes an aggressive stance and is ‘the main threat facing NATO in this decade’. An even bigger threat is China which poses ‘important challenges to our security’. There is also a need to ‘assess Russia and China cooperation’. While in no way being apologists for the regimes in Russia and China, talking up the military threats will not lead to stability in the world. The world this report says is characterised by ‘authoritarian states seeking to expand power and influence’. At the same time NATO is looking itself to further expansion: to bring in Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia into the alliance. It continues to make agreements with countries around the Pacific and Indian Ocean to face out China. The UK’s part in this will be to send an aircraft carrier to the Asia Pacific this spring, while the USA is increasing its military presence in the region. The US Trident nuclear armed fleet (Trident is ‘integrated’ into NATO) is now mainly based at Bangor on the west coast of the USA, having moved from the east coast, with China in its sites. There is also mention of the threat from the ‘South’. But nowhere is it made clear what this vague mention of the ’South’ means. Is that a reference to asylum seekers? It was NATO which was involved in wars against Libya, Afghanistan, in Iraq and Syria from where people now flee.

Even more chilling is the report on future of its nuclear forces. It proposes strengthening its forces in Europe on its eastern flank., providing them with ‘adequate nuclear capabilities, suitable for the situation created with the end of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces’. What is omitted is that it was the USA under President Trump which tore up the Treaty. In other words, the ten experts have asked the USA to speed up the deployment in Europe not only of the new B6-12 nuclear bombs, but also new medium-range nuclear missiles, similar to the 1980s Euromissiles.

The experts also want in future to ‘continue and revitalize nuclear sharing agreements’, which allowed non-nuclear countries – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey – to be ready for the use of nuclear weapons under US command. This has always been against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but as with all the other contradiction is the report, the experts claim they are committed to the NPT. The NPT states that the nuclear armed states should disarm in ‘good faith’. There is no good faith in NATO. Moreover, NATO blocked its member states from joining the negotiations for the UN Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which came into force on 22nd January thus making nuclear weapons illegal under international law. NATO cares not a jot for that – they claim it is not international law.

In the report there is a section entitled, Women, Peace and Security. But its idea of including women is to increase more women in the military exercises and operations. It ignores other aspects of the UNSC resolution 1325 which proposed more women in decision making on conflict, on conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace building. But then it is a military alliance which is not going to be genuinely concerned with conflict resolution even though at the end of the report there is a brief reference to solving conflicts peacefully. There is also a reference in the report to climate change. In future NATO wants to adopt ‘green technologies’. Yet another contradiction in terms. Surely expanding its military hardware, building new planes can only increase carbon emissions?

Last, but not least, there has never been a NATO report which didn’t demand more money from member states. The report is no exception. It is essential that all allies maintain their commitment, made in 2014, to increase their military spending to at least 2% of GDP by 2024. There is no acknowledgement of the fact that increasingly people round the world are looking to decrease military funding and redirecting the money to health, social welfare and the climate change emergency. More and more people can see that the replacement of Trident, costing the people of the UK £205 billion, can do nothing against the threat of the corona virus. But, of course, NATO would want more money as behind it stands the military industrial complex. War is good business. Member states should pay up to enjoy what the report calls ‘the benefits of being under the NATO umbrella’. That ‘umbrella’ is not a benefit to the world, but a grave danger.

First published in the Morning Star

Is 'No First Strike' on the cards?

According to several reports, Joe Biden has assembled a new ‘national security team’ that looks set to ‘review decades of military doctrine.’

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

Amongst the issues on the table is that of ‘No First Strike’. Current nuclear doctrine repudiates the idea that the US should never initiate nuclear war: the US ‘reserves the right’ to launch a nuclear onslaught whenever it chooses to do so. Evidence that ‘No First Strike’ is being seriously considered comes from the fact that numerous figures from the Trump administration and other critics of arms control have come out in opposition to it.

According to a report in Politico, Biden’s new team includes a number of individuals with connections to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, an arm of the ‘Council for a Viable World’ which aims to “reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons.” If true and if this team can seriously push for wide-ranging changes to US nuclear policy, then the peace movements should encourage them all the way.

Likewise, the peace movements in Europe should use this opportunity to raise questions about ‘No First Strike’. In the UK, for example, there is some reticence in the Ministry of Defence and government to openly talk about nuclear posture. Like the US, the UK ‘reserves the right’ to launch nuclear weapons whenever it sees fit. This fact is ‘news’ to some politicians who have never considered the realities of Britain’s nuclear weapons. If Biden’s team is able to push through a thorough discussion of ‘No First Strike’ or even write it into US nuclear doctrine, then some significant pressure should be raised in the UK for its government to follow suit. Regardless of the progress or otherwise of US deliberations, there should be a thorough exposure of the UK’s nuclear posture, its dangers, limits and contradictions. Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d) has made an invaluable contribution to such efforts in his book, Why Trident? (Spokesman, 2020).

It is overwhelmingly likely that those ‘reformers’ in the new security administration will meet massive challenges and obstacles to progress, despite whatever support they enjoy from the President himself. The political interests of those at the heart of the military establishment are deeply entrenched and unlikely to be defeated without a protracted struggle. Meanwhile, even raising the question of ‘No First Strike’ is a positive step.

NATO and the TPNW

A recent report from Chatham House titled ‘NATO and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ has been released which warns NATO allies that “the TPNW is here to stay” and that “a focus on opposing the TPNW may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament”

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

There’s quite a bit to unpick from these two statements but it is most likely unnecessary to spend too much time pointing out the severe problem with suggesting that NATO is committed to global nuclear disarmament. More interesting is the fact that the TPNW has been recognised as a problem for NATO and the suggestion that it should stop publicly opposing it for fear of exposing itself.

The report rehearses NATO’s public objections to the TPNW which amount to: claims that it undermines the NPT; TPNW’s obvious “incompatibility with existing NATO commitments”; “work with partner counties” and the spectre of “potential secondary effects on NATO”.

These concerns are reflected not only in the repeated efforts of NATO member states, headed by the US, to pressure non-nuclear states against signing, ratifying or otherwise engaging with the TPNW but in the rather ‘undiplomatic’ refusal of the vast majority of NATO member states to engage in any way, shape or form with the multilateral processes that have taken the Treaty to this point.

The report concludes that “Now that NATO has made its position on the TPNW clear, it is important not to overemphasize the issue in its overall messaging on support for disarmament. On NATO’s side, more nuance would be helpful as the Alliance seeks to maintain a modern deterrence posture and demonstrate tangible support for nuclear disarmament.”

There is clearly a gaping hole in the logic of this statement, unless you appreciate that what NATO means by ‘nuclear disarmament’ is that ‘everyone else should disarm apart from us.’ Such an argument can only confirm what the peace movements have long argued: NATO is a ‘Nuclear Armed Alliance’ and will continue to be one for as long as the nuclear powers maintain their aggressive military posture.

'France must take responsibility'

Bouzid Boufrioua, a senior milliary official in Algeria, has called on France to take responsibility for the extensive nuclear waste left in the Sahara following nuclear tests in the 1960s.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

following nuclear tests in the 1960s. He said that: “sixty years after its nuclear tests, France still refuses to reveal the location of its nuclear waste and fully compensate the victims of disease caused by radiation ... On 7 July 2017, 122 member states of the UN General Assembly ratified a new treaty to ban nuclear weapons ... [The treaty] clearly and explicitly recognises the ‘polluter pays’ principle; this is the first time that the international community has called on the nuclear-armed states to rectify the errors of the past.”

Boufrioua is quite right and his words highlight an important aspect of the TPNW: that even though nuclear-armed states have refused to engage with it, let alone sign or ratify it, the treaty itself brings some important points into international law.

Article 7, point 6 of the TPNW states: “Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected State Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.”

A big question will be how can the ‘polluter pays’ principle embodied in the TPNW be put into effect? The precise answer to this is a matter for international lawyers, but a non-expert reading of this clause would suggest that it only pertains to those states which have signed the TPNW. However, this should not be a discouragement to the peace movement. Is it possible to construct a set of precise and targeted demands based on this clause? Can those state parties to the TPNW like Austria and Ireland, who - like France - are also members of the European Union find a means to raise these issues in the European Parliament and European Commission? They should certainly be encouraged to.

France is not the only nuclear power which must be made to take responsibility. The British Nuclear Test Veterans Association continues to campaign for restitution for the British nuclear test veterans who took part in the British and American nuclear tests at the Montebello Islands, Christmas Island, Malden Island and Maralinga & Emu Field, South Australia. Local communities, who were often simply ignored by the nuclear testing countries, their environment and lives were also victim to tests.

For example, Operation Grapple was a set of four British nuclear weapons test series of early atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs carried out in 1957 and 1958 at Malden Island and Kiritimati (Christmas Island) in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in the Pacific Ocean (modern Kiribati) as part of the British hydrogen bomb programme. Nine nuclear explosions were initiated, culminating in the United Kingdom becoming the third recognised possessor of thermonuclear weapons and the restoration of the nuclear Special Relationship with the United States with the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement.

For a place at the ‘nuclear table’, Britain - like France - staged explosive nuclear tests without sufficient regard for the longer-term impact. The nuclear powers must all take responsibility.

Atomic Scientists: It's still 100 seconds to midnight

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has maintained the ‘Doomsday Clock’ at 100 seconds to midnight.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

There had been some expectation that the removal of Donald Trump from his White House office would be sufficient to move the hands of the clock away from midnight. This was not to be. Citing multiple factors ranging from the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic to the accelerating climate catastrophe to explain their decision, the Atomic Scientists also raised the following warning about the danger of nuclear weapons:

‘Accelerating nuclear programs in multiple countries moved the world into less stable and manageable territory last year. Development of hypersonic glide vehicles, ballistic missile defenses, and weapons-delivery systems that can flexibly use conventional or nuclear warheads may raise the probability of miscalculation in times of tension. Events like the deadly assault earlier this month on the US Capitol renewed legitimate concerns about national leaders who have sole control of the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear nations, however, have ignored or undermined practical and available diplomatic and security tools for managing nuclear risks. By our estimation, the potential for the world to stumble into nuclear war—an ever-present danger over the last 75 years—increased in 2020. An extremely dangerous global failure to address existential threats—what we called “the new abnormal” in 2019—tightened its grip in the nuclear realm in the past year, increasing the likelihood of catastrophe.’

Speedy moves by Biden’s White House to reengage with certain diplomatic and non-aggressive means to bolster nuclear security must be welcomed and may well contribute to a de-escalation of risk. However, if such instances do not develop into an overall policy of establishing greater nuclear security then an opportunity to make the world a safer place will be missed. With respect to developments in weapons technology, the Atomic Scientists warned:

‘In the past year, countries with nuclear weapons continued to spend vast sums on nuclear modernization programs, even as they allowed proven risk-reduction achievements in arms control and diplomacy to wither or die. Nuclear weapons and weapons-delivery platforms capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads continued to proliferate, while destabilizing “advances” in the space and cyber realms, in hypersonic missiles, and in missile defenses continued.’

If speedy measures are not taken to halt the growing arms-race - if the hypersonic missiles, new warheads and military deployments are not reversed - then every diplomatic effort will be a sticking plaster rather than a cure.

The combination of measures is essential because of what the Atomic Scientists identify as a ‘threat multiplier’: “the continuing corruption of the information ecosphere on which democracy and public decision-making depend.” END Info and writers for The Spokesman have described the configuration of risks as being a ‘global tinderbox’, where one false move - one misunderstanding or misapprehension - could spell disaster for human life. This threat multiplier doesn’t just exist within states but between states. This is why positive moves in one respect must be met with positive moves across the board. In their ‘wake-up call’, the Atomic Scientists argue that the following steps should be taken to save humanity from existential ruin:

* The US and Russian presidents should, upon extension of New START, launch follow-on talks for more ambitious and comprehensive limits of nuclear weapons and delivery systems ...

* US President Joe Biden can show leadership by reducing US reliance on nuclear weapons via limits on their roles, missions, and platforms, and by decreasing budgets accordingly. The United States should declare its commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons and persuade allies and rivals to agree that no-first-use is a step toward security and stability.

These will be essential and, as importantly, achievable steps to massively reduce nuclear risks. One thing missing from this list of requests is for the nuclear armed states to constructively engage with the process now underway thanks to the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

New START extended

Biden must now reverse Trump’s ‘Bonfire of Treaties’

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

The agreed extension of New START, which places limits on the numbers of both US and Russian intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, is a very welcome development. Does it mark a new phase in nuclear agreements? If so, why is this important?

Under the Trump administration, a whole series of treaties and agreements went up in flames: a ‘Bonfire of Treaties’. This was massively destabilising in the context of increased nuclear tensions generally, an aggressive and unpredictable US military posture and a global shift in power away from US dominance. US actions can be understood as an attempt to maintain and extend ‘power’ by a risky effort to both re-write the ‘rules’ from a time when it enjoyed unrivalled influence and to ‘discipline’ strategic rivals into conformity. Without doubt, this was a very risky course, one which generated a ‘global tinderbox’ in international affairs.

As a consequence the ‘Iran Deal’ (JCPOA), which allowed Iran some relief from threat, and the Intermediate-range Forces Treaty (INF), which prevented the deployment of a whole class of nuclear missiles in Europe, were destroyed along with a series of other important agreements. Now that the new Biden administration has accepted Russia’s offer of a five year extension to New START, immediate steps must be taken to revive the JCPOA and INF Treaty as a means of reducing tensions.

The agreed extension of New START offers some hope, but official announcements from the US State Department strike a worrying tone. “President Biden pledged to keep the American people safe from nuclear threats by restoring the U.S. leadership on arms control and nonproliferation” announced Antony J Blinken, Secretary of State. Blinken’s statement reads as if New START was purely a means to reduce the numbers of Russian intercontinental missiles rather than a joint agreement to limit both US and Russian missiles in this classification. A bit of clarity on this point would suggest at least a bit of honesty. Blinken continues: “President Biden has made clear that the New START Treaty extension is only the beginning of our efforts to address 21st century security challenges. The United States will use the time provided by the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons. We will also pursue arms control to reduce the dangers from China’s modern and growing arsenal. The United States is committed to effective arms control that enhances stability, transparency and predictability while reducing the risks of costly, dangerous arms races.” [emphasis added]

It’s noticeable that Blinken says nothing about the US’s dangerous nuclear weapons or the need to reverse their ‘internal proliferation’ and ‘lack of control’. ‘Why is America getting a new $100 billion nuclear weapon?’ asks Elisabeth Eaves in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (8 Feb 21). The Russians and Chinese may well be asking the same question. “America is building a new weapon of mass destruction, a nuclear missile the length of a bowling lane. It will be able to travel some 6,000 miles, carrying a warhead more than 20 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It will be able to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single shot. The US Air Force plans to order more than 600 of them” writes Eaves.

The extension of New START is undeniably for the good. Resurrecting the JCPOA, INF and similar agreements and treaties would make the world a safer place. Biden should work towards this goal. But if Biden’s aim is to simply re-engineer a ‘nuclear order’ that punishes and restrains ‘strategic competitors’ on the one hand and ‘aspiring nuclear powers’ on the other whilst the US continues to plough billions of dollars into ever-more destructive nuclear weapons capabilities, then the world will become a more dangerous place.

If Biden fails to engage in serious diplomacy with Russia and China and instead continues to talk up the risks posed by both states, then what course will Russia and China take? In particular, if Biden continues on the ‘New Cold War’ route with respect to China, then what does he expect will happen? Russia and China will meet like-for-like and continue to develop their nuclear capabilities. Others, not yet nuclear powers, may well pursue their own route to ‘nuclear security’. The world cannot afford the risks that would come with such a course of action.

UK military spending: preparing for ‘future wars’, fuelling the arms race

On Thursday 19 November 2020 the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, addressed the House of Commons to provide an update on the work of the ‘Integrated Review’ into defence, security, foreign and diplomatic work.

Mr Johnson’s update was preceded by widespread media reports of significant new spending on the UK’s armed forces: a total of £16.5bn, which amounts to a real terms increase above previously declared spending of £7bn by 2024-25. This is an enormous amount of money to dedicate to weapons of death and destruction at a time when the health, care and social systems of the UK are in crisis and when poverty, hunger and misery stalk the land after ten years of government imposed austerity.

This spending commitment comes before the conclusion of the ‘Integrated Review’ which is due in early 2021 and which may well include further increases in spending.

Just as worrying as this mis-use of money is the political tone struck by the Prime Minister in his statement, which is laced with science fiction- like talk of artificial intelligence, drones, “directed energy weapons”, “inexhaustible lasers”, cyber war and the rest.

Each and every one of these references to putting new technologies to war signals an intensification of risk.

Peace and anti-war activists have been alert to these risks for some time. As the editorial of The Spokesman 141 - Global Tinderbox argued:

“Between 2002 and 2016, the top 100 weapons manufacturers and ‘military service’ companies logged 38% growth in global sales. In 2016, these sales – excluding Chinese companies – amounted to $375 billion, turning $60 billion profit. Between 1998 and 2011, the Pentagon’s budget grew in real terms by 91% while defence industry profits quadrupled.

In the 1970s, investment in the ‘information technology’ sector stood at $17 billion. By 2017, investment in this sector exceeded $700 billion. In the same year, Apple’s market capitalisation stood at $730 billion, Google stood at $581 billion, and Microsoft stood at $497 billion. Meanwhile, Exxon Mobile – the highest placed ‘industrial’ company – had a market capitalisation of $344 billion. By comparison, the arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin had a capitalisation of around $321 billion and Rolls-Royce $21 billion at the end of 2017.

Whilst the United States and other countries continue to purchase – and use – vast quantities of ‘conventional’ weaponry, the extraordinary figures quoted above occurred alongside the unleashing of a ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, powered by significant leaps in capability in computing, robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, ‘autonomous’ vehicles and the rest. Ever greater sums are being spent on military and policing applications of the ‘fruits’ of this ‘Revolution’. So much so, that the sociologist William I. Robinson identifies a trend towards what he terms ‘militarised accumulation’ as a ‘major source of state-organised profit-making’.

If this trend endures – as it surely will, unless arrested by concerted political action – then not only will ‘battlefields’ of the future look like a science fiction dystopia, but the processes that presently blur the lines between ‘wartime’ and ‘peacetime’ will surely accelerate. At what point will a large-scale computer hacking operation spill over into a ‘hot’ war? How much surveillance, how many drones, how many robotic weapons can be deployed before critical mass is reached? How many things must go wrong – and in what sequence – before these embodiments of what Mike Cooley terms our ‘delinquent genius’ might bring an end to us all?

There is already a technological ‘arms race’ and with each new drone, autonomous field gun, hack or military satellite, this race intensifies. Any such intensification will drastically increase the risks of wide-scale military confrontation, including the prospect of nuclear war.

How should such risks be addressed? An important step is to understand the scope of the problem and the present realities of how these technologies have already been deployed ...

The alarm has been sounded, but what are we to do? How can society ensure that artificial intelligence, for example, is put to work for human good, rather than making war? How to harness the miracles of robotic technology to improve, rather than destroy, our planet? How can we guarantee that nanotechnology and biotechnology are put to work for the preservation and not the eradication of life? In answering these questions, we should utilise the work already under way to develop ideas about socially useful production and defence diversification. These are just some of the very pressing questions we now must face.”

Compare these warnings to the contents of Mr Johnson’s update:

“... For decades, British Governments have trimmed and cheese-pared our defence budget. If we go on like this, we risk waking up to discover that our armed forces — the pride of Britain — have fallen below the minimum threshold of viability, and, once lost, they can never be regained. That outcome would not only be craven; it would jeopardise the security of the British people, amounting to a dereliction of duty for any Prime Minister.

... Based on our assessment of the international situation and our foreign policy goals, I have decided that the era of cutting our defence budget must end, and it ends now. I am increasing defence spending by £24.1 billion over the next four years.

... I have done this in the teeth of the pandemic, amid every other demand on our resources, because the defence of the realm and the safety of the British people must come first.

... Everything we do in this country — every job, every business, even how we shop and what we eat—depends on a basic minimum of global security, with a web of feed pipes, of oxygen pipes, that must be kept open: shipping lanes, a functioning internet, safe air corridors, reliable undersea cables, and tranquillity in distant straits.

... But extending British influence requires a once-in-a-generation modernisation of our armed forces, and now is the right time to press ahead, because emerging technologies, visible on the horizon, will make the returns from defence investment infinitely greater. We have a chance to break free from the vicious circle whereby we ordered ever decreasing numbers of ever more expensive items of military hardware, squandering billions along the way. The latest advances will multiply the fighting power of every warship, aircraft and infantry unit many times over, and the prizes will go to the swiftest and most agile nations, not necessarily the biggest. We can achieve as much as British ingenuity and expertise allow.

We will need to act speedily to remove or reduce less relevant capabilities. This will allow our new investment to be focused on the technologies that will revolutionise warfare, forging our military assets into a single network designed to overcome the enemy. A soldier in hostile territory will be alerted to a distant ambush by sensors on satellites or drones, instantly transmitting a warning, using artificial intelligence to devise the optimal response and offering an array of options, from summoning an airstrike to ordering a swarm attack by drones, or paralysing the enemy with cyber-weapons. New advances will surmount the old limits of logistics. Our warships and combat vehicles will carry “directed energy weapons”, destroying targets with inexhaustible lasers. For them, the phrase “out of ammunition” will become redundant.

Nations are racing to master this new doctrine of warfare, and our investment is designed to place Britain among the winners.

The returns will go far beyond our armed forces, and from aerospace to autonomous vehicles, these technologies have a vast array of civilian applications, opening up new vistas of economic progress, creating 10,000 jobs every year — 40,000 in total—levelling up across our country, and reinforcing our Union. We are going to use our extra defence spending to restore Britain’s position as the foremost naval power in Europe, taking forward our plans for eight Type 26 and five Type 31 frigates, and support ships to supply our carriers.

... We will reshape our Army for the age of networked warfare, allowing better equipped soldiers to deploy more quickly, and strengthening the ability of our special forces to operate covertly against our most sophisticated adversaries.

The security and intelligence agencies will continue to protect us around the clock from terrorism and new and evolving threats. We will invest another £1.5 billion in military research and development, designed to master the new technologies of warfare. We will establish a new centre dedicated to artificial intelligence, and a new RAF space command, launching British satellites and our first rocket from Scotland in 2022. I can announce that we have established a National Cyber Force, combining our intelligence agencies and service personnel, which is already operating in cyberspace against terrorism, organised crime and hostile state activity. And the RAF will receive a new fighter system, harnessing artificial intelligence and drone technology to defeat any adversary in air-to-air combat.”

* * *

‘Opposition’ parties welcomed the spending commitments and the voices of concern were thin on the ground. There were certainly no speeches warning of the dangers of accelerating the introduction of new technology into weapon systems, no concerns expressed about allowing ‘artificial intelligence’ to determine targets and weapon choice, no calls to consider the impact of further blurring the lines between war and peace.

Russia’s 2020 Nuclear Directive

Joachim Wernicke

In June 2020 the Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new directive titled Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The document mentions Russia’s allies: members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO) founded in 2002. CSTO members are Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The central concern of the directive is to address the “risks and threats to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence”, such as: the “build-up by a potential adversary of the general purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters.”

One example of this: NATO troops and equipment including nuclear weapon carriers concentrated in countries bordering Russia or Belarus. Not surprisingly, these adversary countries are seen as nuclear targets by Russia.

Expressly mentioned are the “adjacent waters”, meaning the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea. Not surprisingly, the Russians are expecting US Navy units to appear in these waters with ships that can launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles. No distinction is made between conventional and nuclear warheads of such weapons. Other concerns include:

“Deployment by states which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary, of missile defence systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy weapons;

- development and deployment of missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space.”

These points obviously refer to Romania and Poland which permit US bases which house missile defence systems. The latter point hints to Germany which is about to home an entirely new “NATO Space Center” at the US air base at Ramstein, one year after the US military established its “Space Force” as a separate military branch.

“Possession by states of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as means of delivery of such weapons;

- uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture;

- deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.”

These points evidently refer to the three nuclear weapons states in NATO (USA, Great Britain and France). But also the non-nuclear-weapon states Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey are included, due to their participation in US nuclear sharing: These five states keep special airplanes as nuclear delivery means, prepared and exercising for the dropping of US nuclear bombs. Thus they physically become – even if only temporary – possessors of nuclear weapons, in violation of their obligations from membership in the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) of 1970. This violation can be understood as an illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly these ‘non-nuclear-weapon states’ fulfil the criterion to be Russian nuclear targets, particularly if they should move their nuclear bomber aircraft nearer to the Russian or Belarus border.

“The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation”. Nuclear deterrence comes under the “centralization of governmental control” over nuclear forces. This is a matter of course in all nuclear weapon states. Here it is nevertheless explicitly mentioned as an obvious message to the USA: There is one Russian command structure in and around Moscow – stay away from any attempt of a decapitation strike! This singularity is a specific vulnerability of the traditionally centralized Russian administration. In the more ‘decentralized’ USA the nuclear command structure is geographically distributed, so a decapitation strike against the USA cannot be successful, due to largely different flight times of any missiles fired from outside continental USA.

The conditions under which Russian nuclear weapons can be used include, as can be expected:

- “use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies”, meaning a reaction. But then there is a crucial new point: Russian nuclear weapon use can also be triggered by

- “arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the

Russian Federation and/or its allies”.

Thus for Russia to now use nuclear weapons evidence of a launch is not required, but rather the “arrival of data on a launch” – implicitly: happened or imminent launch – is sufficient. So for example a scenario: “US naval ships with intermediate-range ballistic missiles are gathering in European seas”. The term “reliable” in connection with “data” implies the possibility of technical or human error – or just the claim that such an error had occurred.

And a further possible trigger of a Russian nuclear weapons employment:

- “attack by an adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions.”

In other words, as before: a decapitation strike against the central command structure, regardless of whether it is nuclear or “only” conventional. So, as expected, the decapitation strike is seen as a danger from a Russian point of view, with serious consequences.

In the case of nuclear attack by the USA, this point in the directive only makes sense if Russian nuclear weapon use occurs before the decapitation strike has taken place, i.e. as long as the central command structure still exists, thus as a pre-emptive attack. This fits with the term “arrival of reliable data” and the connected possibility of error, which might be used for justification or excuse of a limited pre-emptive Russian strike, for instance against US installations in Central Europe. Since these main installations are deep underground shelters, they cannot be destroyed by conventional bombs which are too weak – it requires nuclear precision ground explosions.

A successful decapitation strike requires a surprise attack which in turn requires intermediate- range ballistic missiles, since only they have sufficiently short flight times of some minutes, leaving no time for an organized reaction by the victim of the attack. Any concern about the civilian population is outside the concerns of nuclear target planners. Since – different from the Cold War era – hardly any European NATO state today will allow US intermediate-range missiles on its soil, the emphasis has changed towards US missile carrying ships in the European seas, as confirmed in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review which states the advantage of sea-launched missiles, that they “will not require or rely on host nation support”.

And as a further possible trigger for a Russian nuclear weapon deployment:

- “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

This is the reverse of the principle that the USA had claimed in the 1950s in the name of Western Europe: the Soviet Union would be conventionally so superior that a conventional defence against it was not possible – the Soviet Union would win. That is why the USA, as the ‘protective power’ of Western Europe, would immediately repel a Soviet attack by nuclear weapons.

Today, NATO is conventionally many times stronger than Russia, which can be seen from military expenditure alone. This irrational excess obviously is not caused by concerns about European security. Rather defence contracts and military career interests have a major role in propelling this development. For Russia it is not about the claim to protect other countries or about business and careers, but about protecting the existence of her own state system.

The entire Russian directive of 2020 can be read as a loud warning, especially to Central Europe as the prospective battlefield of a US-Russian war. Technically the only way to avoid

an assumedly impending US decapitation strike against Moscow is a pre-emptive attack against regional US command centres and missile ships.

Why was the Russian directive issued just in 2020? The focus on the Covid pandemic from early 2020 fogged up a series of alarming recent events hinting towards the increasing US-Russian nuclear tensions in Central Europe:

- The year before USA sabotaged the INF treaty of 1987 and immediately resumed testing of intermediate-range ballistic missiles which had been banned by this treaty.

- In early 2020 the largest US military maneuver in Europe for 25 years occurred (shortened by the corona pandemic).

- The US government signalled no extension of the NEW Start treaty of 2011 which is due to expire in early 2021.

- The US Navy develops shipborne intermediate-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads (which of course can be exchanged by “low-yield” nuclear warheads).

- The command centre for the US Navy Aegis destroyers armed with long-range missiles is located at Ramstein, Germany.

- Since 2019 Russia deploys short-range (500 kilometer) ballistic missiles SS-26 in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg in Eastern Prussia). Thanks to US President Trump’s cancellation of the INF Treaty in 2019 Russia is again permitted to deploy also intermediate-range missiles, reaching from Kaliningrad to the US command and nuclear installations in Central Europe (about 1.000 kilometer).

- The US European command (USEUCOM), after being pushed out from France in 1966, for more than half a century was located in Stuttgart, Germany. By mid-2020 the US government decided to move it to Mons, Belgium, 300 kilometers further west. Is the Central European soil becoming too hot?

Is the USA planning to attack Russia? There is no proof for such an intent, and – besides all moral aspects – it is doubtful that the US Army as an invader of Russia would ever be able to control this country of twice the size of USA. The developing nuclear arms race is strongly driven by the military-industrial complexes, mainly in the USA, but partly in Russia too. However, there is the experience from the last three decades that the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were started by the US military with massive decapitation strikes against these countries, thus removing their leadership and command. None of these states was able to retaliate against the USA. Russia is in a different situation, having the means to damage the USA. But on top of this and given the end of the INF treaty it obtained the option to end an acute crisis to her favour by a prompt and limited nuclear strike against US outposts in Central Europe. The Russian actions probably will be guided by the subjective perception of the potential dangers.

It has to be hoped that a public opinion movement in Europe – perhaps enhanced by the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) valid from early 2021 – will lead to political measures to defuse the acute dangers as described. The most efficient way would be the nuclear-free zone across Europe.

A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe: Why today?

Marc Finaud

Since 1967, five regions of the world have declared themselves as nuclear-weapon-free on the basis of a treaty:

– Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in 1967, entered into force in 2002),

– The South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, signed in 1985, entered into force in 1986),

– South-East Asia (Bangkok Treaty, signed in 1995, entered into force in 1997),

– Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, signed in 1996, entered into force in 2009),

– Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty, signed in 2006, entered into force in 2009).

In most cases, the nuclear powers have committed themselves in protocols to respect these zones and not to transfer or use their nuclear weapons therein. In addition, Antarctica, outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the seabed are free from the deployment of nuclear weapons under other treaties.1

The idea of such a zone in Europe dates back to the beginning of the Cold War, but never saw the light of day because of the refusal of the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to move into this direction. On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and then of the Warsaw Pact, and in view of the imminent entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), is it not time to relaunch this initiative and gradually make the whole of Europe, which has been the most nuclearized zone in the world, a region of stability and peace?

I. Historical reminder: Proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in Europe2

1.In 1956, when the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the only countries possessing nuclear weapons, the latter proposed banning the deployment of any nuclear weapons on European soil. Moscow’s main fear was Germany’s rearmament and its ambition for strategic parity with the United States, which pursued its nuclear-sharing plan with NATO.

2. In 1957, the Rapacki Plan, presented by the Polish Foreign Minister, aimed to ban nuclear weapons in Central Europe (West and East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland). The United States and NATO, fearing an imbalance of conventional forces in favour of the USSR, opposed it.

3. In the same year, Romania launched the Balkan Initiative for a nuclear-free zone including, on the Socialist side, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia and, on the NATO side, Greece and Turkey. The latter two countries refused to give up the American nuclear umbrella.

4. In 1963 Finland proposed a NWFZ to the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and then the Soviet Union launched its Mediterranean Initiative, excluding all nuclear weapons in most of the countries bordering the Mediterranean. The United States rejected both initiatives.

5. In 1969, after the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Soviet Union extended the Balkan Initiative to the countries bordering the Adriatic. NATO countries rejected it, accusing the USSR of seeking to prevent deterrence against Soviet aggression.

6. In 1982 former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme proposed a new version of the Rapacki Plan for Central Europe, in the form of a corridor from the Baltic to the Balkans, excluding all nuclear weapons with a range of more than 1000 km.

The main reasons for the failure of these initiatives are clear: the policy of the blocs and the nuclear deterrence strategy of the United States and NATO aimed at thwarting the conventional superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. However, the Cold War did not prevent the two superpowers from concluding agreements for the elimination of certain nuclear weapons in Europe, mainly the INF Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty of 1987, which led to the destruction of some 2,700 such missiles.

II. The post-cold war era and progress towards denuclearisation

At the end of the Cold War, the 1991 START I Treaty prohibited the deployment of the strategic offensive nuclear weapons covered by the Treaty outside the territory of the two countries, i.e. also in Europe. In the same year, in the “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives” (PNIs), the United States and Russia undertook to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons from their theatres of deployment (in Europe) and to destroy or store them in central locations. The Lisbon Protocol of May 1992 guaranteed the repatriation to Russia of all Soviet nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act excluded any deployment of nuclear weapons in the new NATO member countries.

In 1996, and after two attempts in 1990 and 1995, in response to the accession to NATO of several former Soviet republics or former members of the Warsaw Pact, Belarus launched a new proposal for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the combination of the INF and START I Treaties and the PNIs meant that, in the area proposed by Belarus,3 no nuclear weapons were to be deployed.

III. Why relaunch a NWFZ

in Europe now?

The conditions that prevailed at the end of the Cold War have undergone major changes. The INF Treaty was abrogated on the initiative of the United States, followed by Russia, in 2019. Although the United States has not announced any redeployment of intermediate-range missiles with nuclear capability in Europe and Russia is considering such deployment only in response to an American initiative, there is no longer any legal obligation to exclude such weapons in Europe.

While Russia maintains some 1,870 tactical nuclear weapons,4 most of which are stored centrally on its European territory, the United States deploys some 150 gravity nuclear bombs on the soil of NATO countries (Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey).5 None of these weapons are covered by the 2010 New START Treaty, which relates only to deployed strategic offensive weapons and is due to expire in February 2021.

At the same time, in 2017 the Treaty

on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted and is due to enter into force on 22 January 2021 after 50 ratifications. In Europe, several states have already signed or ratified the Treaty (Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino, Holy See), while others have supported its adoption at the UN (Cyprus, Moldova, Sweden, Switzerland). Even if these states were already party to the NPT and therefore prohibited themselves from seeking to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, their obligations under the TPNW will be more extensive and will include, in particular, the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil or non-cooperation with any state in the production of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear powers and their allies dependent on “extended deterrence” or nuclear umbrella, unsurprisingly, opposed the TPNW because it will lead to the delegitimization of nuclear weapons. This situation does not seem likely to change in the near future.

However, reviving a NWFZ in Europe would offer several advantages and allow several states to join it subject to the formulation of obligations in a future treaty:

- With the exception of the countries possessing nuclear weapons in Europe (France, United Kingdom, Russia), which would have to renounce them in order to participate in an NWFZ, all the other European states could accept a non-possession and non-stationing commitment apart from the five NATO states where American tactical weapons are currently stationed (Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey). In several of the latter, a debate is taking place on the continuation of nuclear sharing,6 and the launch of a NWFZ could influence this debate in favour of the withdrawal of American weapons and hence negotiations with Russia on the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons from European territory. Indeed, keeping these weapons in the arsenals of both countries contributes to lowering the threshold for their use in a nuclear war, the main targets and victims of which would be in Europe.

- Similarly, a NWFZ initiative widely supported in Europe, one of the consequences of which would be the exclusion of the deployment of new nuclear missiles of the type prohibited by the defunct INF Treaty, would be likely to reassure Russia and encourage the negotiation of a new agreement on this subject, independently or in the framework of a successor to the New START Treaty.

- NWFZs are recognised and encouraged by the NPT (Article VII) and by the Plan of Action of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (Action 9), which states that “[t]he establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned […] is encouraged.” Reaffirming this legitimacy may help those countries that are still hesitant to accede to the TPNW.

- NATO member states (Baltic States, Poland) and non-NATO member states (Ukraine, Georgia) that fear Russian aggression should find it in their interest to belong to a NWFZ which, like the existing zones, would benefit from legal guarantees of non-attack with nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers (“negative security assurances”).

- Precedents of NWFZs in other regions or other negotiations (anti-personnel mines, TPNW) show the diversity and flexibility of possible frameworks: NGO campaigns, conferences of interested states, negotiation of a treaty.

With a view to sounding out the governments of the states most likely to launch or support an initiative for a NWFZ in Europe (the European states party to the TPNW and those that had launched such initiatives in the past: Belarus, Romania, Finland, and Sweden), concerted action with NGOs in these countries should be launched as soon as the TPNW enters into force (22 January 2021).

Notes

1. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty, the 1971 Seabed Treaty.

2. H. Müller et al., “A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Europe – Concept, Problems, Chances”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Jan. 2016 (https://bit.ly/338aZzc). See also: Marc Finaud, “The Experience of Nuclear- Weapon Free Zones”, BASIC, May 2014 (https://bit.ly/3mVdOeT).

3. Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, (Eastern) Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. For a more detailed analysis, see: H. Müller et al., “A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Europe – Concept, Problems, Chances”, op. cit.

4. Source: Federation of American Scientists (https://bit.ly/33rflB4).

5. Ibid.

6. See: P. Grüll & A. Brzozowski, “SPD Leadership Reignites German Debate on US Nuclear Weapons”, Euractiv, 6 May 2020 (https://bit.ly/2KHDf4S); A. Brzozowski, “Belgium Debates Phase Out of US Nuclear Weapons on Its Soil”, Euractiv, 17 Jan. 2020 (https://bit.ly/39qm0iQ).

Thinking through the TPNW

Tony Simpson

Bertrand Russell applied quite a stern assessment of the efficacy or otherwise of disarmament treaties. ‘I think we may infer that no disarmament agreement will be reliable unless all signatory States are sincerely convinced that it is to their own advantage, and not only to that of potential enemies.’ So he wrote in Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, in the context of German rearmament in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany after the First World War. Common Sense was published in 1959, before international agreements on limiting nuclear testing and use of nuclear weapons had been signed.

So what would Russell make of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons? What is in it? What is its importance, bearing in mind its scope and limits?

By resolution 71/258, the UN General Assembly decided to convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The Assembly encouraged all Member States to participate in the Conference, with the participation and contribution of international organisations and civil society representatives. The Conference duly took place from 27 to 31 March and from 15 June to 7 July 2017 in New York, when the Treaty text was finally agreed.

The Treaty runs to 20 articles and includes undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. It prohibits deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory, and the provision of assistance to any State in the conduct of prohibited activities.

States parties are obliged to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

The Treaty also obliges States parties to provide adequate assistance to individuals affected by the use (specifically mentioning hibakusha – victims of the US nuclear attacks against Hiroshima and then, a few days later, Nagasaki in 1945) or those afflicted by testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take necessary and appropriate measures of environmental remediation in areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty was adopted by the Conference on 7 July 2017, by a vote of 122 States in favour, with one vote against (The Netherlands) and one abstention (Singapore). It was opened for signature by the Secretary-General on 20 September 2017. Following the deposit of the 50th instrument of ratification on 24 October 2020, the Treaty will enter into force on 22 January 2021. That is two days after the new President of the United States is due to be installed.

But what does ‘entry into force’ mean? For the Treaty has divided Member States of the United Nations into two distinct camps. On one side, there are more than 120 States publicly backing the Treaty at the UN. They include more than half the states in Africa, South America and Oceania, all 7 Central American states, one in North America, ten out of 26 Caribbean states, and 21 in Eurasia, somewhat unorthodoxly defined as the land mass extending from Ireland in the West to The Philippines in the East.

Lined up against all these are the nine nuclear-armed States and their supporters. Richard Falk, Princeton Professor of International Law and long-time supporter of Russell Tribunals, puts it this way: ‘… there is a near fatal weakness, or at best, a gaping hole, in this newly cast net of legal prohibition … The enormous fly in this healing ointment arises from the refusal of all nine nuclear weapons states to join the Treaty process even to the legitimating extent of participating in the negotiating conference with the opportunity to express their objections and influence the outcome ... Most of the chief allies of these states that are part of the global security network of states relying directly or indirectly on nuclear weaponry also boycotted the entire process. India, Japan, and China were notably absent, and also opposed the prohibition. This posture of undisguised opposition …includes all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and such important international actors as Germany and Japan.’

In response to the new Treaty, the NATO nuclear triangle of France, United Kingdom and United States issued a Joint Statement of denunciation: ‘We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it,’ they said. ‘Therefore, there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.’ Remarkably, in October 2018, China and Russia joined these three in a subsequent Joint Statement reaffirming their commitment to a separate and different treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or ‘NPT’, on the occasion of its 50th anniversary. The Permanent 5 said: “The TPNW fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT ... We will not support, sign or ratify this Treaty. The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law …’

There lies the rub – ‘customary international law’. We’ll come back to that.

Sergio Duarte, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, was a young member of Brazil’s UN delegation in the 1960s when the NPT was being drafted. He reflects widespread dissatisfaction with the NPT among many states that do not possess nuclear weapons, although, in his view, ‘the perceived shortcomings of the NPT are not sufficient grounds to justify mass withdrawal’. ‘In all fairness,’ he says, ‘it can be said that the NPT was quite successful in helping to prevent additional states to obtain nuclear weapons. Nothing in it, however, deals with other forms of proliferation, such as the accumulation of nuclear arms, their spread all over the globe in airplanes and submarines, or technological improvements in their range, speed, accuracy and lethal power ... Nuclear-weapon states seem to interpret the provisions of the NPT as legitimizing their arsenals by claiming an exclusive right to rely on nuclear weapons for their security for as long as they see fit while denying this to all others forever.

Duarte sees the new treaty as complementing the NPT. ‘The persistent standstill in multilateral bodies devoted to disarmament, the recent erosion of the arms control architecture, and the revival of the nuclear arms race gave rise to a successful multilateral effort to negotiate and adopt the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017. Progress in the process of entry into force of this new instrument (TPNW) should reassure, rather than alarm, the possessors of such weapons. None of its provisions contradicts the NPT. Rather, it expressly reinforces the commitments already accepted by the non-nuclear parties, and provides a path for fulfilling the commitments to nuclear disarmament.’ He points out that ‘recent technological advancements in artificial intelligence make overwhelming retaliation and second strike a certainty’.

Richard Falk sees the Prohibition Treaty as a ‘frontal rejection of the geopolitical approach to nuclearism, and its contention that the retention and development of nuclear weapons is a proven necessity given the way international society is organized. Falk develops his ideas about going beyond what he calls ‘nuclearism’ in a recent collection of his Selected Writings edited by Stefan Andersson and Curt Dahlgren, published in 2019 by Cambridge University Press.

We have seen that the nuclear states are sensitive on ‘customary international law’, repudiating any claim that the TPNW ‘contributes to the development of customary international law’. But Falk bases his argument for the applicability of customary international law on ‘nuclear taboo’. ‘To establish a customary legal norm,’ he writes ‘requires a long established pattern of consistent state practice of which the nuclear taboo (against the use of nuclear weapons) might serve as evidence having existed for a period of more than seven decades … In effect, a consistent pattern of practice must be reinforced by the sense that behaviour was done with an accompanying sense of obligation. It could be argued, for example, that the nuclear taboo incorporates a strong widely shared sense that nuclear weapons should never be used …’

So what new does the Prohibition Treaty bring to the table? In Falk’s view, the Prohibition Treaty should be treated as a ‘historic step forward’. It gives authoritative legal backing to the profound populist stigmatization of nuclear weapons, and as such provides anti-nuclear civil society forces with a powerful instrument to alter the climate of opinion in nuclear weapon states.

ICAN, the International Campaign against Nuclear Weapons, already publishes DON’T BANK ON THE BOMB, a regular report highlighting companies and organisations that profit from the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons, and those, such as the Dutch pension fund, which are choosing to divest. ICAN’s spokeswoman, Beatrice Fihn, aims to ‘deligitimize nuclear weapons and devalue them’, as she explains in the current issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. With an annual budget of a million Swiss francs, rather more than a million US dollars, ICAN does sterling work to advance and spread the reach of the new Prohibition Treaty, from its base in Geneva. Principal funders include the governments of Austria, Ireland and New Zealand, Swiss local councils, plus some private Foundations and individuals.

So what would Bertie say? He would surely applaud the sustained international activism over a decade or more which has brought the Prohibition Treaty to the point where it is endorsed by two-thirds of the Member States of the United Nations, across all inhabited continents, with new signatories, most recently Niger, continuing to join the ranks. He would probably be more sceptical about the prospects of the Treaty in eliminating nuclear weapons. In particular, he emphasized the need for détente to build confidence in verification measures to ensure genuine disarmament. Writing during the Cold War years, Russell’s insight was borne out following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 when actual nuclear disarmament was carried through by Kazakhstan and Ukraine, with international participation. But confidence and trust are again in short supply, particularly between Russia and the United States, as the principal nuclear-armed states, with China now also figuring more prominently in such ‘gaming’, as Alva Myrdal, the Swedish Disarmament Minister and Nobel Peace Laureate, characterized what was then described as ‘superpower’ conduct in relation to disarmament in the late 1970s. The Prohibition Treaty exposes the sharp divergence of interests of the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. It’s an old story, but I think Russell would have been encouraged by the renewed and rising awareness of the threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons, which the Prohibition Treaty, and the explicit opposition to it on the part of the nuclear-armed states, sparks. ‘We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest.’

This is the text of Tony Simpson’s talk to the Bertrand Russell Society delivered on 12 December 2020. Tony is the Secretary of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

Bertrand Russell Society:

https://bertrandrussellsociety.org/

Re-start New START

The New START treaty, which commits the US and Russia to halving the numbers of strategic missile launchers, is at risk of expiring unless President-elect Joe Biden takes swift action on entering office. This treaty is one of the few remaining following Trump’s ‘Bonfire of the Treaties’ over the four years of his Presidency. The world cannot afford to lose another treaty.

Talks between the US and Russia appear to have stalled, but recent comments from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs give hope: 

“Russia has repeatedly expressed its support for the unreserved extension of the New START Treaty in the form in which it was signed. It officially made a proposal to the other party to the treaty, the United States, in December 2019 and has reaffirmed it more than once since then. It is abundantly clear that the treaty’s extension would presuppose the preservation of all restrictions stated in New START, both strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear charges.

It is equally important that the treaty’s extension would buy time for comprehensive Russian-US talks on future nuclear missile arms control with due consideration for all factors that have an impact on strategic stability. Russia has presented specific ideas on this score. Now the ball is in Washington’s court.”

When President Putin picks up the phone to President-elect Biden, as he is bound to do before inauguration day, then item number one should be a commitment to speedily agree the extension of New START for a further five years and to accept Russia’s offer of “comprehensive ... talks on future nuclear missile arms control”. Such a move could open a new era of discussion and agreement.

US Missile Intercept

The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reported the successful test of a missile interception system in November, 2020. According to various reports, ‘a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block IIA interceptor successfully destroyed an intercontinental-range ballastic missile (ICBM) target in a test. With this milestone, the SM-3 Block IIA becomes only the second US interceptor type to exhibit this capability.’ (Carnegie Endowment website).

Bloomberg reported the events in the following terms: ‘an intercontinental ballistic missile was fired in the general direction of the Hawaiian islands. During its descent a few minutes later, still outside the earth’s atmosphere, it was struck by another missile that destroyed it.’

It may seem perfectly legitimate for any country, including the US, to test and perfect such systems. After all, it is the right of every American not to be murdered by nuclear weapons. However, the announcement of this test has deep and worrying implications for us all.

If such systems were fully developed, what forces or arrangements would prevent the US from actually using its nuclear weapons? If they could be used without fear of nuclear counter-strike, would an American President be more or less likely to use nuclear weapons? Isn’t such a test deeply worrying given the massively increased nuclear tensions, deliberate undermining of the infrastructure of nuclear arms control and general degradation of the ‘global norms’ that have helped prevent nuclear war in the past?

If the perverse concept of ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ has been undermined by technological developments, then where does this leave nuclear ‘strategy’?

Now that the US has introduced further asymmetry into nuclear questions, what next?

After Trump: what prospects for peace?

The defeat of President Donald Trump at the hands of the US electorate brings an end to four years of threats, bombast and potentially deadly unpredictability. END Info, The Spokesman and other publications have covered the horrible realities of the Trump regime in detail and there is no need to repeat them again.

It is important to note that despite his defeat, Trump’s ‘popular vote’ actually increased: he secured more support on the ground in 2020 than in the previous election. The magnificent mobilisation of voters, who lent their support to President-elect Biden, was the decisive factor. We must hope that the aspirations and demands of these voters are fulfilled by the incoming administration. If not, then a return to ‘Trump-style’ rule is not out of the question. Maintaining a broad political mobilisation will be key to ensuring that the hopes of a ‘better America’ are maintained, if not fully realised, over the next four years.

What hope can we identify in the sphere of global affairs - prospects for peace in particular - with respect to the incoming Biden administration? What avenues of hope have opened up?

There are a number of immediate steps that the Biden administration can and must take in order to restore some semblance of regularity and stability to the global arms control and disarmament structures that Trump did so much to damage.

First amongst these must be an immediate agreement to extend New START, not just for a further year but for the full five years allowed under the treaty. There should be no attempts to re-negotiate certain aspects or to vary the treaty before the extension is firmly agreed.

Next, the Biden administration must re-join the JCPOA (Iran Deal) as a matter of urgency. There needs to be a significant lowering of tensions between the US and Iran and so the additional sanctions imposed following Trump’s withdrawal must be lifted. The Iranian people need urgent access to medical supplies and food-stuffs and the Iranian government needs to hear clear messages from the US government that the JCPOA, the inspections regime and further negotiations will be conducted in good faith. This means no more assassinations, no more sanctions and an end to war-like rhetoric from the halls of Washington.

As with New START, there should be no preconditions to resuming US participation in the JCPOA and any attempts to curb Iran’s ballistic missile system should be addressed in separate negotiations and other measures of reassurance.

Of all the dangerous threats made by the Trump administration, the threat to resume explosive nuclear testing was perhaps the most deadly. Thankfully, no such testing was carried out but if the US had decided to go ahead then there is no international agreement to stop them. The US has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but has, in effect, abided by the international consensus not to engage in such tests. The US should now ratify the CTBT and encourage all other states not yet on board to do likewise.

Trump’s sabotage of the INF Treaty has pitched Europe into heightened nuclear tensions. Can Biden resurrect the treaty or reach agreement with the Russians to replace it with something similar? Such a course of action will be more difficult than with the other treaties and agreements already mentioned, but it is an important course of action. It will be a test for the incoming Biden administration: can they constructively engage with a ‘strategic competitor’ for the good of humanity, or is such an approach beyond them?

Biden must immediately halt US efforts to undermine the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and seriously engage with the unstoppable processes already underway. Likewise, the US must live up to the rhetoric about the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, fully uphold its provisions and act on the already agreed action points from successive review conferences.

The President-elect will be fully aware that the European states - including the UK - will be looking to the new administration to ‘take a lead’, particularly with regards to NATO, which Trump threw into some measure of chaos, and with respect to ‘handling’ both Russia and China. What Biden chooses to do, what course of action he decides to embark upon, presents some fundamental challenges for us all. Whereas Biden can fairly straightforwardly choose to resurrect or shore-up aspects of the nuclear treaty framework and positively engage in ‘multilateralism’ with ‘strategic rivals’ on this score, will his other policy choices be as reassuring?

The evidence seems thin on the ground. Take, for example, his Secretary of State appointment. Antony Blinken may be a very different character to Mike Pompeo, but he comes with his own political baggage. Blinken was characterised in the pages of the London Guardian as a ‘born internationalist’, which seems promising enough until you consider what he might understand ‘internationalism’ to be.

For instance he supported the US invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Libya, has voiced support for the Saudi intervention in Yemen and such like. It should be taken for granted that President-elect Biden is on the same page on these issues.

What is fundamentally at stake here is whether Biden can manage a global shift in power, a shift from US dominance to multipolarity, or whether he and his administration will attempt to stop the unstoppable. Will Biden’s ‘internationalism’ and commitment to ‘multilateralism’ mean positive engagement with the world or building a US-dominated coalition to divide the world between nuclear-armed blocs?

The world is watching.

Nuclear-Free Europe

From END Info 20

General Lee Butler once sat at the centre of the United States’ nuclear capability. He was a member of the ‘nuclear priesthood’ tasked with maintaining and expanding a nuclear infrastructure whilst keeping the political flock on the ‘correct path’. Following retirement, Butler was able to break free from the nuclear doctrine and has devoted himself to the cause of nuclear abolition. His example is not unique but it is rare enough to warrant the highest praise (see Spokesman 129).

So, how to tackle the “powerful, deeply rooted beliefs” in nuclear weapons to which Butler points? If we look at the political landscape in the nuclear-armed states, where the nuclear doctrine is deeply entrenched, then the task seems daunting. In these states, the political establishment is wedded to expanding nuclear capabilities in defiance of Treaty commitments and moral good sense, and the media and institutions of public culture are geared towards legitimising nuclear weaponry and the notion of ‘deterrence’.

What are the actual mechanisms that allow the nuclear doctrine to embed itself and spread? Tom Sauer argues in a recent article in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament (‘Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union’) that they differ between the political and public spheres. In the political sphere, the promise of nuclear force modernisation allows politicians to pledge support for arms control treaties and generates consent from the military without fundamentally undermining a commitment to the nuclear doctrine.

Much of this part of the process happens behind closed doors, “without much debate, let alone approval, of the respective parliaments.” These ‘hidden’ processes are part of the nuclear ‘secret cities’ described by Becky Alexis-Martin in her recent work, Disarming Doomsday (see Spokesman 144). Nuclear weapons grew and spread from the ‘secret city’ of Los Alamos, they spread and mutated into ever more dangerous devices: the A-Bomb became the H-Bomb, then the N-Bomb. The ghastly realities of what these bombs might unleash upon humanity are hidden beneath the notion of ‘deterrence’.

If, rather than using the term ‘nuclear deterrence’, politicians and military personnel referred to ‘genocide machines’ – that is, if nuclear weapons were referred to in accurate terms – then they would quickly lose legitimacy. Sauer argues:

“The public legitimation for nuclear weapons is deterrence and in second order prestige. What these mechanisms show is that public legitimation for nuclear weapons is a narrative that does not reveal the complete picture. This may explain the gap between what the general public thinks about nuclear weapons and the objective characteristics of nuclear weapons … Public opinion in the nuclear armed states is reinforced in thinking that nuclear weapons are ‘good because they make the country safe and secure.”

There are considerable hurdles which must be overcome if we are to win widespread public support for and then achieve nuclear disarmament. Hurdles not mentioned so far include the self-interest of the massively convoluted ‘military-industrial complex’ which reaps enormous material rewards from the development and upgrading of nuclear weapons; the military alliances – some bilateral, between the US and UK for example, others networks of alliances such as NATO – which criss-cross the planet and the reflexes of bodies and institutions – ‘think tanks’, some trade unions representing workers involved in nuclear weapon manufacture, political parties or lobby groups – for whom open discussion of this topic is verboten.

This situation points to the fact that purely ‘national’ initiatives for nuclear disarmament are unlikely to succeed without regional or international cooperation. The ‘national barriers’ existent in nuclear-armed states will be more easily overcome through regional and international cooperation. Not only that, but to an increasing degree the most pressing and immediate issues faced by nuclear disarmers – as with the multiple threats and issues with which humanity faces – manifest transnationally. A transnational response is demanded.

Europe in focus

Germany

An opinion poll commissioned by the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the organisation that has spearheaded the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), provides encouragement. In a survey of four European Union states that currently host US nuclear bombs, clear majorities are in favour of their removal: 57% in Belgium, 56% in the Netherlands, 70% in Germany and 65% in Italy. None of these nations are nuclear-armed states in their own right, but as NATO-member states they are ‘committed’ to the ‘delivery’ of US nuclear weapons if required to do so. The fact that 70% of Germans surveyed are in favour of ridding their nation of US nuclear weapons leads us to the first transnational ‘problem’ that demands a transnational answer.

In May 2020, the leader of the German Social Democrats (SPD) in the Bundestag, Rolf Mützenich, called for US nuclear weapons to be removed from the country. He told the Tagesspiegel newspaper that: “Nuclear weapons on German territory do not heighten our security, just the opposite ... The time has come for Germany to rule out a future stationing.” The ‘Merkel’ era of German politics is drawing to a close and it is not wholly inconceivable that a future government will be composed of parties which share Mützenich’s view. Although the call for the removal of US nuclear weapons is not SPD policy, it may become a bargaining chip in settling a future coalition government. Such a proposal would be popular, as evidenced not only by the ICAN survey but by the 100,000 Germans who recently called for TPNW ratification.

The removal of US nuclear weapons from Germany would be a major victory for nuclear disarmers, but we cannot escape the question of ‘what then?’ If, as seems possible, the US simply moves the weapons from Germany to neighbouring Poland or another allied state closer to the Russian border then what kind of victory will we have?

France

In February 2020, President Emmanuel Macron raised the prospect of ‘Europeanising’ France’s nuclear capability. In a speech to military officers, Macron called for further military coordination between EU member states – a process already under way – and proposed that France’s nuclear weapons system should play a central role. Although Macron is not the first French leader to raise such a prospect, the proposals are significant, and significantly troubling, given the context in which they were made.

Macron points to the near-collapse of the global system of nuclear treaties and control measures as one of the motivations for a new approach to ‘deterrence’ and ‘security’. He has previously called NATO “brain dead”. In his speech he correctly referred to a new ‘arms race’ and worries that Europe “must collectively realise that, in the absence of a legal framework, they could quickly find themselves exposed to the resumption of a conventional, even nuclear, arms race on their soil.”

France has pledged to extend its ‘nuclear umbrella’ to Germany. The promise is implicit in the Treaty of Aachen signed between France and Germany in January 2019. The Treaty was intended to cement plans for future reforms of the EU, including a French-German defence and security council intended as the decisive political body to guide these reciprocal engagements. The Treaty is particularly significant in that its provisions extend beyond NATO’s Article 5. The new Treaty uses the phrase “by all means” when Article 5 states “such action as it deems necessary”. Through this treaty, France and Germany have already established a nuclear relationship above and beyond the ‘security arrangements’ embedded in NATO membership. How long before serious efforts are made to extend such ‘assurances’ to other EU member states?

Sauer outlines three possible future scenarios: ‘Status-quo’, where the mutual defence clauses of the Lisbon Treaty remain the only EU-wide provisions and where France maintains its existing bilateral agreements (including with the now non-EU United Kingdom); ‘Upgrading’, where French nuclear weapons are ‘Europeanised’; and ‘Downgrading’, where France dispenses with its nuclear weapons and the EU becomes nuclear-weapon-free. In all three scenarios, a transnational nuclear disarmament campaign will surely play a vital role.

Europe: Nuclear battleground?

The formal collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty on Friday 2 August 2019 opened a dangerous new era for nuclear security in Europe. The United States quickly followed up on its sabotage of the INF Treaty by testing a Treaty-busting, ground-launched, nuclear-capable missile on 19 August.

Does Europe risk becoming a ‘nuclear battleground’ and, if so, what can we do to resist such a risk? It seems clear that the US will look at Europe once more as a staging post for nuclear war and, as such, a potential nuclear battleground. This horrible reality was starkly illustrated in a recent US ‘war gaming’ exercise. On 21 February 2020, ‘Senior Defense Officials’ from the United States Department of Defense convened a ‘Background Briefing on Nuclear Deterrence and Modernization’. The Briefing was extraordinary for a number of reasons: firstly, because of the level of detail on US nuclear operations; secondly, because these details included the revelation of a ‘war gaming’ exercise focused on a scenario in which Europe was the ‘battleground’; thirdly, because the ‘war game’ involved the use of low-yield nuclear warheads; and fourthly, because of the utterly shameless complacency on display. US defence officials clearly exposed the fact that in terms of nuclear strategy, the US considers Europe to be its territory.

With the sabotage of the INF Treaty now an established fact and given the testing of new intermediate-range missiles, it seems likely that the Trump administration or a future US President will seek to station such weapons in Europe or, given technological developments, on ships close to Europe. Any such move requires decisive opposition. A transnational problem requires a transnational solution.

The case for a nuclear-weapons-free zone

The sample of evidence offered above – there are many other issues, not least the UK’s capability – points to the need for a Europe-wide, coordinated, creative peace movement. The transnational problems – from differences in perception to immediate risks – require transnational solutions. As ever more non-nuclear states ratify the TPNW, the overall legitimacy of nuclear weapons is diminished. When the Treaty comes into force, nuclear disarmers in non-ratifying states will have a powerful tool at their disposal. However, there are time sensitive – that is, urgent – issues which require immediate and energetic responses. In terms of Europe, they require a European movement and European solutions. Thus a coalition of peace organisations discussed, drafted and then launched the following appeal, ‘For a nuclear weapons free Europe’:

On the occasion of the 75th commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing, we, the signatories join our voices to those of the survivors and call upon our fellow citizens, politicians and governments to support a European nuclear- weapon-free zone as a matter of urgency.

We call on European governments to:

· end the modernization of all nuclear weapons

· end nuclear sharing

· sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The situation is urgent. Now is the time to respond.

See www.nukefreeeurope.eu for more and to endorse the Appeal.

First published in The Spokesman 146

Trump Must Go

From END Info 20

The world faces two existential threats: climate catastrophe and the prospect of nuclear annihilation. Since the election of Donald Trump as US President, these threats have grown and the prospects for our environment and survival as a species have diminished.

Trump did not invent climate change and his did not invent the bomb. These things existed before him and will continue to exist if, as we must all hope, he is jettisoned from the White House in a timely fashion. However, the policies he has pursued on both counts have made the world a much more dangerous place. Trump must go.

Let’s look specifically at the question of nuclear weapons. The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review announced to the world that President Trump intended to use the threat of nuclear force to confront strategic rivals: Russia and China. The Review announced plans for new types of weaponry and new warheads.

Subsequently, Trump’s administration has systematically destroyed the INF Treaty, the JCPOA (Iran Deal), Open Skies Treaty and now New START looks under severe threat.

Threats have been combined with disastrous action. Another four years surely heralds more of the same. There has been much talk of another ‘Cold War’ against both Russia and China.

There is much in Trump’s actions that justifies such talk. However, the situation is much more dangerous than the ‘Cold War’ of the past. Accelerated technology, the breakdown of norms of diplomacy, the sharp contradictions developing in a ‘global economy’ mean, to quote Michael Klare, that “this isn’t your mothers’ Cold War”. Rather, we are experiencing a ‘global tinderbox’, where one false move could spell the end of it all.

Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg and other prominent US activists have called for a vote for Democrat candidate, Joe Biden, as the most immediate means to remove Trump from office. Such calls have been criticised by those who point to Biden’s record on a whole number of question. That there are some who cannot cast their vote for Biden for a whole variety of substantial and deeply felt reasons is just one indication of the political mess and the legacies of harm at the centre of US society (characteristics shared by other states). On balance, it looks like Chomsky, Ellsberg and others have it right. Four more years of Trump will be a disaster for humanity. Four years of Biden will not be an easy ride. This is the choice.

New START in peril

From END Info 20

At the end of September, 2020, President Donald Trump ordered his military to assess how quickly it could bring nuclear weapons out of storage and load them onto bombers and submarines. The reason for this instruction and the motive behind publicising it is inextricably linked to Trump’s attempts to sabotage yet another nuclear treaty: New START.

Such a move signals a deliberate increase in already sky-high nuclear tensions. Is the US serious about negotiating an extension to this vital treaty, which aims to limit the number of deployed warheads? Or is it the case that the US’s most recent conduct is part of an overall strategy to tear up the global order of treaties and agreements regulating nuclear weapons?

We hope that the former, rather than the latter, is the case but there is little evidence to support such hopes. Hope comes from a different source: the continued willingness of Russia to remain diplomatically flexible in the face of shifting US demands.

At the time of writing, it has been announced that New START may enjoy a twelve month extension, following further intervention from Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. On 20 Oct, Lavrov issued a statement clarifying Moscow’s offer, saying that Putin envisioned a one-year extension as well as a freezing of nuclear warheads by each side.

“This position of ours may be implemented only and exclusively on the premise that ‘freezing’ of warheads will not be accompanied by any additional demands on the part of the United States,” Lavrov said. “Were this approach to be acceptable for Washington, then the time gained by the extension of the New START Treaty could be used to conduct comprehensive bilateral negotiations on the future nuclear and missile arms control that must address all factors affecting strategic stability.”

We hope that this approach is acceptable and that Trump’s replacement as President of the United States approaches this and related issues in a more measured and constructive fashion.

Meanwhile, whilst agreement to ‘freeze’ the overall number of deployed warheads is welcome, recent developments and the deployment of ‘low-yield’ nuclear warheads (sometime referred to as ‘useable’) by the US is a major source of concern.

B-52s over Europe: here to stay?

From END Info 20

Following our coverage in END Info 19 (September 2020) of the presence of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers at RAF Fairford, it has now been confirmed that these planes staged further provocative ‘exercises’ over Europe.

The respected analyst Hans Kristensen tweeted the above picture and the following text on 25 September 2020: “Unique mission of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers today over the Baltic, flying through the Suwalki gap between Kaliningrad and Belarus, and doing a pass over Stockholm...”

We ask once more: what is the purpose of such flights other than to increase already sharp tensions between the US/NATO and Russia?

We understand that the B-52s will continue to fly from Fairford on a regular basis. Watch this space for more info and for campaign updates.