A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe: Why today?

Marc Finaud

Since 1967, five regions of the world have declared themselves as nuclear-weapon-free on the basis of a treaty:

– Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in 1967, entered into force in 2002),

– The South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, signed in 1985, entered into force in 1986),

– South-East Asia (Bangkok Treaty, signed in 1995, entered into force in 1997),

– Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba, signed in 1996, entered into force in 2009),

– Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty, signed in 2006, entered into force in 2009).

In most cases, the nuclear powers have committed themselves in protocols to respect these zones and not to transfer or use their nuclear weapons therein. In addition, Antarctica, outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the seabed are free from the deployment of nuclear weapons under other treaties.1

The idea of such a zone in Europe dates back to the beginning of the Cold War, but never saw the light of day because of the refusal of the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, to move into this direction. On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and then of the Warsaw Pact, and in view of the imminent entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), is it not time to relaunch this initiative and gradually make the whole of Europe, which has been the most nuclearized zone in the world, a region of stability and peace?

I. Historical reminder: Proposals for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in Europe2

1.In 1956, when the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were the only countries possessing nuclear weapons, the latter proposed banning the deployment of any nuclear weapons on European soil. Moscow’s main fear was Germany’s rearmament and its ambition for strategic parity with the United States, which pursued its nuclear-sharing plan with NATO.

2. In 1957, the Rapacki Plan, presented by the Polish Foreign Minister, aimed to ban nuclear weapons in Central Europe (West and East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland). The United States and NATO, fearing an imbalance of conventional forces in favour of the USSR, opposed it.

3. In the same year, Romania launched the Balkan Initiative for a nuclear-free zone including, on the Socialist side, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia and, on the NATO side, Greece and Turkey. The latter two countries refused to give up the American nuclear umbrella.

4. In 1963 Finland proposed a NWFZ to the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and then the Soviet Union launched its Mediterranean Initiative, excluding all nuclear weapons in most of the countries bordering the Mediterranean. The United States rejected both initiatives.

5. In 1969, after the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Soviet Union extended the Balkan Initiative to the countries bordering the Adriatic. NATO countries rejected it, accusing the USSR of seeking to prevent deterrence against Soviet aggression.

6. In 1982 former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme proposed a new version of the Rapacki Plan for Central Europe, in the form of a corridor from the Baltic to the Balkans, excluding all nuclear weapons with a range of more than 1000 km.

The main reasons for the failure of these initiatives are clear: the policy of the blocs and the nuclear deterrence strategy of the United States and NATO aimed at thwarting the conventional superiority of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. However, the Cold War did not prevent the two superpowers from concluding agreements for the elimination of certain nuclear weapons in Europe, mainly the INF Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty of 1987, which led to the destruction of some 2,700 such missiles.

II. The post-cold war era and progress towards denuclearisation

At the end of the Cold War, the 1991 START I Treaty prohibited the deployment of the strategic offensive nuclear weapons covered by the Treaty outside the territory of the two countries, i.e. also in Europe. In the same year, in the “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives” (PNIs), the United States and Russia undertook to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons from their theatres of deployment (in Europe) and to destroy or store them in central locations. The Lisbon Protocol of May 1992 guaranteed the repatriation to Russia of all Soviet nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act excluded any deployment of nuclear weapons in the new NATO member countries.

In 1996, and after two attempts in 1990 and 1995, in response to the accession to NATO of several former Soviet republics or former members of the Warsaw Pact, Belarus launched a new proposal for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the combination of the INF and START I Treaties and the PNIs meant that, in the area proposed by Belarus,3 no nuclear weapons were to be deployed.

III. Why relaunch a NWFZ

in Europe now?

The conditions that prevailed at the end of the Cold War have undergone major changes. The INF Treaty was abrogated on the initiative of the United States, followed by Russia, in 2019. Although the United States has not announced any redeployment of intermediate-range missiles with nuclear capability in Europe and Russia is considering such deployment only in response to an American initiative, there is no longer any legal obligation to exclude such weapons in Europe.

While Russia maintains some 1,870 tactical nuclear weapons,4 most of which are stored centrally on its European territory, the United States deploys some 150 gravity nuclear bombs on the soil of NATO countries (Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey).5 None of these weapons are covered by the 2010 New START Treaty, which relates only to deployed strategic offensive weapons and is due to expire in February 2021.

At the same time, in 2017 the Treaty

on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted and is due to enter into force on 22 January 2021 after 50 ratifications. In Europe, several states have already signed or ratified the Treaty (Austria, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San Marino, Holy See), while others have supported its adoption at the UN (Cyprus, Moldova, Sweden, Switzerland). Even if these states were already party to the NPT and therefore prohibited themselves from seeking to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, their obligations under the TPNW will be more extensive and will include, in particular, the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil or non-cooperation with any state in the production of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear powers and their allies dependent on “extended deterrence” or nuclear umbrella, unsurprisingly, opposed the TPNW because it will lead to the delegitimization of nuclear weapons. This situation does not seem likely to change in the near future.

However, reviving a NWFZ in Europe would offer several advantages and allow several states to join it subject to the formulation of obligations in a future treaty:

- With the exception of the countries possessing nuclear weapons in Europe (France, United Kingdom, Russia), which would have to renounce them in order to participate in an NWFZ, all the other European states could accept a non-possession and non-stationing commitment apart from the five NATO states where American tactical weapons are currently stationed (Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey). In several of the latter, a debate is taking place on the continuation of nuclear sharing,6 and the launch of a NWFZ could influence this debate in favour of the withdrawal of American weapons and hence negotiations with Russia on the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons from European territory. Indeed, keeping these weapons in the arsenals of both countries contributes to lowering the threshold for their use in a nuclear war, the main targets and victims of which would be in Europe.

- Similarly, a NWFZ initiative widely supported in Europe, one of the consequences of which would be the exclusion of the deployment of new nuclear missiles of the type prohibited by the defunct INF Treaty, would be likely to reassure Russia and encourage the negotiation of a new agreement on this subject, independently or in the framework of a successor to the New START Treaty.

- NWFZs are recognised and encouraged by the NPT (Article VII) and by the Plan of Action of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (Action 9), which states that “[t]he establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned […] is encouraged.” Reaffirming this legitimacy may help those countries that are still hesitant to accede to the TPNW.

- NATO member states (Baltic States, Poland) and non-NATO member states (Ukraine, Georgia) that fear Russian aggression should find it in their interest to belong to a NWFZ which, like the existing zones, would benefit from legal guarantees of non-attack with nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers (“negative security assurances”).

- Precedents of NWFZs in other regions or other negotiations (anti-personnel mines, TPNW) show the diversity and flexibility of possible frameworks: NGO campaigns, conferences of interested states, negotiation of a treaty.

With a view to sounding out the governments of the states most likely to launch or support an initiative for a NWFZ in Europe (the European states party to the TPNW and those that had launched such initiatives in the past: Belarus, Romania, Finland, and Sweden), concerted action with NGOs in these countries should be launched as soon as the TPNW enters into force (22 January 2021).

Notes

1. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty, the 1971 Seabed Treaty.

2. H. Müller et al., “A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Europe – Concept, Problems, Chances”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Jan. 2016 (https://bit.ly/338aZzc). See also: Marc Finaud, “The Experience of Nuclear- Weapon Free Zones”, BASIC, May 2014 (https://bit.ly/3mVdOeT).

3. Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, (Eastern) Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. For a more detailed analysis, see: H. Müller et al., “A Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Europe – Concept, Problems, Chances”, op. cit.

4. Source: Federation of American Scientists (https://bit.ly/33rflB4).

5. Ibid.

6. See: P. Grüll & A. Brzozowski, “SPD Leadership Reignites German Debate on US Nuclear Weapons”, Euractiv, 6 May 2020 (https://bit.ly/2KHDf4S); A. Brzozowski, “Belgium Debates Phase Out of US Nuclear Weapons on Its Soil”, Euractiv, 17 Jan. 2020 (https://bit.ly/39qm0iQ).