Russia’s 2020 Nuclear Directive

Joachim Wernicke

In June 2020 the Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new directive titled Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence. The document mentions Russia’s allies: members of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO) founded in 2002. CSTO members are Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The central concern of the directive is to address the “risks and threats to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence”, such as: the “build-up by a potential adversary of the general purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters.”

One example of this: NATO troops and equipment including nuclear weapon carriers concentrated in countries bordering Russia or Belarus. Not surprisingly, these adversary countries are seen as nuclear targets by Russia.

Expressly mentioned are the “adjacent waters”, meaning the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea. Not surprisingly, the Russians are expecting US Navy units to appear in these waters with ships that can launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles. No distinction is made between conventional and nuclear warheads of such weapons. Other concerns include:

“Deployment by states which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary, of missile defence systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy weapons;

- development and deployment of missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space.”

These points obviously refer to Romania and Poland which permit US bases which house missile defence systems. The latter point hints to Germany which is about to home an entirely new “NATO Space Center” at the US air base at Ramstein, one year after the US military established its “Space Force” as a separate military branch.

“Possession by states of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as means of delivery of such weapons;

- uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture;

- deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.”

These points evidently refer to the three nuclear weapons states in NATO (USA, Great Britain and France). But also the non-nuclear-weapon states Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Turkey are included, due to their participation in US nuclear sharing: These five states keep special airplanes as nuclear delivery means, prepared and exercising for the dropping of US nuclear bombs. Thus they physically become – even if only temporary – possessors of nuclear weapons, in violation of their obligations from membership in the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) of 1970. This violation can be understood as an illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly these ‘non-nuclear-weapon states’ fulfil the criterion to be Russian nuclear targets, particularly if they should move their nuclear bomber aircraft nearer to the Russian or Belarus border.

“The decision to use nuclear weapons is taken by the President of the Russian Federation”. Nuclear deterrence comes under the “centralization of governmental control” over nuclear forces. This is a matter of course in all nuclear weapon states. Here it is nevertheless explicitly mentioned as an obvious message to the USA: There is one Russian command structure in and around Moscow – stay away from any attempt of a decapitation strike! This singularity is a specific vulnerability of the traditionally centralized Russian administration. In the more ‘decentralized’ USA the nuclear command structure is geographically distributed, so a decapitation strike against the USA cannot be successful, due to largely different flight times of any missiles fired from outside continental USA.

The conditions under which Russian nuclear weapons can be used include, as can be expected:

- “use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies”, meaning a reaction. But then there is a crucial new point: Russian nuclear weapon use can also be triggered by

- “arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the

Russian Federation and/or its allies”.

Thus for Russia to now use nuclear weapons evidence of a launch is not required, but rather the “arrival of data on a launch” – implicitly: happened or imminent launch – is sufficient. So for example a scenario: “US naval ships with intermediate-range ballistic missiles are gathering in European seas”. The term “reliable” in connection with “data” implies the possibility of technical or human error – or just the claim that such an error had occurred.

And a further possible trigger of a Russian nuclear weapons employment:

- “attack by an adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions.”

In other words, as before: a decapitation strike against the central command structure, regardless of whether it is nuclear or “only” conventional. So, as expected, the decapitation strike is seen as a danger from a Russian point of view, with serious consequences.

In the case of nuclear attack by the USA, this point in the directive only makes sense if Russian nuclear weapon use occurs before the decapitation strike has taken place, i.e. as long as the central command structure still exists, thus as a pre-emptive attack. This fits with the term “arrival of reliable data” and the connected possibility of error, which might be used for justification or excuse of a limited pre-emptive Russian strike, for instance against US installations in Central Europe. Since these main installations are deep underground shelters, they cannot be destroyed by conventional bombs which are too weak – it requires nuclear precision ground explosions.

A successful decapitation strike requires a surprise attack which in turn requires intermediate- range ballistic missiles, since only they have sufficiently short flight times of some minutes, leaving no time for an organized reaction by the victim of the attack. Any concern about the civilian population is outside the concerns of nuclear target planners. Since – different from the Cold War era – hardly any European NATO state today will allow US intermediate-range missiles on its soil, the emphasis has changed towards US missile carrying ships in the European seas, as confirmed in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review which states the advantage of sea-launched missiles, that they “will not require or rely on host nation support”.

And as a further possible trigger for a Russian nuclear weapon deployment:

- “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

This is the reverse of the principle that the USA had claimed in the 1950s in the name of Western Europe: the Soviet Union would be conventionally so superior that a conventional defence against it was not possible – the Soviet Union would win. That is why the USA, as the ‘protective power’ of Western Europe, would immediately repel a Soviet attack by nuclear weapons.

Today, NATO is conventionally many times stronger than Russia, which can be seen from military expenditure alone. This irrational excess obviously is not caused by concerns about European security. Rather defence contracts and military career interests have a major role in propelling this development. For Russia it is not about the claim to protect other countries or about business and careers, but about protecting the existence of her own state system.

The entire Russian directive of 2020 can be read as a loud warning, especially to Central Europe as the prospective battlefield of a US-Russian war. Technically the only way to avoid

an assumedly impending US decapitation strike against Moscow is a pre-emptive attack against regional US command centres and missile ships.

Why was the Russian directive issued just in 2020? The focus on the Covid pandemic from early 2020 fogged up a series of alarming recent events hinting towards the increasing US-Russian nuclear tensions in Central Europe:

- The year before USA sabotaged the INF treaty of 1987 and immediately resumed testing of intermediate-range ballistic missiles which had been banned by this treaty.

- In early 2020 the largest US military maneuver in Europe for 25 years occurred (shortened by the corona pandemic).

- The US government signalled no extension of the NEW Start treaty of 2011 which is due to expire in early 2021.

- The US Navy develops shipborne intermediate-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads (which of course can be exchanged by “low-yield” nuclear warheads).

- The command centre for the US Navy Aegis destroyers armed with long-range missiles is located at Ramstein, Germany.

- Since 2019 Russia deploys short-range (500 kilometer) ballistic missiles SS-26 in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Koenigsberg in Eastern Prussia). Thanks to US President Trump’s cancellation of the INF Treaty in 2019 Russia is again permitted to deploy also intermediate-range missiles, reaching from Kaliningrad to the US command and nuclear installations in Central Europe (about 1.000 kilometer).

- The US European command (USEUCOM), after being pushed out from France in 1966, for more than half a century was located in Stuttgart, Germany. By mid-2020 the US government decided to move it to Mons, Belgium, 300 kilometers further west. Is the Central European soil becoming too hot?

Is the USA planning to attack Russia? There is no proof for such an intent, and – besides all moral aspects – it is doubtful that the US Army as an invader of Russia would ever be able to control this country of twice the size of USA. The developing nuclear arms race is strongly driven by the military-industrial complexes, mainly in the USA, but partly in Russia too. However, there is the experience from the last three decades that the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were started by the US military with massive decapitation strikes against these countries, thus removing their leadership and command. None of these states was able to retaliate against the USA. Russia is in a different situation, having the means to damage the USA. But on top of this and given the end of the INF treaty it obtained the option to end an acute crisis to her favour by a prompt and limited nuclear strike against US outposts in Central Europe. The Russian actions probably will be guided by the subjective perception of the potential dangers.

It has to be hoped that a public opinion movement in Europe – perhaps enhanced by the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) valid from early 2021 – will lead to political measures to defuse the acute dangers as described. The most efficient way would be the nuclear-free zone across Europe.