US Nuclear Posture Review: "what's in it for NATO?"

From END Info 28 - Jan/Feb 2022 - DOWNLOAD

By Tom Unterrainer

“What’s in it for NATO?”, asks Adrea Chiampan in a recent NATO Defense College Policy Brief on the upcoming US Nuclear Posture Review*. The way in which this question is formulated may seem a bit odd, given the central role played by the US nuclear arsenal in NATOs ‘Strategic Concept’. However, the contents of Trump’s 2018 review and the attitude of his administration towards NATO raise a number of questions about how the Biden presidency might ‘undo’ some of Trump’s damage, fulfill campaign promises and “maintain a credible [sic] nuclear deterrence [sic]”. During the Trump era, it may have been reasonable for NATO to worry over the damage his next announcement or policy update would do to the alliance. It seems unlikely that Biden will create major ripples, but there’s always a chance.

Chiampan’s brief serves as a useful insight into NATO thinking and suggests a number of issues that anti-nuclear campaigners should be alert to.

What is a Posture Review?

The NDC Policy Brief provides a useful outline:

“The [Nuclear Posture Review] is a public policy document that each US administration has published since 1994 during the first months in office and that is scheduled to be released in 2022. NPRs are important public statements: they set out the administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. NPRs are also crucial signalling documents. They provide insight into an administration’s understanding of the prevailing geopolitical environment ... and convey US intentions to allies and adversaries alike. Given NATO’s significant reliance on US extended deterrence, the elements of continuity and change that the new NPR will propose will inevitably have direct effects on NATO’s defence posture.”

Trump’s 2018 NPR contained much alarming rhetoric that sparked concerned reaction from the anti-nuclear movement. Beyond the rhetoric, there were a series of announcements that provided concrete evidence of sharply increased nuclear risks. The worst amongst these was the plan to develop and deploy new ‘low-yield’, often termed ‘useable’, nuclear warheads. These warheads were to be placed on “existing Trident D-5 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) known as the W76-2 and [a] re-introduced sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM)” that Obama had taken out of service.

Will Biden scrap this “bad idea”?

Biden has personally called the W76-2 a “bad idea” and said that the US “did not need new nuclear weapons”. Despite thinking they’re a “bad idea” his administration has confirmed funding for both in the 2022 defence budget. Will the NPR announce a change of direction?

Chiampan argues that “adding new capabilities signals an unjustified lack of confidence in the existing ability”. If Biden’s NPR includes a commitment to see through on the development and deployment of these ‘useable’ nuclear weapons, then it suggests that NATO’s existing capabilities (ie. the nuclear capabilities that the US deploys to allegedly maintain ‘alliance security’) are not ‘up to the job’. This brings into question the often-repeated claim that US nuclear weapons in Europe are the ultimate guarantor and that NATO’s strategy is central to overall security. Such an admission would bring NATO back to the situation it found itself in under Trump: a big question mark hung around its neck. Will Biden want this?

Further, the deployment of ‘useable’ nuclear warheads, whether on submarines or on warships, will have the following impact:

Most importantly, both weapons carry risks of lowering the nuclear threshold; blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear missions and increasing the chances for miscalculation. In a crisis, an adversary would be hard-pressed to distinguish a Trident missile carrying a single W76-2 from one carrying multiple higher yield warheads, or a SLCM mounting a conventional or nuclear warhead.

Given Biden’s oft-repeated commitment to reviewing the US’s ‘declatory policy’ on nuclear weapons, such a lowering of the threshold seems contradictory.

Sole Purpose

Whereas some nuclear-armed states maintain a clear public stance on the circumstances under which nuclear weapons would be used (China, for example, maintains a ‘No First Use’ policy), NATO’s policy “rested on one key characteristic: ambiguity...”:

Allies did not resolve to predetermine in what circumstances they would use nuclear weapons. Allies could, for instance, use nuclear weapons first in a conventional conflict to achieve specific military goals ... This ambiguity would leave an adversary deterred for fear of triggering nuclear escalation. Despite significant reduction in the number of weapons deployed in Europe after the end of the Cold War, this ambiguity continues to underpin NATO’s deterrent posture.

This ambiguity, combined with the development of ‘useable’ nuclear warheads, has significantly lowered the threshold for nuclear use. Other factors, such as the diminution of the overall capabilities in the Royal Navy (UK), lower the threshold further. Biden and his administration are on record as registering this situation, which is why the issues of ‘No First Use’ and ‘Sole Purpose’ have been discussed in mainstream disarmament and arms-control discourse.

A ‘No First Use’ policy benefits from a high degree of clarity over the circumstances under which a nuclear-armed state would use nuclear weapons: only in response to a nuclear strike from another party. This is how Chiampan describes a ‘Sole Purpose’ posture:

In its most basic formulation, sole purpose states that the US nuclear arsenal exists exclusively to deter a nuclear attack, whether against US or Allies’ territory. Sole purpose dramatically reduces ambiguity regarding the scenario for nuclear use ... While [No First Use] restricts nuclear employment scenarios dramatically, sole purpose would allow, in theory, for first use if this was essential to deter, for instance, an imminent nuclear strike ... In other words, NFU offers a clear restriction on nuclear employment, while employment restrictions from sole purpose largely depend on its qualifications and implementation.

Obama’s administration examined the possibilities of adopting a ‘Sole Purpose’ posture but rejected the idea “largely on account of European and Asian allies’ anxieties that this would undermine extended deterrence.” As previously reported in END Info, the individual though most likely to introduce ‘fresh thinking’ of this type into Biden’s NPR has been dismissed from post. The prospects of a significant shift in nuclear posture look slim.

Enduring Risks

Given the agreement to fund new nuclear weaponry and the lack of clarity with regards to prospects for NFU/Sole Purpose, will Biden’s NPR herald a decisive break with the past? The signals are not promising. These signals include an ongoing ratcheting of tensions with Russia and China, recent declarations from NATO and individual NATO member states (including the UK, which announced an increased ‘ambiguity’ in posture). How will Biden’s NPR relate to the recently announced AUKUS agreement between Australia, the UK and US?

One thing we can be sure of is that Biden’s NPR will not remove the stark, existential risks posed by a nuclear-armed world. Our work for nuclear abolition must continue.

* Andrea Chiampan, ‘Biden’s nuclear posture review: what’s in it for NATO’, NDC Policy Brief, No. 21, December 2021. All quotes taken from this document. Accessed at: www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1640