On the 'responsibility to uphold the NPT'

From END Info 28 - Jan/Feb 2022 - DOWNLOAD

By Tom Unterrainer

After some delay, the tenth Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was due to be held from the 4 to 28 January 2022. it has now been postponed once more. Speaking on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the NPT’s opening for signature, 24 May 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that:

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an essential pillar of international peace and security, and the heart of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its unique status is based on its near universal membership, legally-binding obligations on disarmament, verifiable non-proliferation safeguards regime, and commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Secretary-General is not alone in offering praise for the NPT. In a written statement to Parliament on the UK’s national report to the NPT, defence minister James Cleverly reports that:

The UK’s commitment to the Treaty and to fulfilling our NPT obligations remains undiminished. As an original signatory of the NPT, and a Nuclear Weapon State that takes its responsibilities seriously, the UK remains committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons where all states share in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.

The NPT has been an unmitigated success for over 50 years. It is the centre of international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to create a nuclear weapon-free world, and to enable access to the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

The report itself (National Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, pusuant to Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference 2010 for the 10th NPT Review Conference) opens with a ‘Ministerial Introduction’ from Mr Cleverley, Baroness Goldie and Greg Hands, Minister of State at the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. The Ministers claim:

We are strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects. We believe there is no credible alternative route to effective and verifiable disarmament ...

[W]e cannot take the NPT for granted. Our recent Integrated Review ... recognises that nuclear risks have not gone away - indeed, they are getting worse ...

Every NPT State Party, not least the Nuclear Weapon States, has a responsibility to uphold the NPT ...

Every action the UK takes in this effort, as set out in the pages that follow, is underpinned by a firm belief in the importance of transparency.

Warheads

Compare and contrast these sentiments to the following passages from the Integrated Review:

In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads. (IR page 76)

An increase in the warhead stockpile from 180 to 260 warheads represents a 44.4% increase. If the British government is “strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects” then why is it increasing the number of nuclear warheads? Isn’t this the opposite of “implementation”? Doesn’t the internal proliferation of nuclear weapons increase, rather than decrease the “nuclear risks” that Cleverley et al warn us of? What to make of this section of the Integrated Review?

While our resolve and capability to do so if necessary is beyond doubt, we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Given the changing security and technological environment, we will extend this long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity and no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers. This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.

(IR page 77)

Transparency

In its report to the NPT, the British government claims that its actions are “underpinned by a firm belief in the importance of transparency”, yet in the Integrated Review they announced a policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ extended to cover numbers of warheads and other capabilities in addition to the ambiguity around overall posture. How is this transparent? Then there is this announcement:

The UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT). This assurance does not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. However, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.

So the British government is publicly committed to both upholding and - if it chooses - breaching the NPT! Which is it? Basic logic suggests that you cannot be “strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT” at the same time as ‘reserving the right’ to break such commitments. Perhaps ‘basic logic’ does not operate in the field of nuclear weapons. History suggests as much. Fortunately, some practitioners and experts on international law do operate in the realm of basic logic.

For instance, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK commissioned a legal opinion on the Integrated Review announcements from Professor Christine Chinkin & Dr Louise Arimatsu of the London School of Economics and Political Science (April 2021, available at cnduk.org). Professor Chinkin and Dr Arimatsu conclude their opinion with the following statements:

In our opinion, for the reasons set out above:

(i) The announcement by the UK government of the increase in nuclear warheads and its modernisation of its weapons system constitutes a breach of the NPT article VI;

(ii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a state party to the NPT solely on the basis of a material breach of the latter’s non-proliferation obligations;

(iii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in self-defence solely on the grounds that the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities or emerging technologies, could have comparable impact to nuclear weapons.

This legal opinion and thousands of signatures from British citizens and residents critical of the breach of international law were handed in to President-designate of the NPT RevCon, Ambassador Gustavo Flauvinen, in the first week of December 2021. Will any of the NPT State Parties be prepared to formally raise the UK’s non-compliance over the course of January 2022? The breach of international law already established and the glaring contradiction between the contents of the Integrated Review and National Report give plenty of material to work with.

Section I of the National Report on ‘national measures relating to disarmament’ doubles-down on the contradictions with specific reference to Action 5(c) of the 2010 NPT Action Plan. Action 5(c) commits state parties to:

To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

The National Report claims that the:

Integrated Review maintains our commitment to ensure that nuclear weapons play the smallest possible role in our national security strategy, in keeping with Action 5(c) ... and supports our continued commitment to transparency of doctrine and capability.

Section II of the National Report focuses on “national measures relating to non-proliferation”. Under the sub-heading ‘AUKUS’ we are told that:

Under the UK, Australian and US enhanced trilateral security partnership (AUKUS), we have committed to an 18-month programme to work to identify the optimum way to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy. These will not carry nuclear weapons. Any progress will be consistent with our international obligations and our respective safeguards obligations. [p 20)

The NPT explicitly rules out the transfer or sharing of nuclear weapons technology. It also explicitly promotes the sharing of nuclear power technology. The British government seems to think that nuclear-powered submarines constitute a “peaceful” use. So far, so illogical.

Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones

Further on in Section II, attitudes towards Nuclear weapon-free zones are recorded. It is claimed that:

The UK continues to support the principle of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ). Accordingly. the UK can provide legally-binding negative security assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of a NWFZ by signing and ratifying a protocol to the NWFZ treaties. [p23]

There are currently five NWFZ treaties, four of which have been signed and ratified by the UK. Why has it not signed and ratified the fifth, the Treaty of Bangkok, which has been in place since 1995? We are told on page 24 that “difficulties over proposed reservations and declarations have delayed signing by the” nuclear weapon states. The Treaty of Bangkok covers Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philipines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. This is a strategically ‘sensitive’ region where the nuclear weapons states maintain active interests. Any NPT state serious about upholding the treaty or acting in good faith on the 2010 RevCon Actions Points would surely support the Treaty of Bangkok. Action Point 9 from 2010 states:

The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.

Why are no such efforts made in Europe, where the concept of NWFZs originated? Why the multiple delays and disruptions with respect to the much-promised and much-needed ‘Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone’? What might link the refusal of the Treaty of Bangkok, lack of effort in Europe and the fate of the MEWMDFZ? South East Asia, Europe and the Middle East are a vipers nest of ‘interests’, ‘influence’ and competition. On page 25 of the National Report the UK attempts to explain delays to the Middle East Zone:

We remain fully committed to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and to the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. It is our long-held view, consistent with the principles and guidelines for MWFZs adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999, that all processes related to such a zone should be based on consensus and on arrangements freely arrived at by all states in the region.

As a co-sponsor, we fully recognise our responsibilities under the 1995 Resolution. We remain prepared actively to support and facilitate renewed regional dialogue aimed at bridging the differing views in the region on arrangements for a Conference that is set out in the NPT 2010 Action Plan.

The UK attended the Conference convened by the UN in 2019, demonstrating our commitment to the establishment of the zone, whilst also voicing our reservations about the credibility of a process that does not have the support of all states of the --region.

Which states might be reluctant to join the ‘consensus’ in the Middle East and ‘freely agree’ to arrangements? Which states might not support the creation of a zone free from nuclear weapons in the Middle East? Why doesn’t the National Report name these states? Happily - or perhaps not - we do not have to guess at the identity of one such state. Israel is the only nuclear-armed state in the entire Middle East. For a nuclear-free zone to be established in the region, Israel would have to renounce its nuclear weapons. In order for this to happen, Israel’s allies would have to apply significant diplomatic pressure and perhaps risk losing a consistent ally in this oil and resource rich - and geopolitically important - region.

Quite why the British government doesn’t get straight to the point should be obvious: Britain and allies want us to focus on the alleged but as yet unproven Iranian nuclear weapons programme. In November 2021, Britain and Israel signed a major trade and defence deal. A joint statement between the British and Israeli foreign ministers Liz Truss and Yair Lapid, declared:

“We will also work night and day to prevent the Iranian regime from ever becoming a nuclear power. The clock is ticking, which heightens the need for close cooperation with our partners and friends to thwart Tehran’s ambitions.”

No word on the actually-existing nuclear weapons systems in Israel, no reference to the NPT and the commitments laid out in the National Report. It is almost as if the British Foreign Office isn’t being wholly transparent with other NPT member-states. It is worth noting in this context that there is one country in the Middle East which has never been a member of the NPT: Israel.

Conclusion

The UK’s National Report is little more than a work of fiction. As with much else that emanates from the Johnson government, it’s as if they’re taking us for fools. Will the non-nuclear weapon states tolerate such a situation? Will those NPT member states that have also signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons allow the UK to present such a blatantly false account to the RevCon?

If the NPT is to live up to the claims made for it, then each and every instance of non-compliance should be vigorously accounted for. If the NPT is to avoid the perception that it is little more than a convenient rock for the nuclear weapon states to hide behind when the question of nuclear abolition is raised, then the non-nuclear weapon states must draw a line.

The prospects for such accountability are hindered in a number of ways. First, the ‘business’ of the NPT RevCon is in the hands of the state parties. This means that civil society, which can see through the lies and bluster, cannot get its issues onto the agenda. Not only that, but as with all international settings the states with the most power have the biggest say in what and what does not get discussed. It would take courageous and insistent action on the part of a number of states to change this situation. They are being encouraged to do so and the growing numbers of states ratifying the TPNW gives some encouragement.

A further block on decisive moves at the NPT arises from the fact that the United States is in the process of finalising its Nuclear Posture Review. Mr Biden and his representatives will know the basic outline of the NPR and will want to avoid anything that contradicts it from emerging at the NPT RevCon. Relatedly, the NPR looks likely to re-emphasize the overall strategic direction of the United States - and allies - with respect to what the UK’s Integrated Review termed “systemic competitor” states. The increasing global tensions and increased rhetoric against Russia and China cannot be separated from the question of nuclear arms and the international systems and treaties that are supposed to protect us from the ultimate danger.

Whether or not the NPT RevCon and its outcomes make the world a more or less dangerous place is something we must all keep in mind.