NATO, nuclear weapons and Europe

From END Info 26 DOWNLOAD

Joachim Wernicke

Evaluation of the communiqué on the NATO summit on 14 June 2021

It was a major endeavor to evaluate the 31-page NATO communiqué of June 14, 2021 (covering 79 topics, with much self-praise and repetition), in search of facts about the possible stationing of new US intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Following US President Trump’s termination of the 1987 INF Treaty in 2019, new such missiles – Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons (LRHW) for the US Army and Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) for the US Navy – were tested and ordered, for delivery from 2024.

What follows are selected and annotated citations from the communiqué (topic numbers in brackets), in their own translation, as the original NATO text is published in English, French, Russian and Ukrainian, but not in German:

(3) “Russia’s aggressive actions pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” So NATO officially states Russia is a military adversary.

(9) “While NATO adheres to international agreements, Russia continues to break the values, principles, trust and agreements that underlie the NATO-Russia relationship.” No indication of which agreements have been broken from NATO’s point of view. And the claim conceals the Western breaches of international agreements, for example: promises to the Soviet head of state Gorbachev in 1990 and the breaking of these promises by NATO’s eastward expansion since 1997; permanent stationing of NATO units in countries of the former Warsaw Pact, thereby breaking the NATO-Russia Basic Act.

(11) “(...) the creation of modern dual-capable [i.e. conventional and nuclear] missiles in Kaliningrad (...), which increasingly threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.” NATO does not specify how, in its view, these missiles which have been stationed in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly German North-East Prussia) since US President Trump’s termination of the INF Treaty in 2019 “increasingly threatens the security of the Euro-Atlantic area”. What is the difference between whether the missiles are stationed in Kaliningrad, in the Russian heartland or on Russian naval ships? Unfortunately, NATO is silent about the presumably important reason that Russia stations missiles in vulnerable circumstances in the small Kaliningrad area which is only the size of Thuringia and in the crosshairs of NATO guns from Poland, Lithuania and the Baltic Sea. And NATO fails to mention that it was US President Trump’s termination of the INF Treaty that allowed Russia to produce and deploy the intermediate-range missiles necessary to shell the US command structure in West Germany from Kaliningrad. Thus, this threat was caused by the NATO chief himself. The communiqué does not ask why this happened.

(22) “NATO is advancing a new military strategy through the implementation of two significant military concepts that will further strengthen our ability to deter and defend against any potential adversary and to maintain and develop our military lead in the future.” Thus, NATO confirms its superiority over the Russian armed forces, which is also known and documented by a comparison of the military budgets (the USA spends more than ten times that of Russia).

“The concept of warfare envisages a long-term vision for the maintenance and further development of NATO’s decisive military lead.” NATO confirms that it is preparing for warfare. But it fails to specify where the battlefield would be.

There is a general consensus that any warfare in Europe is incompatible with the protection of civilians in European countries, including Russia. That is why warfare in Europe inevitably means genocide. Successful military defence is no longer possible in Europe. On the other hand, non-violent civil defense is possible. Political problems in Europe can no longer be solved by military force. The main task of any European government is to prevent any warring party from bringing the effects of weapons of war to its territory. The reasons for this are Europe’s centralized infrastructure, the extreme dependence on electrical power and the lack of shelters for the civilian population.

(25) “We will not be constrained by any possible adversary regarding the movement of Alliance troops on land, in the air or at sea and within any part of the Alliance territory.” Thus, NATO claims the right to deploy new US intermediate-range missiles near Russia’s borders, despite the violation of the NATO-Russia Basic Act, and on Europe’s inland seas. NATO fails to mention that the presence and movement of foreign NATO troops on the soil of NATO members requires the prior permission of these members.

(26) “We reaffirm our commitment to respond in an appropriate, balanced, coordinated and timely manner to Russia’s growing and evolving range of conventional and nuclear-equipped missiles, which is increasing in scale and complexity, and which poses significant risks to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area from all strategic directions (...) We have no intention of stationing land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.” Thus, the new US intermediate-range missiles are claimed as a “response” to Russian missiles (following the example of NATO’s argument for the stationing of US intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the 1980s). And of the Russian missiles, it is claimed that they are “conventional and nuclear-deployable”. However, NATO fails to add that the new US LRHW and CPS intermediate-range missiles have the same technical feature of dual capability.

NATO avoids talking more precisely about its intentions with regard to new US medium-range missiles. Land-based conventionally equipped missiles and sea-based nuclear and conventionally equipped missiles are expressly not excluded. The U.S. government claims that the new LRHW and CPS missiles will only carry conventional warheads — the “C” stands for “conventional”. There are reasons to doubt the truth of this claim. Replacing conventional warheads with nuclear warheads is technically easy, and the lower weights of recent nuclear warheads gives the missile greater range.

(31) “In cases of hybrid warfare, the [NATO] Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack.” The success of “hybrid warfare” against a state presupposes that it has delivered its critical infrastructure to insecure data networks – a self-inflicted vulnerability that can be easily avoided by appropriate technical protection measures and by humans instead of remote-controlled robots at critical control points. It is therefore doubtful that “hybrid warfare” or a “cyber attack” can be considered a military attack under Article 5 of the Charter of the United Nations – or whether it is merely a euphemism for and irresponsible dereliction of duty to exercise caution in data security. If I leave my front door open and then complain about a stolen item, who is to blame? The thieves or me? In World War II, no one could shut down a power plant or waterworks via a telephone line or a radio link.

NATO gives the impression here that the proclamation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty is a strong measure of the NATO Council, which inevitably leads to military action against an adversary. However, this is not the case. NATO is ‘sovereignty-friendly’. Each member state decides individually how to proceed in the event of a NATO alliance case, ranging from a diplomatic touch of compassion to military participation. There is no obligation of any kind for the individual member state to participate in warfare that NATO intends or begins.

The only exception is those NATO member states that allow foreign troops on their soil. The sovereignty of these states is undermined because, under international law, foreign troops are allowed to stage military actions in alleged “self-defense”, at their own discretion, with weapons of their own choice, regardless of the decisions or wishes of the host country. This problem affects Germany and Great Britain, for example. On the other hand, France, Denmark, the Czech Republic and other NATO members act differently: no deployment of US troops.

(34) “We continue to improve our increased forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland by adapting to plans and by ensuring the ability of the four combat-ready battle groups to operate in conjunction with the national homeland defense forces.” Thus, NATO acknowledges that there is a permanent ‘reinforced forward estate’ in the territory of the former Warsaw Pact, consequently in violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

(40) “The Alliance’s strategic forces, especially those of the United States, are the highest guarantee of allies’ security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have their own role and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. The separate decision-making centers of these allies contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of possible adversaries. NATO’s nuclear deterrence set-up is also based on United States nuclear weapons deployed forward in Europe and infrastructure provided by the allies concerned.” This fundamentally correct description results from the fact that NATO is legally a foreign legion of the US president. The Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe also serves as NATO Commander-in-Chief. The US nuclear weapons stationed forward in Europe allow the US president to cause crisis in Europe while keeping his the ‘homeland’ safe.

The French nuclear forces are outside this purely US national chain of command of NATO. Britain’s nuclear weapons use Trident II launchers leased from the US, so they must realistically be seen as part of the US national chain of command, at least as long as it is only a matter of blocking British actions that are not acceptable to the US government.

(44) “We have told Russia many times that the BMD system [ballistic missile defense] cannot work against Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and that there is no intention to redevelop this system in the future to give it the capability.” This claim is obviously false, because the GMD/GBI heavy defense system against intercontinental ballistic missiles is in use in California and Alaska.

(46) “NATO will continue to respond in an appropriate and responsible manner to the material risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile to the security of the Alliance and by other short- and medium-range missiles (...) Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on the stationing of mid-lying missiles in Europe does not fit in with Russia’s unilateral and continued deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from deploying such missiles outside its European territory; this proposal is therefore not credible and unacceptable.” What kind of “essential risk” do Russian cruise missiles 9M729 (SSC-8) pose compared to Russian sea-based cruise missiles 3M14 (SS-N-30)? What other Russian short- and medium-range missiles pose such a “significant risk”?

Russia’s rejection of US claims of violation of the INF Treaty by SSC-8 has never been independently investigated. The SSC-8 thus serves as a pretext for stationing new US missiles in Europe, as the Soviet SS-20 missiles did in the 1980s.

This paragraph reveals the structure of NATO’s public relations work for the stationing of new US medium-range LRHW and CPS missiles in Europe: unlike in the 1980s, there will be no negotiations on a new INF Treaty, claiming that the Russian proposal was “not credible and unacceptable”. Due to the prevailing media coverage of corona and climate change, the European public has not yet noticed the situation of the new US missile stationing and its consequences.

(47) “Allies remain strongly committed to the full fulfillment of the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968] and all its aspects, as an irreplaceable platform, and to strengthening the NPT through its mutually reinforcing three pillars (...) NATO’s nuclear arrangements have always been fully in line with the NPT, which is the only credible path to nuclear disarmament.” This NATO claim is obviously false: for more than 50 years, the three nuclear-weapon states in NATO have been permanently violating Article VI of the NPT, because during this time they have never sought nuclear disarmament “in good faith”, but have continuously participated in an international nuclear arms race.

“We reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which does not fit with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence strategy, is incompatible with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT and does not take into account the current security environment. The TPNW does not change the legal obligations of our countries regarding nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW in any way reflects or contributes to the development of customary international law.” NATO’s business model is based on nuclear weapons. That is why NATO rejects the TPNW, against the majority will of the peoples of NATO member states. But NATO’s claim that the TPNW “does not get along with the existing architecture for non-proliferation and disarmament” and “undermines the NPT” is false. The TPNW is based on the NPT and essentially corrects its fatal shortcoming, namely not to give a date for nuclear disarmament. Since 1968, the five nuclear-weapon states in the NPT have been taking advantage of this deficiency by mutual agreement, with the USA and Russia endangering the existence of civilization through their excessive nuclear armament. That is why signing the TPNW is the most important task of all governments today, even with priority over domestic tasks such as corona pandemic, climate protection, education, social services, etc.

All NATO member states except the US and Turkey are members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has been prosecuting and convicting war criminals since 2002. The legal standard for war crimes is the ICC’s interpretation of the international humanitarian law of war. The state of customary international law on nuclear weapons was established by the International Court of Justice in 1986, at the request of the UN General Assembly. The TPNW continues to strengthen this status, which also becomes important for states that are not participants in the TPNW.

As Richard Falk points out in The Spokesman 147 (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 2021), UN General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961 also has significance; it declared the threat of and use of nuclear weapons to be unconditionally illegal under the UN Charter. In addition, Falk points to the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, which has been observed internationally since 1945, and to the NPT itself. Both documents have weight in delegitimizing and stigmatizing nuclear weapons, with 122 of the 193 UN members (63 percent) voting for the TPNW in 2017. Regardless of NATO positions, compliance with international humanitarian law is a duty of every single citizen of the European NATO states. After committing a war crime, he or she stands alone before the ICC – neither their government nor NATO are able to protect him or her against prosecution, conviction and punishment.

Conclusion

Russia is now in a much worse military situation than the Soviet Union was in 1984. At that time, there was a security strip about 1000 km wide as a separation from NATO territory. The Pershing II missiles in West Germany, with their accuracy of meters and flight time of about ten minutes, were seen in Moscow as presenting an acute danger of decapitation strike against the underground bunkered Soviet command structure. The Soviet missiles of that time did not yet have the accuracy necessary to reliably destroy deep underground bunker targets. Therefore, in a situation of acute military tension in Europe in the 1980s, the Soviet military would have led a massive area-wide first strike as far as foreseeable, primarily the mass of the European-based US military, concentrated in West Germany, with destruction of the entire country as collateral damage, with an atmospheric total explosive force of a few tens of megatons, complete loss of the German population, moderate damage caused by radioactive fallout in neighboring states (mainly in eastern states due to the main wind direction) and a large area in Central Europe uninhabitable for at least future centuries.

The US forces in West Germany would have been destroyed in this proxy war. But by mutual agreement, both sides would have strictly avoided nuclear hits on the core countries of the USA and the Soviet Union. Both sides (Reagan/Gorbachev) recognized the remaining risks for their countries and defused the nuclear duel in Europe by concluding the INF Treaty with each other in 1987.

Today, the situation is fundamentally different. As a part of NATO’s eastward expansion, the new US medium-range missiles will be stationed directly near the Russian land border and in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. As a result of their longer range (around 2700 km), these missiles will be LRHW and CPS – faster than the old Pershing II, which will shorten flight times. This makes a nuclear decapitation strike on the command bunkers in Moscow possible within about five minutes. Given this stronger US position, there will be no new INF Treaty, not even negotiations with Russia, as NATO has made explicitly clear.

On the other hand, instead of a few tens of megatons of nuclear explosive power on West Germany in the past, Russia has gained a unique new and advantageous situation, thanks to the termination of the INF Treaty by US President Trump. With this termination, Russia was again given the freedom to produce and station land-based medium-range missiles. Due to technical progress in accuracy, a first strike with “only” a small number of nuclear hits of so-called “small” explosive force (comparable to Hiroshima/Nagasaki) would be sufficient to decapitate the bunkered US command system in Europe, which is located (also for the new missiles) in West Germany (at least with targets in Stuttgart, Ramstein, Wiesbaden and Spangdahlem). The enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg, East Prussia) is in a sufficiently close firing position for medium-range ballistic missiles, about 1000 km or seven minutes flight time away from the US bunkers in Germany. The required total nuclear explosive force would be a few tens of kilotons – a thousand times lower than in the 1980s.

This Russian first strike can be carried out at little risk for Russia, because the area of damage is limited to Germany, and a pretext is at hand, namely a ‘regrettable computer error in the automatic alarm system, which is unfortunately required since the US stationed the new missiles’. Russia could even immediately take responsibility and offer help and compensation. The hard-hit target areas (explosion areas and radioactive fallout drags) would make up a few percent of the area of Germany, with less than one percent of the population as victims of the attack. In view of this “minor” damage only to economic rival Germany and the now non-existent operational capability of US troops in Europe, the US government would possibly refrain from reacting militarily, because the Russian command system and the intercontinental ballistic missiles targeted at the USA would be fully functional and in a high state of alert.

The German-Russian relationship would be severely disrupted. Russia would have lost export customers for a while. But presumably the US would have permanently lost the role it had held as a European power since 1945, so Russia would have significantly and permanently increased its security. When Stalin annexed the area around Königsberg in 1945, he was reportedly interested in an ice-free Baltic Sea port. He probably never expected that one day this small enclave could play an existential military role for Russia.

The scenario described above must never happen. It can easily be prevented: The nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe and in the European inland seas must be urgently established, starting with Germany immediately following Austria’s example (since 2017) and signing the UN Nuclear Ban Treaty. This is a sovereign German decision, regardless of the assessments and wishes of the US and NATO. The German signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is demanded by 80 percent of the German population. The territory of the former GDR – a third of today’s Germany – has been a nuclear-weapon-free zone since 1990, thanks to the Two-plus-Four Treaty. Now the rest of Germany must achieve the same status. Thus, there will be no more US targets for Russian missiles in Central Europe. The next step: NATO and Russia embedded in the pan-European peace order of the OSCE, and a ban on any future attempt to solve political problems in Europe through military force, with gradual demilitarization of the continent and meaningful reallocation of the saved funds for urgent civilian tasks.

Translated from German. Any errors the responsibility of END Info.