Hypersonic threat

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According to Hypersonic Weapons: Background Issues for Congress, produced by the Congressional Research Service (accessed at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf):

The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs. Those who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies. In recognition of this, the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies “[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.” Similarly, the House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report notes that hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the years to come.

The report notes further that:

U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed, according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100 times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects.

The different branches of the US armed forces are developing their own hypersonic weapons systems:

U.S. Navy

In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle for use across the services. The common glide vehicle is being adapted from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully tested in 2011 and 2017. Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, the designer of the original concept, then will build the common glide vehicles. ... Booster systems are being developed separately.”

The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with a booster system to create a common All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army ...

U.S. Army

The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over 1,725 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive targets.”

U.S. Air Force

The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA’s Tactical

Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000 miles. Despite testing delays due to technical challenges, ARRW successfully completed a “captive carry” test flight in June 2019; its first free-flight test failed in April 2021.

The development of these weapons is in part a response to similar developments in Russia and China, which the US and allies view as strategic competitor nations. The race to develop and deploy such weapons systems is part of the new ‘arms race’ which seeks to enhance existing military capabilities by introducing new technologies, robotics, artificial intelligence etc... into the battlefield.

The questions that remain unanswered are: when will these weapons be deployed and where will they be stationed?

According to a report (11 August 2021) on the Breaking Defense website:

The US Army is steadily progressing with its Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) prototype, to the point the service plans to start training operations staff on ground-based equipment by mid October, says Bob Strider, deputy director of the Army Hypersonic Project Office.

“We are moving very rapidly toward getting this capability put in place,” he told the annual Space and Missile Defense Symposium on Tuesday. “We’re very, very confident that we’re going to meet our 2023 fielding date.”

The U.S. Navy and Air Force versions of these weapons will be in use wherever the Navy and Air Force deploy their ships and planes (the US has an extensive ‘boot print’) and as such the range of the weapons will not limit the scope of deployment as they will be carried by machines that themselves have significant ranges. The exact positioning of the ground-based hypersonic weapons by the US Army has not been revealed.

Various news reports on the operational requirements of the LRHW indicate that nearby airfields will be required to supply the equipment and military bases will be needed to house troops, conduct repairs etc...

The nature of the ground-based LRHW’s, their capabilities and the fact that they are intended to ‘meet the threat’ posed by Russia and China narrows down the likely field of deployment.

For example, with a reported range of 2,775km the LRHW could reach China from Guam. Likewise, if the LRHW was deployed in any part of Europe then Russia would be in range. It is worth noting that if LRHW was based in London, UK, for example, then it would be within comfortable range of Moscow, Russia, and the complex of command-and-control facilities in the area.

When these new weapon systems are deployed in Europe, it looks likely that they will be stationed in Germany or a neighbouring NATO member state (Poland, for example). It seems unlikely, but not impossible, that they will be stationed in the UK and whether or not the US is able to station them in Germany will depend to one degree or another on the outcome of the upcoming Federal elections.

Wherever these missiles are based in Europe, they are unlikely to increase security on the continent. More likely, the presence of such weapons will increase tensions further and lead to a deterioration of general security. There deployment will surely spark reciprocal deployments by Russia.

A further concern is addressed in more detail in Joachim Wernicke’s article on page 18. Although the LRHW’s are to ‘conventionally’ armed upon deployment, it appears that the missile technology is capable of ‘dual use’, which means that a conventional payload could be replaced with a nuclear payload. A similar situation exists with the Aegis Ashore missile systems: a fact we have pointed out on a number of occasions.

The European peace movements should be alert to the prospect of LRHW’s being stationed in Germany, Poland, Romania or elsewhere on the continent. We should be clear that any such stationing will degrade security and increase risk. Wherever possible, the alarm should be raised on this prospect and plans formulated to resist the deployment.