Unarmed Victory: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis
Bertrand Russell
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The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, more than any previous crisis, made the ordinary citizen suddenly aware of the ever-present danger of nuclear annihilation, and no sooner had the fright passed than it was renewed on the borders of India and China. Bertrand Russell shared these feelings, both the fright and the anger, but decided he must go on to turn concern into action. Russell’s book, Unarmed Victory, tells what he did in those frightening weeks, why he did it, and of the curious reception his activities had.
He asked Khrushchev not to challenge the US blockade of Cuba and Khrushchev acted as Russell had suggested that he should. This was exactly the action that the West had hoped for, but most people in the West still blamed Russell as too pro-communist because it was not by force that the result had been achieved. The same occurred in the Sino-Indian crisis. So the book contains a message of hope. Two precedents have been set for dignified and voluntary compromise in order to avoid nuclear war, and moreover the suggestions of a respected individual outside the battle were heeded. If we want a parallel we must look back to the thirteenth century, when Frederic II was quarrelling with the Pope and was ex-communicated. While ex-communicated he went on a crusade, but instead of fighting the Saracens, he negotiated with them. He secured far more than more warlike crusaders had ever been able to obtain, but he remained in bad odour with the Pope because it was wicked to negotiate with the Saracens. The analogy is very close.
As the world faces new, acute, nuclear tensions, you would hope that every effort was being made to reduce them. This seems not to be the case. Rather, the nuclear powers are exchanging nuclear threats and the situation becomes more perilous with each passing day. In the spirit of Russell, we call for an approach to resolving the nuclear threat that avoids the prospect of brinkmanship boiling over to disaster.
We republish extracts from Unarmed Victory and encourage all of those interested in learning more to read the whole text, which includes Russell’s letters to world leaders at the time.
Unarmed Victory
Bertrand Russell
155 Pages, ISBN 978 0 85124 812 7, £8.95
Russell wrote:
During the days of October 24 and 25 1962, those who had knowledge and imagination went through an anxious time. It seemed probable that, at any minute, war between America and Russia would break out and would involve, in all likelihood, the extinction of the human race. If you had private affections, if you had children or grandchildren for whom you had hoped a happy future, if you had friends whom you loved, you could expect their death in the coming week. Within this brief period of time, there would cease to be any to enjoy the poetry of Shakespeare, the music of Bach or Mozart, the genius of Plato or Newton. All the slow building up of civilization in art and science and beauty would be at an end—forever, so far as this planet is concerned. If you spoke of these things to your friends, they said: ‘But, surely, you can understand the great issues involved. Is the world to be governed by godless Communists (or, alternatively, rapacious Capitalists)? Is it not your duty to die for the right, without regard for whatever loss may be entailed?’ And so the great march towards disaster went on. I asked myself if there were no sane men in the seats of power. At the last possible moment, the answer came: Yes, there was one sane man. It happened that he was on the side of Russia. This was an unimportant accident. His sanity saved the world; and you and I still exist.
* * *
This crisis in October was so sudden and so swift that the usual forces making for conciliation had no time to act. There was no time for the United Nations to suggest conciliation. There was no time for the neutral nations to suggest compromises. There was no time for pacifist organizations to arrange demonstrations. In paralysed terror the world looked on as, hour by hour, the distance between American and Russian ships grew less. In the time available, only individuals could act. With little hope of success, I decided that I must telegraph to Kennedy and Khrushchev beseeching them to let the human race continue to exist. I had had reason, already, to think that Khrushchev might not be offended by my approach to him. I had sent a message to an international Congress in Moscow in which I said, inter alia:
‘The present situation is one involving imminent and daily peril, not only to the nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but to all mankind. Of all the risks that are involved in this or that policy, none is even approximately as great as the risk of nuclear war. I should like every negotiator from the West to state: “I am firmly convinced that a nuclear war would be worse than the world-wide victory of Communism”. I should like every negotiator from the East to declare: “I am firmly convinced that a nuclear war would be worse than the worldwide victory of Capitalism.” Those on either side who refused to make such a declaration would brand themselves as enemies of mankind and advocates of the extinction of the human race. At present, negotiators tend to be obsessed by possible dangers in any suggested concessions to the other side and to forget that the continuation of the arms race involves far worse dangers than those that negotiators are apt to emphasize.’
Khrushchev had picked out this passage in my message for special commendation. In the West, the message was less favourably received: the pundits of the British Labour Party made an abortive attempt to have me expelled from the Party for talking to Communists.
* * *
What was new, after the Second War, was the destructive power of nuclear weapons. When these came to be possessed by both sides, it became obvious that nothing desired by any Government could be achieved by nuclear war, but the strength and habit of tradition was such
that Governments went on exactly as before, threatening each other and pursuing power and prestige even at the risk of complete disaster to all sides.
The immense destructive power of nuclear weapons made World War untenable and the death of Stalin made co-existence possible as well as necessary.
* * *
But whenever the question of peace or war is relevant, the merits of either side become insignificant in comparison with the importance of peace. In the nuclear age, the human race cannot survive without peace. For this reason, I shall always side with the more peaceful party in any dispute between powerful nations. It has happened that in both the disputes with which this book is concerned, the Communist side has been the less bellicose, but it cannot be said that this is always the case. And, where it is not, my sympathies are anti-Communist.
* * *
Will the leaders of nuclear-armed states learn the lessons Russell develops in Unarmed Victory or will they allow the ultimate disaster to destroy humanity whole?