Time for Europe’s nuclear-weapon-free zone

Editorial comments, Tom Unterrainer

More nuclear brinkmanship

The 2022 Belarussian constitutional referendum, conducted three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (27 February 2022), resulted in the renouncement of nuclear-free status. The referendum was met with wide-spread internal opposition and the day of the referendum itself was marked by anti-war protests across the country. The elimination of nuclear-free status was only one of several measures intended to solidify President Lukashenko’s power.

If the timing of the referendum was mere coincidence, its outcome – along with Lukashenko’s support for Russia’s invasion – is of major significance. Take, for instance, these comments from Lukashenko on the day of the referendum:

“If you (the West) transfer nuclear weapons to Poland or Lithuania, to our borders, then I will turn to Putin to return the nuclear weapons that I gave away without any conditions”.

Did Lukashenko pluck the idea that the US might station nuclear weapons in Poland out of thin air? Or were such prospects on the table? You need look no further than the Twitter feed of the US Ambassador to Poland in 2020 to see that Lukashenko’s statement was not without foundation. It is worth noting that although the US Ambassador at the time, Georgette Mosbacher, has been replaced with Mark Brzezinski the Tweet raising this suggestion remains in the public domain.

The context in which such messages were sent was a growing opposition to the presence of US nuclear bombs in Germany and the refraction of this opposition through the Social Democratic Party. As we reported in END Info 15 (May 2020), Rolf Mützenich – SPD leader in Bundestag – publicly criticised the stationing of US bombs in the country:

“Nuclear weapons on German territory do not heighten our security, just the opposite ... The time has come for Germany to rule out a future stationing.”

The suggestion that US nuclear bombs could or should be move eastwards to a state bordering Belarus (and Ukraine) was a direct response to this mood in Germany at the time.

Despite the change in the Belarussian constitution and Lakashenko’s warning at the time of the change, US nuclear weapons have not arrived in Poland or Lithuania and Belarus remains free from Russian nuclear weapons. This does not mean that the matter is settled.

On 31 March 2023, Lukashenko took to the airwaves to deliver an hour-long speech to the nation. Among his comments was the following:

“Putin and I will decide and introduce here, if necessary, strategic weapons, and they must understand this, the scoundrels abroad, who today are trying to blow us up from inside and outside ... We will stop at nothing to protect our countries, our state and their peoples.”

These comments were reported in the press as a direct indication that Russian nuclear weapons would be stationed in Belarus. In an October 2022 interview with the Gazeta Polska weekly, Polish President Andrzej Duda is reported as saying:

“There is always a potential opportunity to participate in the nuclear sharing programme ... We have spoken with American leaders about whether the United States is considering such a possibility. The issue is open ... this would not be a nuclear weapon under the control of Poland. Participation in nuclear sharing does not imply having your own nuclear weapon”.

Duda’s comments were made in a new context, one where there is now no political will and a much-diminished mood in society to remove US bombs from Germany.

What appears to be happening with these repeated, reckless and frankly terrifying threats to proliferate nuclear weapons is connected to what Zbigniew Brzezinski (father of the current US Ambassador to Poland) termed the ‘Critical Core of Europe’s Security’ (see map) and the proximity of Belarus and Russia to this ‘Core’. As Ken Coates noted in his Foreword to the new edition of Bertrand Russell’s Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare:

“America’s diplomatic efforts are not disinterested, and follow the perceived interests of the American Government. This interest has been bluntly stated, in 1997, in respect of Ukraine, by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his blueprint for American Policy, The Grand Chessboard. It sees American power as dependent on the establishment and maintenance of hegemony over Ukraine, which is defined as part of the critical core or ‘geopolitical pivot’ of ‘American primacy’. (2001)

Such an analysis does not let Russia ‘off the hook’ with respect to its criminal actions in Ukraine. Nor does is excuse each and every aspect of Lukashenko’s conduct. But it does illustrate the fact that the US has long recognised the strategic centrality of control over Ukraine. It also highlights the degree to which the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe and the conduct of the nuclear-armed NATO play a central role in furthering US strategic aims. Lastly, it helps to give context to the brutal and dangerous realities of nuclear brinkmanship on the European continent and the degree to which such nuclear brinkmanship translates into US efforts to extend influence into ‘Eurasia’.

Each and every step – verbal, constitutional or actual – towards the ‘eastward’ or ‘westward’ deployment of nuclear weapons escalates the already significant nuclear tensions and nuclear risks faced by humanity.

In place of such escalation, Europe needs a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The 2016 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) working paper, A Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Europe: Concepts-Problems-Chances, outlines a number of such objectives: 1. Security objectives in the narrow sense, 2. Political-symbolic objectives and 3. Adapting defence policies to the political situation in Europe. More detail is given within each of the three objectives, as outlined below:

1. Security objectives in the narrow sense

Confidence-building in the regional neighbourhood: “All states in the region are loyal parties to the NPT, and for many of them, membership goes beyond compliance and involves active promotion of the spirit and letter of that treaty.” Acting upon Action Point 9 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference would build and reinforce trust amongst regional signatories to the NPT, and would signal to neighbours – Russia in particular – that no threat is posed.

Irreversibility and Stability: The creation of the NWFZ in Europe would be the result of a legally binding, verifiable and therefore “hard to revoke” arrangement.

Immunizing the region against the consequences of a nuclear confrontation: “one objective of any NWFZ has always been to protect the region concerned against becoming a nuclear battleground”.

2. Political-symbolic objectives

Strengthening the non-proliferation regime: Developing a NWFZ in Europe would mean signatories to the NPT acting on the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Such an act could only reinforce existing arms control and disarmament regimes.

Fostering nuclear disarmament: “Sub-strategic nuclear weapons are today one of the most nagging issues for nuclear disarmament … A NWFZ in Europe would intend to, eventually, cover an area in which NATO’s sub-strategic nuclear weapons are presently sited and to stimulate adequate reciprocal concessions by Russia concerning her capabilities in the same weapons category”.

Helping delegitimize nuclear weapons/provoking debate: As the PRIF study points out, the legitimacy of nuclear weapons as an issue of debate has never been “dormant”. There have, however, been identifiable periods when debate and discussion adopted a much higher pitch than usual. The stark threats posed to the continuation of the INF should be an opportunity for the debate to gain traction and the proposal for a NWFZ in Europe can only boost such debates.

3. Adapting defence policies to the political situation in Europe

“One of the most frequently heard observations by non-Europeans is the disconnect between the nuclear constellation and the political situation in Europe. The relation between the West and Russia is not without disputes and occasional tensions … but the idea of a war against each other sounds still far-fetched.”

Developments since the PRIF study was published now make it much easier to imagine war, even nuclear war, breaking out between “the West and Russia”. Further, the general political situation in Europe has deteriorated markedly in the years since the PRIF study, much ‘adaptation’ of defence policies is already underway. The development of plans for the NWFZ in Europe would add something definitively more positive to the current debate and could unleash an all-too-necessary political counter-dynamic to the current direction of travel.

An important aspect of any proposal for a NWFZ in Europe is that it would, in fact, benefit from being part of a international system of such zones. In his indispensable study, Security without Nuclear Deterrence, Commander Robert Green notes:

“Every year since 1996 the UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution introduced by Brazil calling upon the states parties and signatories to the regional NWFZ treaties ‘to promote the nuclear weapon free status of the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas’, and to explore and promote further cooperation among themselves.”

The first conference of states already participating in NWFZs took place in Mexico in April 2005. The declaration adopted by the conference reaffirmed a commitment to the “consolidation, strengthening and expansion of NWFZs, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the achievement of a nuclear weapons free world.” So not only do signatories to the NPT share a commitment to establish NWFZs, but existing such zones are committed to their expansion.

This leaves the rather important question of ‘who’, or ‘what’, will have the capacity to drive forward the call for the NWFZ in Europe. European peace movements can and must answer this question. A united European peace movement, dedicated to nuclear abolition and NWFZ’s, is needed now more than ever.