Return of the European Missile Duel?

From END Info 16 | June 2020. Download here

By Joachim Wernicke

In the period 1985-87 Europe was the scene of a nuclear missile duel between the USA and the former Soviet Union. In 1983 US intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Pershing-II, were deployed in Western Germany, followed in 1985 by the deployment of Soviet short-range missiles, SS-23, in the former GDR and Czechoslovakia. The nominal range of the Pershing-II was 1850 km, reaching the Moscow region. A technical innovation was the terminal guidance of the missile’s warhead with a hit accuracy of some ten meters. This precision allowed for the destruction of deep underground hardened shelters by nuclear hits, even with so-called low yield warheads comparable to the Hiroshima bomb of 1945.

In the Soviet Union the political-military command system was concentrated in the Moscow area. The talk was about 100 underground shelters. Due to the improved hit accuracy of the missiles since late 1980s the term of decapitation strike came into the official military vocabulary of the USA, meaning a surprise attack in order to destroy the Soviet leadership. A precondition would be the rush to overthrow the Soviet warning system. The ten-minute flight time of Pershing-II from Western Germany would leave the Moscow leadership no time for situation assessment and ‘rational reaction’.

In order to destroy a target with sufficient confidence, at least two missiles have to be fired on it. Thus a total of about 200 missiles would have been required for a decapitation strike against Moscow. The number of Pershing-II in Western Germany, according to NATO announcements, would be 108. In its open and unprotected deployment in the field these missiles were highly vulnerable and therefore unsuitable for a counterstrike after a Soviet attack: Use them or lose them.

As expected, the Soviet side reacted accordingly, deploying SS-23’s, with a flight time about 5 minutes. The purpose of the SS-23 was presumably to destroy by a nuclear first strike the Pershing-II sites before they could be used. Knowledge that a Pershing-II attack was imminent would have been based on espionage information which possibly would be incorrect, perhaps intentionally incorrect, but plausible for a government declaration in the international media. Following a Soviet first strike on Western Germany, a counterstrike by the USA would have been rather questionable. The Soviet Union, by striking first, would have experienced heavy damage to its international reputation. But the willingness of Continental European NATO countries to allow further US military installations and hardware on their territory would probably have been reduced. Thus the danger of a decapitation strike would have been diminished for the Soviet Union.

In 1987 the Soviet leader Gorbachev and US president Reagan agreed the INF Treaty for the destruction of all land-based intermediate-range missiles on both sides. In the process of agreeing the treaty it was revealed that the number of Pershing-II missiles was not 108 but 234.

Since 2018 Russia has deployed Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad, formerly part of the German province of Eastern Prussia. After US president Trump unilaterally withdrew from the INF Treaty, Russia is permitted to deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles. The approximately 500kg Iskander-M conventional warhead can probably be replaced by a nuclear warhead of lower weight, increasing the range.

Germany is the only Continental European country which provides territory to the USA for military bases at large scale. The USA is using these facilities in their wars in Africa and Asia. All their European command centres are located on German soil, including deep underground shelters in Stuttgart, Ramstein and Wiesbaden. Such shelters cannot be destroyed by conventional bombs but by precise nuclear hits, the detonation of which would cause considerable radioactive fallout. Is it unrealistic to assume that amongst the targets of the missiles in Kaliningrad there are US military installations in Germany, with the priority on command shelters? The distance is about 1000 km, an intermediate range.

Today there are no US intermediate-range missiles in European countries, and it is questionable if any European government still would give the US permission for a new deployment on its territory. However, a development in going on which Europe hardly is noticed: In the Pershing-II era sea-launched ballistic missiles were not precise enough to destroy deep underground shelters. Today, with satellite navigation, they are sufficiently precise. Since 2017 tendencies from the US Navy and their supporting industries have introduced intermediate-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads for surface ships into military discussions2. Sovereignty over the South China sea is given as the reason. As an example of the missile type required, the Pershing-II of 1983 is referenced. It could be redesigned with modern technology and adapted to the launch techniques used in surface ships. The working title employed is Pershing-III2, at a different source Sea Pershing3.

A missile like Pershing-III would offer a new capability: at similar weight as Pershing-II it could be built more compact, in order to fit into the launcher geometry of naval ships. In this weight of a typical conventional warhead also a nuclear warhead can be placed. A main strength of the US Navy’s surface ships are cruisers and destroyers in the global Aegis system. Its European command centre is located in Ramstein, Germany. For the direct radio coordination of the ships such a regional centre is indispensable, because the time-critical commanding of the ships in European waters via satellite communication from the USA would be too sluggish, due to the signal propagation delay.

An Aegis destroyer contains 96 vertical launcher tubes usable for SM-3 air defense missiles or Tomahawk cruise missiles. From the launcher space available it should be feasible to accommodate in such a ship (or a similar type of ship) about 25 Pershing-III missiles in modified launcher tubes. Eight such ships would be sufficient in order to launch a decapitation strike against the Russian leadership, using a total of about 200 missiles from the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea, with about 10 minutes flight time. However, this describes a technical feasibility, not any real military conclusions.

It might take some years until missiles of a Pershing-III type will be deployed on US Navy ships. But in this case the nuclear duel of the 1980s would be revived in Europe, instead of Pershing-II/SS-23 this time it will be with Pershing-III and medium-range ballistic missiles from Kaliningrad. The question is: Independent of the real intentions of the US leadership, after observing the first medium-range ballistic missiles on US surface ships, would the Russian military wait until the number of these missiles is sufficient for a decapitation strike before taking action?

These are the tensions and dangers that are building. In order to avoid the dangers, could Germany negotiate a deal with Russia? Could Germany copy the example of neighbouring countries and NATO members France, Denmark or Czech Republic – no foreign military in the country – in exchange for Russia retracting its missiles from Kaliningrad? In the same sense on the European level: could a treaty between the EU and Russia, for instance in the frame of OSCE, be arrived at? The verified ban on intermediate-range ballistic missiles not only in the European countries but also on the European seas? Here the geographical map and the international sea law gives a means to force such a ban towards Non-European states too, via the right for peaceful passage. Thus a new European missile duel would be permanently prevented. Indispensable for the success of such an effort would, however, be to bring the subject of a nuclear war danger into broad public discussion in Europe.

Notes

1. Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine – Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, New York 2017: Bloomsbury USA, ISBN 978-1-6081-9670-8.

2. Captain Sam J. Tangredi U.S. Navy (Retired) (2017), Fight Fire with Fire, Proceedings U.S. Naval Institute, August 2017, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/august/fight-fire-fire.

3. Gabriele Collins, US Naval War College, Time to Put China’s Rocketeers on Notice, The National Interest, February 8, 2017, www.nationalinterest.org/feature/time-put-chinas-rocketeers-notice-19372?page=0%2C1.