No First Use: US/UK connections
From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE
Tom Unterrainer
Text of a contribution made on 15th May to an online conference on ‘No First Use’ hosted by a coalition of US peace groups.
On 25th September 1945, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote to US President Truman in the following fashion:
“… I have so far heard no suggestions of any possible means of defence. The only deterrent is the possibility of the victim of such an attack being able to retort on the victor. In many discussions on bombing in the days before the war [World War II, that is] it was [argued] that the only answer to the bomber was the bomber. The war proved this to be correct. This obvious fact did not prevent bombing but resulted in the destruction of many great centres of civilisation. Similarly if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation…”
Why commence a short contribution on the question of a ‘No First Use’ policy with a quote from a letter written seventy six years ago? ‘Changing the political relationships of States’ is key.
At the time of writing, Britain was not yet a possessor of atomic weapons. It was, however, experiencing the collapse of its empire. One month before this letter was written, Truman had given the order for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after this letter was written, Attlee issued secret orders – kept secret from the majority of his administration, parliament and the people – for British scientists and engineers to begin work on what is still quaintly referred to as an ‘independent deterrent’.
Many of us gathered here will know that the ‘independence’ of Britain’s atomic weapons was short-lived, that following the successful test of a British hydrogen bomb the US waived the strictures of the McMahon Act and that the nuclear arsenal now maintained on these islands is entirely dependent on US technologies and assistance. We know that there is a ‘Mutual Defence Agreement’ between the US and UK, first signed on 3 July 1958 and which has been renewed nine times since. The next renewal date is 31 December 2024.
The extent of the UK’s reliance on the US in these matters extends from missile targeting – UK nuclear missiles are at several days’ notice to fire – to nuclear fuel for propulsion reactors. The UK’s nuclear weapon arsenal is, in fact, counted as simply a component part of the US arsenal.
So it is of some interest to trace the thoughts of two western leaders at the opening of the nuclear age. All the more so given Attlee’s warning that “if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation …”. All the more given the recent nuclear posture announced in the ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ titled Global Britain in a Competitive Age. This document says much about a certain interpretation of how the relationship between states has changed, but says nothing about how they should and could be positively changed to avert mutual annihilation.
The headline measure in the review was the announcement that Britain would abandon the upper threshold for the number of nuclear warheads it possesses and rather than maintain a commitment to reduce the overall numbers over time, it would increase the upper threshold by over 40%, a total of 260 warheads. This increase galvanised a wave of opposition in the UK and left many commentators baffled about the reasoning behind it. Others suggest that the announced increase simply reflects the fact that rather than actually reducing the numbers of warheads as promised, the UK failed to do so and has found a means to account for the failure. The review announced that in future, the British government will not be as forthcoming about the number of warheads in its possession.
Less notice has been taken of the outline offered on the UK’s nuclear warfighting posture, which begins:
“we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons.”
The review claims that:
“This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.”
It then goes on to explain that the UK “will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”
However, the British government then announces that all such policies are under review and that:
“the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact” This mean that it ‘reserves the right’ to reconsider and respond with nuclear weapons. It is not explicit by what means the reconsideration will take place, the time scale or the parameters that might guide the reconsideration.
The integrated review itself makes clear that ‘emerging technologies’ include drones, AI and cyber-attack type technologies. So here, the British government is warning of a drastic reduction in the threshold for nuclear use from a scenario where such weapons might be used to prevent a possible aggressor from using them to one where they might be used in response to the use or threat of use of a cyber attack, for example.
This posture announcement demonstrates a number of things: A complete failure of diplomacy and foreign policy in the face of a disrupted and still-changing global order; the relative incapacity of conventional British military capabilities to respond to perceived threats and a stick-not-carrot approach to engaging with the realities of the world as it is.
All of which has lowered the threshold at which the UK – and, we might presume – other nuclear armed states in the NATO alliance would actually use nuclear weapons.
Rather than assuring any sense or form of security, such a posture drastically increases the insecurity of life on this planet. Such a posture acts as a block on the road to changed political relationships between states. How will the other nuclear armed states – some of which are described as ‘strategic competitors’ – respond?
Such a posture makes the case for examining the feasibility of adoption of an explicit No First Use posture and a thinking-through of how such a policy might be achieved all the more pressing.
What, for instance, does the new US administration think of Britain’s nuclear posture? Will the shift in the UK’s posture be reflected in the future US Nuclear Posture Review or will it be repudiated?
What does the UK’s posture mean for mainland Europe, which is once again being thought of as a potential nuclear battleground? The Russian Foreign Ministry was outspoken in opposition. The German Foreign ministry spokesperson raised concerns about the numbers of warheads, but not much has been said about the threatened reduction in threshold for use.
The peace movements in Europe are certainly alert to these changes and have voiced their concerns, as has the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK itself.
Joining the opposition to the British governments’ posture are a growing number of voices from former Naval-personnel, who warn of the risks associated and the parlous state of the British Navy and other conventional forces.
For the first time a several years, the US has an administration that might – just might – be more thoughtful, rational and open-minded on such questions than the British government. Whilst Prime Minister Johnson dreams of a ‘Global Britain’ and ‘Empire 2.0’, President Biden seems open to a different approach. Adoption of a No First Use policy by the US – the aim of efforts underway – would be an important contribution to our work in the UK and Europe more widely.
For more information on the conference and ongoing work see:
https://masspeaceaction.org/event/prohibiting-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/