Double standard policy

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

“I swear I believe Armageddon is near.”1

So wrote US President Ronald Reagan in his diary on the evening on June 7, 1981. What prompted this private proclamation of doom? Earlier that day, fourteen US-built F-16 aircraft flew from their base in the Negev dessert. These Israeli military jets made their way at low level across Jordanian and Saudi Arabian airspace, before reaching their target: the Osirak nuclear reactor, located just 10 kilometres southwest of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. The jets dropped bombs which destroyed Iraq’s fledgling nuclear energy programme.

In conformity with diplomatic protocol, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin informed the US President through his Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis. Some accounts hold that Lewis was stunned at the news, which was conveyed to Reagan via the text of this rather bland cable:

‘At 1940 local (1740 ZULU) Prime Minister Begin contacted me and asked me to convey the following message to you as quickly as possible. Commence text. Today our air force carried out a raid on the atomic reactor near Baghdad. According to the reports of our pilots the target was completely destroyed. All our planes returned safely. End text.’2

At the time of the attack, Iraq – unlike Israel – was a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear materials at the Osirak reactor were under the supervision and safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency and, with the exception of a short period following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, had been regularly inspected.3 The volume and status of the materials at the site were such that the prospect of Iraq developing nuclear weapons from them in the short-term was close to zero. Why, then, did Israel attack the Osirak reactor at this point? Why attack when Iraq was fully signed up to international arms control and monitoring arrangements? Why attack when there was little or no prospect of Iraq developing weapons from the small quantity of nuclear materials at the site?

Israeli elections were due to take place on June 30, 1981. Begin’s Likud party and government coalition partners were thought to have only a narrow lead in the run-up to the polls. Likud and company had been behind in the polls prior to the outbreak of tensions around the placing of Syrian missiles in Southern Lebanon – itself a response to building Israeli aggression. Israel had planned to attack these missile installations, first in April and then May but was thwarted by poor weather conditions and other factors. “Was the timing of the raid on Iraq an election-month substitute for the destruction of the Syrian missiles?”, asked Anthony Fainstein in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

“It is difficult for me to avoid this conclusion; the same thoughts have occurred to the Israeli opposition. The raid did provide psychological points against Iraq, but did little else for Israel beyond helping Begin’s re-election bid.” 4

Neither did the raid prevent Israel from unleashing an attack on PLO and other targets in Lebanon just ten days later, on June 17.

What prompted President Reagan’s stark reaction? Was the attack a surprise? Not according to archival record which contains multiple warnings from Ambassador Lewis.5 Was the US opposed – in principle – to an Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor? Almost certainly not. The reaction from the White House was about something else, as was the chorus of opposition that culminated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 487, which condemned:

“the danger to international peace and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations … [and] strongly condemns the attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”6

The main factor at play in the response was not outright opposition to Israel’s action but a concern about timing. Begin worked according to his own timetable – determined by the upcoming elections – and imperatives (more on which later), but the rest of the world – and the new US President in particular – feared a slide into widespread regional conflict that would jeopardise a clear settlement of power and influence in the region.

The Iran-Iraq war, which commenced in September 1980, was in part an attempt by the Iraqi regime to replace Iran as the preeminent regional power following the Iranian revolution. It was not until 1982 that the US officially ‘normalised’ relations with Iraq and – together with Saudi Arabia and others – started to pump money and arms into the country. The point here is that regional power and influence, beyond the role played by Israel in US regional concerns, was a key factor in the initial response to the Osirak bombing. Israel’s actions had potentially jeopardized the power settlement but in the event, the much-feared chain of events that could have led to full-scale regional conflict failed to materialise.

If timing was a factor for both Begin and Reagan in this instance, it was a marginal one in the overall dynamic. As far as Israel is concerned, its external priorities in relation to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is wholly determined by the fact that Israel is itself a nuclear power. As such, the attitudes of neighbouring states towards the acquisition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is conditioned by a nuclear-armed Israel. This is one leg of the ‘double standard policy’ that operates in the Middle East, whereby whilst Israel insists on maintaining and developing its own nuclear arsenal to ensure the ‘ultimate deterrence’, it cannot countenance any other regional power taking the same course. Official Israeli nuclear policy – insofar as it can be determined from under the veil of deliberate opacity – seems blind to the fact that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot but induce other regional states to develop their own nuclear programmes alongside the development of other weapons of mass destruction.

This point was comprehensively made by Matti Peled, onetime military commander of Gaza and Major General in the Israeli Defence Forces, turned peace activist and Knesset member. On 25 November 1987, during a speech on behalf of the Progressive List for Peace on a vote of no confidence in the Israeli Parliament, Peled stated:

“The Israel government deludes itself that being the leading Middle East state in the field of nuclear power bestows upon Israel immunity from weapons of mass destruction. This is one of the most dangerous illusions in the sphere of strategic thinking. There may be found some people, however, sticking to the argument that Israel is mainly concerned to prevent any Arab state from developing nuclear weapons … The Israeli government’s assumption that it can succeed in preventing the development of nuclear weapons by Arab states by a series of bombardments of nuclear reactors, is thoroughly unrealistic. This is another dangerous illusion distorting the strategic thinking of Israel.”7

Peled’s point being that the mere existence of an Israeli nuclear arsenal is no protection and, moreover, itself presents a threat to Israel’s security. Nonetheless, this approach to regional actors endures with hostility towards Iran the starkest illustration.

Another leg in the ‘double standard policy’ relates to what Commander Robert Green refers to as a “distinct version of the concept of existential nuclear deterrence”8 whereby:

“a deliberately opaque and contradictory posture of refusal to acknowledge possession, let alone deployment, of a nuclear arsenal. Understanding the evolution of this particular, perverse notion is essential because it poses a grave danger to Israel, the Middle East and the United States.”

Green continues, quoting from the 1993 edition of Seymour Hersh’s work on Israeli nuclear doctrine, The Samson Option:

“For more than three decades, successive American administrations of both parties, the bureaucracy, and the diplomatic service have ignored the existence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal … The current official position of the United States and its allies is, astonishingly, that there is no evidence that Israel is, in fact, in possession of nuclear arms.”9

Israel’s “distinct” formulation of nuclear deterrence and the continuing American disinclination to publicly recognising it, is all the more peculiar given the widespread acknowledgement and understanding that such a nuclear arsenal exists. Hersch is not the only writer to cover the story of Israel’s nuclear programme and policies. Anver Cohen’s important work, Israel and the Bomb,10 traces the development of Israeli nuclear strategy through stages of secrecy, denial, opacity and its current phase: ambiguity, whereby deliberate obfuscation and concealment are deployed.

In the last two of these phases, Israel has had a willing accomplice and enabler: the United States. Even when the US government has been presented with undeniable evidence, such as proof of joint nuclear tests between Israel and Apartheid South Africa or the materials presented by Mordechai Vanunu, no acknowledgement was forthcoming. Ken Coates presented an explanation for this state of affairs:

“Conventional theories of deterrence are deeply flawed, and nowhere more than in their standard presumption of a bipolar model of nuclear confrontation. In a crude way, several thousand warheads may, when confronted by several thousand other warheads, determine a certain kind of behaviour. No such determination may be presumed, however, once proliferation has extended to the ‘pariah’ states. In the hotspots which include and surround these states, there is sufficient turbulence to encourage the insane idea that nuclear weapons can be useful as a means of actual warfare. What elsewhere would be normal restraints of public opinion are here conspicuously absent. We have more than a little evidence that neither domestic nor international law controls the potential responses of such governments.

In small things, the Israeli government kidnaps its opponents, and visits exemplary repression on them. In large things, it misleads the United Nations and extends the threat of nuclear destruction to two of the most dangerous areas in the contemporary world.”11

Ken Coates did not have a crystal ball and could not have foreseen the coming of the Trump Administration in the US and its cooperation with the Netanyahu government in Israel. He could not have anticipated the degree to which the “normal restraints of public opinion” have degraded. However, he and other analysts were supremely alert to the trajectories of US policy in the Middle East and the terms by which the ‘double standard policy’ operated.

Notes

1. Reagan, Ronald (2007) The Reagan Diaries, Harper Collins

2. Evans, Alexandra (2017) ‘A Lesson from the 1981 Raid on Osirak’, The Wilson Centre,

3. Fainberg, Anthony (1981) ‘Osirak and international security’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1981

4. Ibid

5. Evans, Alexandra (2017) ‘A Lesson from the 1981 Raid on Osirak’, The Wilson Centre

6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 487,

7. Peled, Matti (1988) ‘Denuclearising the Middle East’ in Coates, Ken (ed) Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim – The Case of Mordechai Vanunu, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

8. Green, Robert (2018) Security without Nuclear Deterrence, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

9. Hersh, Seymour (1993) The Samson Option, quoted from Green, Robert (2018) Security without Nuclear Deterrence pp 123

10. Cohen, Anver (1998) Israel and the Bomb, Columbia University Press, New York

11. Coates, Ken (1988) ‘Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim’ in Coates, Ken (ed) Israel’s Bomb: The First Victim – The Case of Mordechai Vanunu, Spokesman Books, Nottingham

A nuclear-armed state versus the Palestinian people

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

Dateline: 16 May 2021. Al Wahda Street, central Gaza City.

Israel intensifies air-strikes on Gaza in a continuation of its latest assault on the Palestinian people. Official Israeli channels insist that such actions are “precision targeted” against individual “terrorists” and related organisations.

Al Wahda Street – in the bustling heart of Gaza – was home to many before the missiles struck. Amongst them were the family of Dr Ayman Abu al-Auf who served as head of Internal Medicine at Gaza’s Shifa hospital. By the end of the day, Dr al-Auf was dead. So were his 13 year old daughter Tala and his 17 year old son. All three killed by Israeli “precision” bombing.

According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), “Rula Mohammad al-Kawlak, 5, Yara, 9, and Hala, 12 – all sisters - together with their cousin Hana, 14, and several other of their relatives, as well as sisters Dima and Mira Rami al-Ifranji, 15 and 11, and neighbour Dana Riad Hasan Ishkantna, 9” were killed in the same “precision” attacks.

The NRC reported that by the 18 May, of the 60 children killed in Israeli attacks, 11 had been receiving treatment for pre-existing trauma at one of its facilities. Tala Abu al-Auf was one of their patients.

Tala’s life was dominated by trauma, suffering, uncertainty and violence. Anywhere else in the world, the teenage daughter of a doctor might have expected a relatively care-free and comfortable life. A life loaded with opportunity, hope and joy. Such opportunities are denied to the children of Gaza, be they the children of doctors or the children of the countless jobless in that stretch of land.

Tala is no longer traumatised. Death at the hands of “precision” bombing put an end to her too-short life.

* * * 

The most recent Israeli assault on the Palestinian people looks like an all-too-familiar and all-too-tragic event. Every few years the gross ‘normality’ of the protracted oppression of the Palestinian people is punctured by an intense assault at the hands of the Israeli military. Every few years the State of Israel pushes at the boundaries of what has previously been accepted by the international community and demands more. It deploys a highly organised, heavily equipped military and demands one bit more: more Palestinian territory, more Palestinian lives, more traumatised children, more concessions from world opinion.

Rather than maintain a balance between coercion and consent as is the norm in many states – ‘liberal’ or otherwise – Israel employs brutal coercive measures and demands consent from the world. The death, trauma and suffering of the Palestinian people are secondary to the drive for one more cluster of houses, one more stretch of land. The wishes of the Palestinian people or the calculable reaction of an oppressed people are not accounted for. All-too-often the death, trauma and suffering are not recorded on the balance sheet of world opinion.

When the reaction comes in the form of children throwing stones at soldiers in bullet-proof vests with machine guns slung over their shoulders, or in the firing of scores of missiles in the expectation that some of them will penetrate Israel’s sophisticated missile defence system, we are expected to draw an equals sign. We are expected to kneel at the altar of ‘reasonableness’ and condemn an occupied and oppressed people who refuse to kneel in the face of occupation and oppression. We might be tempted to draw an equal’s sign in the name of peace, in the name of opposition to violence whatever its source.

However, we cannot talk sensibly of peace unless we can identify and understand the roadblocks to peace. We cannot talk sensibly of peace unless we are clear that powerful forces are ranged against the conquest of peace. We cannot talk sensibly of peace in Palestine or the Middle East more widely without a clear recognition that in Palestine we are talking about a nuclear-armed state against a people denied a state of their own.

We cannot talk sensibly about peace in this region unless we are clear that the ‘double-standard’ policy employed by the US and allies with respect to Israel’s nuclear weapons is mirrored in the double-standards deployed in the treatment of Palestinians on the streets of Gaza, the West Bank and within the Palestinian community in Israel itself.

When Israel is allowed to maintain obscurity around its nuclear weapons arsenal when other states face threats of attack, sanctions and international opprobrium for seeking the bomb, a double-standard policy is at work. When Israel refuses to sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but threatens NPT member states with attack for developing a nuclear programme, a double-standard policy is at work. When Israel refuses to constructively engage in efforts towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East and finds encouragement for doing so, a double-standard policy is at work.

Where is the room for an equal’s sign? To draw such a sign would not only be a crime against mathematics but a crime against reality, a crime against morals and a crime against reason.

When a people stand up against decades of dispossession, occupation, trauma and oppression the peace movement must stand with them. When a nuclear-armed state, armed to the teeth with ‘conventional’ weapons with the help of foreign aid from the US, UK and elsewhere wages war then the peace movements are clear where we stand.

When we learn the name Tala Abu al-Auf, learn of her fate and know that she is one of legions who have suffered then we know where we stand. When we understand that a thick strand connects her killing to the lived experience of millions of Palestinians, to the fate of the Middle East and all the way to the murderous hum of Israel’s nuclear warhead stockpile, we know where we stand.

Stand with Palestine.

A version of this article first appeared on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament website, www.cnduk.org

The UK’s First Use policy

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d)

Text of a contribution made on 29th April to an online conference on ‘No First Use’ hosted by a coalition of peace groups.

I am a former British Royal Navy nuclear submarine commanding officer. In the 1970s I served in a UK Polaris submarine with responsibility for the ‘permission to fire key’ which would have launched 48 300kt warheads . I did so on the understanding that we would only be ordered to do so as a counter-attack – 2nd strike - against an incoming nuclear weapon attack by the Soviets. I would have withheld permission if I had any reason to think we were being ordered to launch a first strike. I was not prepared, under any circumstance, to start a nuclear war based on an intelligence assessment that the Soviets might be on the point of launching a nuclear attack. Intelligence can be fatally flawed, or wide open to misinterpretation or be straightforward prejudiced manipulation - as the 2003 US-UK invasion of Iraq showed all too clearly. Fortunately, UK Secretary of State for Defence’s pre-war assertion that nuclear weapons might be used to counter Saddam Hussein launching a chemical or biological weapon attack was not acted upon.

In the run-up to the 2016 UK’s Trident submarine replacement debate in the UK Parliament, I questioned the cost and utility of Trident missiles in this post-Cold War world. I was also concerned that this ignored the UK’s commitment to Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT’s entry into force in 1970 - two years before I went on my first Polaris patrol - had encouraged me to think that the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction was indeed so mad that, within my lifetime, nuclear weapons would become the dinosaurs they deserved to be. How wrong I was.

So it was quite a shock for me to discover five years ago that First Use had, secretly, always been part of UK planning but had not been declared either to us at sea or to the nation. We were all under the false impression that Polaris was solely a counter-strike weapon. And still today, hiding in plain sight - but camouflaged behind the comfort blanket phrase ‘weapons of last resort’ - is the fact that the UK’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ – as it is now called - could still include a First Strike as a ‘last resort’ if our conventional forces are in danger of being over-run.

This ambiguity places current UK Trident submarine Commanding Officers in an impossible position. If nothing is ruled out, then everything, including First Use, can be ruled in. However, submerged on patrol, they will have no way of knowing why they are being ordered to fire, what the target is, or the consequences on civil populations of doing so. They therefore cannot make the legal and moral judgements that the Nuremberg Principles require them to do. They will not know if they are carrying out a superior’s order to commit a war crime. They must completely trust in their Prime Minister who, uniquely among nuclear weapon States, has the sole authority for a decision to fire with no military or third party approval required.

Interestingly, another former Royal Navy submarine captain recently stated ‘I would not press the button for Boris’ – why? Because he said he did not trust Prime Minister Johnson’s judgment. Similar reservations were expressed by senior US military during President Trump’s time in office.

So I fully support this initiative to examine whether now is the time to press for a global No-First-Use policy. Much as I applaud and support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force recently, the reality is that an instant outright ban is not likely to be observed by the nuclear weapon states. But it may well apply such pressure on them that they feel the need to concede some relaxation of threat posture - such as No-First-Use - if only to show some compliance with NPT Article 6.

However, a big obstacle to overcome is that the nuclear weapon States justify possession of their weapons and the lawfulness of First Use by referring to the International Court of Justice 1996 Advisory Opinion which, by a casting vote, could not conclude whether or nor the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful if the very existence of a State was threatened; although it did decide that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would ‘generally’ be unlawful.

Similarly, the 1977 conference chaired by the International Committee of the Red Cross that negotiated Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions acceded to the nuclear weapon States’ insistence that the Protocol should not ‘name and shame’ any specific weapons. This enabled the UK to include in its Military Law handbook that the use of nuclear weapons was not prohibited by the Protocol: a factually correct conclusion but speciously achieved.

I therefore wonder if the UN General Assembly could be prevailed upon to frame a more specific request for the ICJ, and also perhaps for the ICRC, for an Advisory Opinion on whether there are any circumstances in which First Use - or even the threat of First Use - of nuclear weapons would be lawful? The danger of course is that, if First Use is deemed unlawful, it may seem to justify their use (or threat of this) for a counter strike. But this may be a temporary price worth paying.

In parallel, let us also consistently remind those States not signed up to the NPT that nuclear ‘comfort blankets’ provide no comfort at all. For every £ put towards funding a nuclear armoury that is already more than big enough to end the world, they are a £ further away from being equipped to defend against far more immediate modern day threats.

For more information on the conference and ongoing work see:

https://www.gcsp.ch/events/nuclear-risk-reduction-and-disarmament-it-time-no-first-use-policies-usa-and-globally

No First Use: US/UK connections

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Tom Unterrainer

Text of a contribution made on 15th May to an online conference on ‘No First Use’ hosted by a coalition of US peace groups.

On 25th September 1945, the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee wrote to US President Truman in the following fashion:

“… I have so far heard no suggestions of any possible means of defence. The only deterrent is the possibility of the victim of such an attack being able to retort on the victor. In many discussions on bombing in the days before the war [World War II, that is] it was [argued] that the only answer to the bomber was the bomber. The war proved this to be correct. This obvious fact did not prevent bombing but resulted in the destruction of many great centres of civilisation. Similarly if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation…”

Why commence a short contribution on the question of a ‘No First Use’ policy with a quote from a letter written seventy six years ago? ‘Changing the political relationships of States’ is key.

At the time of writing, Britain was not yet a possessor of atomic weapons. It was, however, experiencing the collapse of its empire. One month before this letter was written, Truman had given the order for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Shortly after this letter was written, Attlee issued secret orders – kept secret from the majority of his administration, parliament and the people – for British scientists and engineers to begin work on what is still quaintly referred to as an ‘independent deterrent’.

Many of us gathered here will know that the ‘independence’ of Britain’s atomic weapons was short-lived, that following the successful test of a British hydrogen bomb the US waived the strictures of the McMahon Act and that the nuclear arsenal now maintained on these islands is entirely dependent on US technologies and assistance. We know that there is a ‘Mutual Defence Agreement’ between the US and UK, first signed on 3 July 1958 and which has been renewed nine times since. The next renewal date is 31 December 2024.

The extent of the UK’s reliance on the US in these matters extends from missile targeting – UK nuclear missiles are at several days’ notice to fire – to nuclear fuel for propulsion reactors. The UK’s nuclear weapon arsenal is, in fact, counted as simply a component part of the US arsenal.

So it is of some interest to trace the thoughts of two western leaders at the opening of the nuclear age. All the more so given Attlee’s warning that “if mankind continues to make the atomic bomb without changing the political relationships of States sooner or later these bombs will be used for mutual annihilation …”. All the more given the recent nuclear posture announced in the ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’ titled Global Britain in a Competitive Age. This document says much about a certain interpretation of how the relationship between states has changed, but says nothing about how they should and could be positively changed to avert mutual annihilation.

The headline measure in the review was the announcement that Britain would abandon the upper threshold for the number of nuclear warheads it possesses and rather than maintain a commitment to reduce the overall numbers over time, it would increase the upper threshold by over 40%, a total of 260 warheads. This increase galvanised a wave of opposition in the UK and left many commentators baffled about the reasoning behind it. Others suggest that the announced increase simply reflects the fact that rather than actually reducing the numbers of warheads as promised, the UK failed to do so and has found a means to account for the failure. The review announced that in future, the British government will not be as forthcoming about the number of warheads in its possession.

Less notice has been taken of the outline offered on the UK’s nuclear warfighting posture, which begins:

“we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons.”

The review claims that:

“This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.”

It then goes on to explain that the UK “will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.”

However, the British government then announces that all such policies are under review and that:

“the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact” This mean that it ‘reserves the right’ to reconsider and respond with nuclear weapons. It is not explicit by what means the reconsideration will take place, the time scale or the parameters that might guide the reconsideration.

The integrated review itself makes clear that ‘emerging technologies’ include drones, AI and cyber-attack type technologies. So here, the British government is warning of a drastic reduction in the threshold for nuclear use from a scenario where such weapons might be used to prevent a possible aggressor from using them to one where they might be used in response to the use or threat of use of a cyber attack, for example.

This posture announcement demonstrates a number of things: A complete failure of diplomacy and foreign policy in the face of a disrupted and still-changing global order; the relative incapacity of conventional British military capabilities to respond to perceived threats and a stick-not-carrot approach to engaging with the realities of the world as it is.

­­All of which has lowered the threshold at which the UK – and, we might presume – other nuclear armed states in the NATO alliance would actually use nuclear weapons.

Rather than assuring any sense or form of security, such a posture drastically increases the insecurity of life on this planet. Such a posture acts as a block on the road to changed political relationships between states. How will the other nuclear armed states – some of which are described as ‘strategic competitors’ – respond?

Such a posture makes the case for examining the feasibility of adoption of an explicit No First Use posture and a thinking-through of how such a policy might be achieved all the more pressing.

What, for instance, does the new US administration think of Britain’s nuclear posture? Will the shift in the UK’s posture be reflected in the future US Nuclear Posture Review or will it be repudiated?

What does the UK’s posture mean for mainland Europe, which is once again being thought of as a potential nuclear battleground? The Russian Foreign Ministry was outspoken in opposition. The German Foreign ministry spokesperson raised concerns about the numbers of warheads, but not much has been said about the threatened reduction in threshold for use.

The peace movements in Europe are certainly alert to these changes and have voiced their concerns, as has the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK itself.

Joining the opposition to the British governments’ posture are a growing number of voices from former Naval-personnel, who warn of the risks associated and the parlous state of the British Navy and other conventional forces.

For the first time a several years, the US has an administration that might – just might – be more thoughtful, rational and open-minded on such questions than the British government. Whilst Prime Minister Johnson dreams of a ‘Global Britain’ and ‘Empire 2.0’, President Biden seems open to a different approach. Adoption of a No First Use policy by the US – the aim of efforts underway – would be an important contribution to our work in the UK and Europe more widely.

For more information on the conference and ongoing work see:

https://masspeaceaction.org/event/prohibiting-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/

Note on Nuclear Weapon Announcements in the UK Integrated Review

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Peter Jenkins, British Pugwash

Summary

The United Kingdom government recently announced, in the context of an integrated policy review, that it will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 (from a previous target of no more than 180) and that it will extend its longstanding policy of deliberate ambiguity by no longer making public figures for its operational stockpile, deployed warheads and deployed missiles.

These decisions are best seen as symptomatic of a belief that the United Kingdom’s and NATO’s security environment has been deteriorating and that now Russia in particular poses a grave threat to the Kingdom and its NATO allies. Pugwash has an opportunity to react constructively to the decisions by exploring the reasons for the heightening of NATO/Russian tensions in recent years.

Additionally, use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear aggressors in certain circumstances

is envisaged ( extension to the policy of deliberate ambiguity may be connected to this) and the right to review the UK’s negative security assurance to Non-Nuclear Weapon States is reserved. But nuclear weapon use in response to cyber-attacks and against non-state actors is ruled out, and the UK’s nuclear weapon submarines will remain at several days’ notice to fire.

Detail

The context of these changes in the UK’s nuclear weapons policy is a strategic review of “security, defence, development and foreign policy”. Being the first review of UK strategy since the 2016 decision to withdraw from the European Union, and inviting comparison with strategic reviews done in 2010 and 2015, the 2021 review suggests a wish to convince readers that EU withdrawal has enhanced the UK’s potential to be an important actor on the global stage. In particular, the 2021 review dwells on economic and political interests in the Indo/Pacific region and it sets out the capabilities, actual and aspirational, that the Kingdom can bring to bear on the pursuit of those interests. Nonetheless, it recognises that the North Atlantic area remains the primary concern of UK defence policies.

Increase in the Overall

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

“In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile

ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads”

Integrated Review of Security,

Defence, Development and

Foreign Policy (IR), 15 March 2021

The most specific and most logical explanation for this decision came in a TV interview that the Secretary of State for Defence gave on 21 March. He referred to improvements in Russian missile defences and implied that these meant the UK’s nuclear deterrent must grow in size to remain credible. UK governments have long taken a capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on Moscow as a yardstick for the credibility of the UK deterrent. Russia is thought to have been strengthening Moscow’s anti-ballistic missile defences in the context of a major upgrade of its anti-access and area-denial capabilities, lessons having been drawn from the first and second Iraq wars and NATO’s 1999 aerial assault on Serbia.

However, the Integrated Review itself contains no reference to Russian missile defences.

Instead, it refers to a wider, more amorphous range of threats, which has been described as “a deteriorating security environment.”

“We have previously identified risks to the UK from major nuclear armed states, emerging nuclear states, and state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. Those risks have not gone away. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their nuclear arsenals. They are investing in novel nuclear technologies and developing new ‘warfighting’ nuclear systems which they are integrating into their military strategies and doctrines and into their political rhetoric to seek to coerce others. The increase in global competition, challenges to the international order, and proliferation of potentially disruptive technologies all pose a threat to strategic stability….We will continue to keep our nuclear posture under constant review in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries.” (IR)

This explanation seems to lack logic. It is far from obvious that increases and improvements in another state’s nuclear forces require increases in a retaliatory nuclear force judged to be assured (because invulnerable to a first strike) and credible (because capable of causing a potential aggressor unacceptable damage). Nonetheless, this is the explanation to which the

Integrated Review gives pride of place.

British Pugwash has heard it said that these risk concerns centre on Russia, China, North Korea (DPRK) and Iran. Here, too, an element of illogicality enters in. China has stated publicly that it does not intend to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the event of a confrontation with an adversary, and it is hard to imagine the UK intending to be the initiator of a nuclear exchange with China. The North Korean government is preoccupied with what it sees as an existential threat from the United States of America. Iran is not thought to have resumed the research into nuclear weapon design and manufacture that it abandoned in 2003; its Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the possession and use of nuclear weapons; in agreeing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Iran pledged to remain a Non-Nuclear Weapon State; Iran does not possess a missile capable of reaching Western Europe; and Iran

has offered to refrain from developing missiles with ranges in excess of 2000 km.

It is probable, therefore, that these risk concerns centre essentially on the weapon systems and military doctrines of Russia, and that they are felt as much from a NATO perspective as from a national UK perspective. A country assessment of Russia in the review includes this passage:

“The UK respects the people, culture and history of Russia. However, until relations with its government improve, we will actively deter and defend against the full spectrum of threats emanating from Russia. Through NATO, we will ensure a united Western response, combining our military, diplomatic and intelligence assets in support of collective security ... We will also support others in the Eastern European neighbourhood and beyond to build their resilience to state threats.”

This is not the place to explore why the British government has formed a view that the United Kingdom and NATO now face a grave “spectrum of threats” from Russia. Several possible reasons will occur to anyone who has been taking an interest in the evolving character of Russia’s relations with NATO members since 2012. Suffice it to say that this grim assessment contrasts with the 2010 strategic review (which set the stockpile target at no more than 180):

“No state currently has both the intent and the capability to threaten the independence or integrity of the UK. But we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge – a state’s intent in relation to the use or threat of use of its capabilities could change relatively quickly, and while we will continue to work internationally to enhance mutual trust and security, we cannot rule out a major shift in the international security situation which would put us under grave threat.”

The 2021 assessment also goes some way beyond the assessment in the 2015 strategic review. The latter confines its Russian threat perception to the following sentence:

“Though highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that it [Russia] may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies.”

Belief in a re-born Russian threat thus seems to be the leading explanation for the decision to increase the overall weapons stockpile. Two other possible factors mention merit, however, before turning to the decision to expand a longstanding policy of ambiguity to embrace actual stockpile and deployed nuclear weapon numbers.

One is a possible fear that in time improvements in offensive underwater technologies will affect the invulnerability of the UK’s strategic missile submarines. Behind the stockpile increase could lie an intention to maintain more than one such submarine on patrol on a routine basis.

However, an IISS commentary on the Integrated Review casts doubt on the feasibility of a two-vessel routine, at least until a new generation of submarines enters service during the 2030s:

“There are, however, potential constraints to that scenario. Among them are the well publicised problems with the refits and serviceability of the current Vanguard class, which have recently made it challenging to maintain the minimum Continuous At Sea Deterrence requirement of one submarine on patrol.”

(The UK and nuclear warheads – stretching credibility?, 26 March 2021)

Second, it could be that officials have come to the view that the 2010 decision to cut the stockpile to 180 by 2025, re-confirmed in 2015, and to deploy no more than 40 warheads on routine patrol, was ill-judged and that the stockpile needs to grow, irrespective of changes in the strategic environment and threat perceptions, to achieve credibility. This possibility has been hinted at in British Pugwash’s hearing but there is no hard evidence for it.

Withholding of Missile and Warhead Numbers

“We will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Given the changing security and technological environment, we will extend this long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity and no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers. This ambiguity complicates the calculations of potential aggressors, reduces the risk of deliberate nuclear use by those seeking a first-strike advantage, and contributes to strategic stability.” (IR)

Two additional explanations for this prizing of ambiguity come to mind.

The first is that the UK government intends to deploy nuclear weapon systems to deter substrategic nuclear and non-nuclear threats to NATO on its North East front, but does not wish to reveal the number of systems designated for this purpose that will be on routine patrol at any one time. A Q & A paper issued some weeks after the Integrated Review suggests that this explanation is unlikely. In it the Ministry of Defence affirms that none of the UK’s nuclear weapons are “designed for tactical use during conflict”; instead, they exist to “deter the most extreme threats to national security”.

However, this formulation seems to leave open the possibility that ‘low-yield’ strategic systems will be deployed routinely in case a need for their use in sub-strategic/tactical contexts arises. That possibility is also left open by statements in the review that the UK’s nuclear weapons are committed to the defence of both the Kingdom and NATO allies, and that “their fundamental purpose” is, inter alia, to deter “aggression”, the qualifier “nuclear” being omitted.

The second possibility is that the UK government has come to view a greater lack of

transparency as a necessary adjunct to maintaining the option of using nuclear weapons in retaliation for chemical or biological attacks and to cope with threats which emerging technologies may pose:

“We reserve the right to review this [Negative Security] assurance if the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact, makes it necessary.” (IR)

The impression sought is perhaps that the United Kingdom will have sufficient systems deployed at any one time to be able to respond to non-nuclear WMD and emerging technology threats without impairing the credibility of its strategic deterrent.

To end on some positive notes. The Integrated Review indicates that when on patrol the UK’s strategic submarines will continue to be at several days’ notice to fire. The review states that

“since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state.” It seems, from what British Pugwash has heard, that the option of using nuclear weapons against non-state actors has been excluded. The MOD’s Q & A paper rules out their use in response to cyber-attacks. And the UK government comes down firmly on the deterrence side of the deterrence/warfighting distinction:

“We would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies ... We remain committed to maintaining the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction…The fundamental purpose of our nuclear weapons is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression.” (IR)

Conclusion

These changes in the UK’s nuclear policy are regrettable. They amount to a step backwards and away from the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. They call into question the sincerity of the UK’s advocacy of “step-by-step” movement in the direction of that vision. They raise doubt about the strength of the UK’s commitment to full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They demonstrate that the United Kingdom is still wed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

However, it would seem best for the Pugwash movement to channel concern over these decisions into a constructive initiative. One option would be for Pugwash to explore in some detail why the UK government (probably in the company of other NATO governments) has come to believe that Russia now poses a much graver threat to NATO than UK governments believed in 2010 and 2015. Such work would open up the possibility of Pugwash trying to contribute to a reduction in NATO/Russian tensions and would complement work to prevent a resumption of the nuclear arms race (see Pugwash Note on Arms Control and Disarmament, January 2021).

It is probably fanciful to imagine that the mutual confidence which characterised relations between Russia and NATO in the years that followed German re-unification can be re-built. But there is room for each side, NATO governments and the Russian government, to clarify the motives behind recent forms of behaviour that the other side has found objectionable, and to draw up mutually acceptable rules of the road for future co-existence.

The current climate of mutual incomprehension, suspicion and fear, of which the UK’s latest strategic review appears to be a product, is pregnant with nuclear risk on both sides of the NATO/Russian border.

Peter Jenkins

Chair, British Pugwash,

9 May 2021

Roadmap to end nuclear sharing

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

Report on the Nuke Free Europe webinar

Compiled by Angelika Claussen, IPPNW Deutschland

The first webinar on the “Roadmap to end nuclear sharing” on March 29, 2021, was a real success, with 87 people from all over Europe, and some from other continents, taking part. Our aim was to develop interactive connections and a common strategy for European peace and disarmament activists to approach governments.

Tom Sauer, Professor in International Politics, Universiteit Antwerpen stated at the beginning of his overview that nuclear weapons are illegal under international law since January 22nd. We peace activists now expect the nuclear weapons states to pledge to take nuclear arms elimination under Art. VI NPT seriously. Europe is over-armed with nuclear weapons, there are not only three nuclear weapons states (F, UK and RUS), but it also hosts US nuclear weapons in five countries (B, D, I, NL, Turkey) and 20 European countries are NATO members. As Tom Sauer pointed out, NATO and its dogma of nuclear deterrence policy is the key obstacle for NATO countries in Europe preventing them from signing the TPNW.How can peace activists in NATO countries proceed? Tom Sauer proposes: Tackle NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and increase pressure on the nuclear sharing countries Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. We can do this by arguing that there are five NATO countries that already refuse to allow nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory: Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Spain. Policies can be changed since the majority of people is opposed to any kind of nuclear deterrence. We can put forward concrete steps to join the TNPW. If all four nuclear sharing countries act together, other countries, like Poland, whose governments currently declare that they want nuclear weapons deployed on their territory, will have difficulty justifying this stance to their population. This will be the beginning of a change in deterrence policy, initiated by civil society.Tom Sauer proposed a mixed policy approach: lobbying, protesting at US military bases and systematic media work. In particular, international protests at military bases in the four nuclear host countries could address either modernisation policies or ask to withdraw the bombs and send them back to the US.

The strategies and action levels presently used in the four nuclear host countries are good, but not enough, when one compares it with the fact that 70–80 % of the public want their governments to sign the TPNW. This message has not yet been delivered to our governments. Joining the TPNW and shifting the NATO paradigm of nuclear deterrence will be the focus of our work.

What are constructive steps that could be taken in the short term? A. Stop the dismissive tone used towards TPNW advocates and make that clear at the upcoming NPT review conference. B. Do not vote against the TPNW in the UN General Assembly in future. C. Take part in the first state meeting of TPNW as an observer next year in Vienna.

The following peace groups work on TPNW in Belgium: Vrede, Pax Christi Flanders and CNAPD in the French speaking part of Belgium. Protests will be held on the September 26th at the US military airbase in Kleine Brogel. Although 77 % of the Belgian public is in favour of joining the TPNW, the Belgian government does not care – yet. However, the Belgian government coalition agreement does not dismiss the TPNW out of hand, rather seeks to find ways to engage with TPNW parties. Only the Greens and Dutch speaking Socialists agree with joining the TPNW.

Peter Buijs, chair NVMP/IPPNW Netherlands, pointed out how medical and humanitarian arguments helped to revitalise the nuclear weapons debate in Dutch politics, brought forward by allies and ourselves separately and united by the civil society coalition “Balieberaad for a nuclear weapon free world”, initiated in 2016 by the NVMP. This meanwhile includes the Dutch Council of Churches, Red Cross, Mayors for Peace, Dutch Humanists, Pugwash, Greenpeace, PAX, IALANA and the NVMP. In 2017 our common pressure resulted in a premiere: after the elections: for the first time a coalition agreement mentioned nuclear weapons: “This government actively pursues a nuclear weapon-free world”, completed by the right wing liberal party VVD (from PM Rutte) by the ‘disclosure’: “... , within the framework of alliance obligations,...”, meaning of course NATO. This regards a centre-right wing government (Rutte-III).

In order to improve this paragraph after the next elections (17-3-2021), NVMP invited the Balieberaad-partners early last summer to draft six urgent recommendations for the election programmes of the political parties. Together we finally issued a statement in July 2020, that said The Netherlands should:

1. further intensify its active pursuit of a nuclear weapon-free world;

2. intensify its role as an initiator and bridge-builder in and outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with emphasis on the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapons states (Art. VI);

3. end nuclear sharing: phase out the remaining Dutch nuclear task, i.e. the (approx. 20) US nuclear B61 bombs at the Dutch airbase Volkel;

4. start discussion within NATO about alternatives to nuclear deterrence;

5. sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, TPNW;

6. advance a paradigm shift from spending on weapons to diplomacy and combatting root causes of war like hunger, inequality and climate change

From the 27 political parties running for parliament, nine - mostly on the centre-left side – did incorporate (partly) these recommendations in their political programmes, especially about joining the TPNW and ending nuclear sharing. Two young NVMP-board members developed a Nuclear Weapon Election Compass for the Balieberaad, used intensively on social media.

All these nine parties were elected to parliament, but none have a majority (see Susi Snyder’s: https://nonukes.nl/march-2021-dutch-election-outcomes-and-nuclear-weapons/ ). Again, there were heavy losses on the left, just as in 2017, and the biggest party, the ruling right-wing liberal VVD from PM Rutte, won again. Fortunately, the second strongest party – the winning D66 (centre-left liberal democrats) has for decades a quite positive paragraph on nuclear weapons, including signing the TPNW, and making sure that the new Dutch fighter jets are not capable of dropping nuclear weapons, in their election programme. Together with the Social Democrats, D66 is also the party behind the resolution that got the former Dutch government (Rutte-II) to participate in TPNW negotiations in 2017. But Mark Rutte, the expected new Prime Minister, is in favour of nuclear sharing.

On 13-4-2021, the Balieberaad will convene online to decide how to influence the making of a new government, resulting in a new coalition agreement, that will go beyond the one from 2017, and also beyond the recent Belgium one from 30-9-2020, which will explore “... how the TPNW can stimulate multilateral nuclear disarmament”. Peter’s conclusion: civil society should start a European Appeal to NATO to end its policy of ‘credible nuclear deterrence’, e.g. by gathering signatures from well-known European writers, physicians, scientists, religious leaders, and others, stating that we Europeans don’t want to be defended any longer by weapons that any moment can mean our own destruction and that of the rest of the world.

Lisa Clark, Co-President of IPB and Rete Italiana Pace e Disarmo, Italy. Lisa agrees with Peter’s idea of creating some sort of a European Russell-Einstein Appeal to put an end to the NATO dogma of nuclear deterrence. No Italian government, either centre-left or centre-right, has ever wanted US nuclear weapons to be removed from Italian soil, although in some cases they paid lip service to “a world without nuclear weapons”. The civil society campaign in favour of removing them started a long time ago, but lobbying gained momentum in 2016, when Italy voted against the convening a conference in 2017 to discuss a ban treaty. Italy has a long tradition of supporting disarmament agreements, but not in this case. The campaign concentrated on education/information on the TPNW, on the ethical and legal issues. Up to now more than 200 cities have approved council resolutions demanding that Italy sign the ban treaty. In many cases, approval was unanimous, proving that the stigma is already having effect – no one dares to speak in favour of nuclear weapons in public. Opinion polls on nuclear weapons in 2019 showed that 70% were in favour of joining the TPNW, in 2020 it was 87 %, showing that the campaign has reached a lot of people.

The coalition has grown: the Bishops of the 7 Catholic dioceses near the USAF base at Aviano endorsed activities celebrating the entry into force of the TPNW on January 22nd. In the province of Brescia, where the Ghedi nuclear base is located, 165 grassroot NGOs also endorsed celebrations for entry into force, alongside 56 local government authorities. Throughout Italy many more cities printed the campaign’s poster, informing their citizens of the entry into force of the TPNW: it was displayed in city hall’s public spaces.

A resolution was passed in parliament in 2017 requiring the government to commission research into the legal consequences of Italy joining the ban treaty. Though this resolution was passed, nothing has ever been done. This year the campaign is pressing for another resolution on this issue, which will also ask for Italy to be present at the first TPNW States Parties meeting in Vienna in January 2022.

Johannes Oehler, ICAN Germany. Johannes Oehler gave an overview of the history of nuclear sharing in Germany since 1958. At that time, the Social Democrats said that nuclear sharing should not be connected to NATO membership.

Büchel airbase today: the current CDU/SPD government decided to renew the airbase and construction is taking place right now in preparation for the new B61-12 nuclear weapons. This is in opposition to the will of the population to end nuclear sharing. We activists should continue to remind that nuclear deterrence is useless.

German groups launched the campaign: “Atombomber, nein danke” (nuclear bomber, no thanks), responding to the fact that the updated B61-12 will need new aircraft to transport these bombs. The campaign contacted many parliamentarians and thus put pressure on government policy. The Social Democrats decided that the decision to buy a new aircraft from the US for nuclear sharing should be postponed until after the German general election in September 2021.

On the future of nuclear sharing in Germany: A study of the scientific board of the German parliament stated that joining the TPNW does not conflict with either NATO or with NPT membership.

On the election on September 26th in Germany: The Social Democrats support participating as an observer at TPNW conference in 2021 or 2022 and urge the nuclear weapons states, US and Russia, to start talks on nuclear disarmament.

The Greens will support signing TPNW but without giving any timeline. In the current draft of their election programme, there is no mention of refusing to buy nuclear aircraft or opposition to the deployment of the updated B61-12 nuclear weapons.

The Left Party is in favour of signing, ratifying the TPNW, and ending nuclear sharing.

Johannes invites everyone to join IPPNW and ICAN’s action days in July 2021 at the Büchell airbase: https://buechel.nuclearban.de/

Susi Snyder, Pax Netherlands. We need support for concrete steps to implementation, for instance the member states of TPNW are obliged under the treaty to call on others to join- this is something they can do in many multilateral forums.

Last year, a letter signed by more than 50 former ministers from our countries called on our governments to join the treaty - https://www.icanw.org/56_former_leaders. A similar type of action could take place again, and if so, it should be brief and focused.

There’s been great success engaging Mayors and municipalities, including with Mayors for Peace. There is an opportunity to go back to these cities, and raise the profile of the motions or resolutions that were passed earlier. Now that the TPNW is in force, we can raise the stakes, for example by going back and asking them to make sure that the city doesn’t do business with nuclear weapon producing companies, that the city pension funds are not invested in companies that are complicit in keeping nuclear weapons around. There’s a city guide for divestment tool kit which might be useful: https://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/city-guide/

Prohibited behaviour will be stigmatised since nuclear weapons are illegal. Be loud and proud. It’s not our job to equivocate about the fact that all WMD are prohibited -its those who refuse to make the worse weapons illegal that should be forced to explain the differences.

There is an opportunity with B61-12 modernisation: the old bombs will be sent back to the US to allow the new Boeing tail-kits and other parts to be added, and this is a moment to make sure that the new nuclear bombs cannot return to Europe.

We can also use the annual exercises with nuclear weapons for stigmatisation, for instance the “Snowcat” or “Steadfast Noon” exercises. (17 countries involved). The timing is usually September/ October, which gives us enough time to get former military people from several SNOWCAT countries to publish a joint op-ed in multiple outlets that stigmatise nuclear weapons.

We should continuously use our arguments on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use. There is no way that nuclear weapons can be used without causing a humanitarian catastrophe. There is no help if they are used. The Red Cross will not show up, there will be no soup, no blankets, just destruction, suffering which for some will last for decades. There is no arguing this, but still, lots of people don’t know. By keeping focused to this message in our outreach last year, and giving HOPE that the ban treaty offers, we were able to increase support for the Dutch joining the TPNW by more than 15%, to now being over 75%. Here’s a link on the surveys across Europe: https://www.icanw.org/nato_poll_2021.

Removing the roadblocks to peace

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

“The world stands at a crossroads” declares the ‘Call for Action’ for a Nuclear Weapons free Europe. The organisers of the call, the Nuke Free Europe network in which the Russell Foundation participates, have initiated a month of action (see below) focussed on demanding an end to nuclear modernisation and nuclear sharing and for European states to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. These demands are a starting point towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons once and for good.

The demands address three key ‘roadblocks to peace’ in the European context. Each and every nuclear armed state has begun a process of not just updating existing weapons, but are developing a whole new range of nuclear warheads. Billions of Euros are going towards ‘more usable’ nuclear weapons, new machines of death and destruction, at a time when we should all be focussed on remaking society in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic. A new arms race must be stopped.

The fact that US nuclear weapons have a home in Europe under nuclear sharing agreements is another roadblock. The presence of such weapons in Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands makes each country a potential target. The presence of such weapons indicates that the US views Europe as a potential nuclear battleground. They must be removed.

The refusal of the vast majority of European states to engage with the TPNW and the hostile posture assumed by some states indicates another major roadblock: a refusal to take stated commitments (through the NPT, for example) to nuclear disarmament seriously. The peace movements in Europe must organise to put the question near to the top of the political agenda.

The UK’s announcements on nuclear warheads and nuclear use indicate some of the challenges we face, but also indicate that such decisions can be challenged. The UK is in breach of the NPT and must be held to account.

The final roadblock addressed in this issue of END Info relates to the plight of the Palestinian people. The status of Israel as a nuclear-armed state and the double-standards in relation to this status indicates two things: that the Palestinian people face an occupier with military capacities beyond any other state in the region and that the failure of the international community to bring Israel into the NPT or effectively challenge serial breaches of international law in other respects means that a drastic shift in approach is required.

To give context to Israel’s bomb, we reprint Ken Coates’ detailed account of how it was developed and its impact on the region.

Hold UK to account on nuclear warheads

From END Info 24 | May/June 2021 DOWNLOAD HERE

In response to the UK Government’s ‘Integrated Review’, Lord McDonald of Salford – former chief civil servant in the Foreign Office – commented as follows:

“raising the cap on our stockpile of nuclear warheads looks odd. I understand that a continuous at-sea deterrent needs us to be able to deploy two boats from time to time. The new ceiling allows both boats to be fully armed. But that does not increase deterrence. It is expensive and incompatible with our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In 1968, the non-nuclear weapon states accepted that as their permanent status in exchange for two things: the sharing of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, and that nuclear weapon states would work towards nuclear disarmament. The Government assert that the objective is untouched, but the announcement is a step away from its achievement.”

For a former senior civil servant in the Foreign Office to so bluntly question the decisions contained in the Integrated Review is quite something. If such a person considers the announcements to be “incompatible” with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), then everyone concerned should stop and think. It is likely the case that similar concerns were raised by those still serving in the highest positions but, of course, their advice remains largely hidden from public view. Voices of restraint and concern seem to have been ignored. As Machiavelli noted: “A prince who is not wise cannot be well advised.” Such a ‘prince’ sits in Number 10 Downing Street.

The peace movements do not need to infer breach of the NPT from the comments of an English Lord or by use of their own good sense. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has done a significant service to the movement by securing a legal opinion on the matter. The opinion, titled Legality Under International Law of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Policy as set out in the 2021 Integrated Review, is clear that the British government is in breach of the NPT: it has broken international law.

The detailed opinion was drafted by Professor Christine Chinkin and Dr Louise Arimatsu, both international lawyers based at the London School of Economics. The full opinion can be read on CND’s website (www.cnduk.org) but it is worth quoting the conclusions of the report fully:

In our opinion, for the reasons set out above:

(i) The announcement by the UK government of the increase in nuclear warheads and its modernisation of its weapons system constitutes a breach of the NPT article VI;

(ii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a state party to the NPT solely on the basis of a material breach of the latter’s non-proliferation obligations;

(iii) The UK would be in breach of international law were it to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in self-defence solely on the grounds that the future threat of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities or emerging technologies, could have comparable impact to nuclear weapons.

The conclusion is clear. What next? Is there a court anywhere on the planet that might take up the case and hold the UK to account? It looks unlikely and even if such a court existed, would the British government take any notice?

As with many questions of international legality or illegality, the fundamental issues are in essence political issues. As such, political responses are required. The fact that the British government is in breach of international law should spark a widespread response, including from the overwhelming majority of states which are party to the NPT. As a priority, the peace movements and organisations in Europe should report the UK to the United Nations for being in breach of the NPT. Individuals can and should do the same. Efforts can be made to get parliamentarians either individually or collectively to report the breach. Importantly, the ongoing work of CND in this respect should be followed carefully and supported fully.

What of the NPT itself? What does the UK’s action and the legal opinion imply? The next NPT Review Conference will take place “no later than August 2021”, according to the UN’s website. This conference presents an opportunity for state parties alarmed by the UK’s announcements to make a clear intervention. If such interventions are not forthcoming, then the peace movements can use the opportunity to raise the issues on their own account.

According to UN Secretary-General António Guterres:

“The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an essential pillar of international peace and security, and the heart of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its unique status is based on its near universal membership, legally-binding obligations on disarmament, verifiable non-proliferation safeguards regime...”

If this is the case, then now seems to be the time to re-assert the “essential” character of the NPT and to finally begin the political work that has not been forthcoming in the previous 53 years of the NPT’s history. As a first step, this means working towards nuclear disarmament in line with the TPNW and halting all nuclear modernisation.

TPNW deflates nuclear sharing

by Joachim Wernicke

From END Info 23 available here

“Umbrella” vs. “Sharing”

NATO was founded in 1949 with the claim that a US ‘nuclear umbrella’ would protect non-nuclear member states. In 2018, the British government affirmed that its nuclear Trident SSBN missiles are part of “the defense of our NATO allies”1. The French government, meanwhile, never made such explicit claims about using its nuclear ‘Force de Frappe’ for non-French interests.

Besides this ‘umbrella’ situation, five out of the 27 non-nuclear NATO member states (Turkey, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) have taken part in US nuclear sharing2, since the 1960s: US nuclear free-fall bombs are stored in these countries. In the event of war, fighter-bomber planes and aircrews from these countries are supposed to drop US nuclear bombs on selected targets. As the NATO commander-in-chief is always a US general, European aircrews in the nuclear sharing system function as de facto foreign legionnaires of the USA.

The operational radii of the fighter-bomber aircraft are about 1,000 km, thus (except Turkey) the ‘sharing’ targets are necessarily in European region. Given NATO’s overall posture in Europe, Russia is presumably the main target.

In this precision guided missile era the dropping free-fall nuclear bombs from decades-old manned aircraft is dangerous for the air crew. In order to drop the bomb the aircraft has to take a flight path over its target. What chance does a German nuclear fighter-bomber Tornado – a 50 year old ‘veteran’ – have to penetrate modern air defence systems?

Differing risks for NATO members

Nuclear sharing illustrates different levels of risk among the NATO states: 22 non-nuclear NATO member states are allegedly “protected” passively by the US “nuclear umbrella”. For the 5 “sharing” states this “umbrella” has holes, as they – and only they – are commanded to become accomplice to actions which otherwise would legally burden the USA alone, who are the owner state of the nuclear weapons. The US nuclear airbases in the “sharing” states obviously present high-ranking targets for any US adversary. In none of the five NATO states was nuclear sharing ever put to a public vote3. France, Czech Republic, Denmark and Iceland do not allow US bases in their territory. Iceland doesn’t even have a military. Thus even neighbouring NATO states carry widely differing risks.

“Sharing” dependent on personal decision

The functionality of nuclear sharing has a peculiarity: It doesn’t depend on government or military decisions. Instead it is up to the will of individuals, in this case air force personnel being citizens of the ‘sharing’ states. In the decision of such air force personnel to obey or refuse a nuclear command the following should be considered:

(a) the consequences of personal insubordination,

(b) the consequences of being accused as a war criminal at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague (Netherlands) and

(c) personal, moral and related aspects.

Insubordination

If air force personnel refuse the command to deploy nuclear bombs, they might have a setback in their professional career, but nothing more. European ‘sharing’ states no longer shoot ‘disobedient soldiers’, as historic predecessors regularly did. This liberalization removed an ancient principle of the military: The soldier follows blindly the commands from the political leadership, they are not to ask questions. The ‘sharing’ air force personnel are citizens of democracies. They will have experienced the fact that democratic governments can fail and even lie to the public regarding the ‘justifications’ for war. The most prominent example was the 2003 US/UK Iraq invasion, as has been shown by the 2016 Chilcot Report to the British government.

Each member of a ‘sharing’ fighter-bomber crew has the personal obligation to respect the international law of warfare. To refuse a command which, according to the available information, appears illegal is no insubordination contrary to discipline but a citizen’s obligation. If the air force personnel happens to be a German citizen, they are expressly obliged to obey international law by the constitutional ‘Basic Law’.

Air force personnel as professional soldiers are trained and familiar with the international law of warfare, including awareness of its rapid development concerning nuclear weapons in the recent decades. This culminated in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has been in force since January 2021 for the – till present – 54 states which ratified it. It is backed by the consent of 122 of the 193 UN member states. Major European states which have ratified the TPNW are Austria and Ireland. The Treaty has finally internationally stigmatised nuclear weapons in line with chemical and biological weapons. Thus the question “Is a threat or use of a nuclear weapon legal?” is no longer pending, as nuclear weapon states and their entourage kept claiming over decades, but it is answered for good by a general and unconditional “No”.

So theoretically, each crew member has to make a personal decision as to whether a given command to drop a nuclear bomb on a specific target is legal. For the details of this see the work of Robert Forsyth, former Commanding Officer of a British Polaris nuclear ballistic missile submarine, who points out1: the legal situation demands for the soldier (a) to know the identity of the target (which the Polaris crew didn’t) and (b) to assess the damage to be expected at this target from the bomb drop under the given conditions, particularly with regard to civilian collateral damage. For targets in inhabited areas the result is clear: such attacks are illegal.

Concerning nuclear weapons, a German Bundeswehr airman or airwoman is in a legally clear situation: According to the MoD service instructions of 2006, it is forbidden for her or him to use anti-personnel mines, nuclear weapons, bacteriological weapons and chemical weapons5. So he or she doesn’t have the choice but the obligation to refuse a command to drop a nuclear weapon, regardless what the government does.

Accusation of war crime

The Rome statute of 1998, the basis of the International Criminal Court, contains a clear definition of which actions are treated by the court as war crimes. It refers explicitly or implicitly to long existing international law like:

- the Hague Convention of 1907 (prohibiting firing into dwelling quarters),

- the Nuremberg Charter of 1945 (declaring that a command doesn’t free the soldier from his or her obligation to check if this command may be illegal, if he or she had the personal choice to refuse an illegal command),

- the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949 with their Protocol Additional I of 1977 (prohibiting attacks which cannot discriminate between combatants and civilians) and

- the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 1996 (declaring both the threat and the use of any nuclear weapon to be illegal).

The US law professor Richard Falk4 adds that the unwritten nuclear taboo (never to use nuclear weapons) has been in effect for more than seven decades and therefore is evidence that it is a customary legal norm.

Since 2002 the ICC searches, prosecutes, judges and punishes war criminals. Following the Rome statute and seeing the effects of nuclear weapons, the use of a nuclear weapon in an inhabited area is unavoidably a war crime, regardless of weapon yield and air or ground burst. In other words: No scenario is known where use of a nuclear explosion in an inhabited area could be legal.

The ‘sharing’ air force personnel who pressed the nuclear button and survived the mission flight despite air defence finally will stand alone in front of the ICC. Except for the US and Turkey, all NATO states are members of the Rome statute. Thus the US denies the responsibility of the ICC for actions of their military personnel which might be assessed as war crimes according to the Rome statute definition. This may be formally right, but is it acceptable for NATO’s supreme command? In the case of nuclear sharing the US will – perhaps rightfully – argue that the ‘sharing’ air force personnel were not their citizens so the US are not involved. NATO will – perhaps rightfully too – refuse any responsibility for nuclear sharing and will point to the national government of the personnel concerned. However, this government will not be able to protect its personnel from the ICC procedures. In case of a ‘sharing’ nuclear explosion the responsible government officials (MPs, MoD and air force command chain) will to be accused at the ICC too, comparable to the Nazi offenders at the Nuremberg tribunal from 1945.

Before the TPNW came into force the ‘sharing’ air force personnel could claim for her or his defence that they trusted, in good faith, the legality of the actions and commands of their government to which they may have sworn an oath of loyality. With the TPNW in force it is no longer a debatable political opinion but an undisputable fact, regardless of whether a particular government has signed the treaty or not: The military strategies of the nuclear weapon states and their entourage are based on the preparedness to commit monstrous war crimes.

Personal aspects

If the air force personnel has family she or he might think about their children at home who will ask one day what they had done in the war. Shall they tell them: “I pressed the button and killed some ten or even hundred thousand people. For a similar number of surviving people I made their future life hell. These people had never harmed our country. I made their country uninhabitable for generations. This crime carries my name. I could have refused the command but I obeyed”?

The airman or airwomen knows that ‘the system’ or ‘the politicians’ do not press the nuclear button, but they themselves according to their free will. They also might think about how for the rest of their life they will be chased in their dreams by the nightmare scenes on the target ground, either learnt from media reports or from their own imagination. They wouldn’t only ruin the lives of the victims. They would ruin their own and their family’s lives too.

And even if they somehow escaped punishment by the ICC: their name as a crew member responsible for the nuclear bombing will be in the history files. Therefore they might expect personal revenge by a secret service of the victim state or even privately by survivors who will trace and find them. Similar has happened: In 2002 a midair collision of two airliners occurred over Southern Germany, killing 71 people including 49 children. In 2010 the father of a victims family met the responsible ground based air traffic controller who had ‘mis-performed’ and stabbed him to death.

Nuclear sharing in retreat

NATO claims that the TPNW is irrelevant because the nuclear weapon states and their entourage are not members. This is formally correct. But since the TPNW, according to the will of the majority of the UN states, stigmatises nuclear weapons like chemical and biological weapons, there is no longer space for claims that there are conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons might be legal.

A side problem for NATO is that non-NATO countries consider the US nuclear sharing a violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 and an illegal nuclear proliferation: After take-off the non-US national air crew has the power of disposal over a nuclear weapon. Exactly this is prohibited by the NPT. For instance the crew could decide to desert and emergency-land with the nuclear weapon on enemy ground.

To further illustrate the problem, one may think about a fictional nuclear sharing, legally a copy of NATO’s action: Saudi-Arabian or Iranian aircraft carry nuclear bombs shared by Pakistan as the owner state.

NATO member state governments keep claiming that the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ is ambiguous for the extreme case that nuclear weapon use is the “Last Resort” to save the very existence of a state, and therefore it could be legal (on this question the ICJ judges voted 7:7 undecided). Whatever this could mean for a nuclear weapon state, such a “Last Resort” scenario can only be valid for the nuclear weapon state itself, not for any third parties like its allies, thus not for the five European states involved in nuclear sharing.

Will there be at any time any Turkish, Italian, German, Belgian or Dutch air force personnel of clear mind and morality prepared to obey a command to drop a nuclear bomb on any target in Europe? How will the air forces of the five European nuclear sharing states under the TPNW – regardless if signed by them – recruit their nuclear bomber crews? What will be the result of an open public discussion on this question? It looks like the TPNW indeed has deflated US nuclear sharing.

Steadfast Noon

An open question will probably remain as to whether the participation of air force personnel of the “sharing” states in the yearly NATO maneuver ‘Steadfast Noon’ is legal. With or without nuclear bomb mockups, nuclear missions are practiced in this maneuver. Is it a threat against Russia and her ‘allies’? According to the ICJ 1996 Advisory Opinion it is. The ‘sharing’ governments may claim it isn’t. By principle a valid statement could be obtained from the ICC following an accusation from a state which might see itself as threatened, as a member of the Russian-led “Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO): Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. But these states are not members of the Rome statute, with the exception of Tajikistan. This country, however, is located more than 2,000 km from the nearest NATO area (eastern Turkey), so technically it is out of range of US ‘nuclear sharing’.

Notes:

1 Robert Forsyth, Why Trident?, Nottingham 2020: Spokesman, ISBN 978-0-8512-4890-5.

2 Nuclear Sharing: the facts, END Info Issue 22, February 2021, Russell Peace Foundation, www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/ENDINFO22.pdf

3 Beatrice Fihn and Daniel Hogsta, Changing Europe’s Calculations - Treaty on the

Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, The Spokesman No. 147, February 2021, Russell Peace Foundation, ISBN 978-0-8512-4895-0.

4 Richard Falk, Challenging Nuclearism, The Spokesman No. 147, see above.

5 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung R II 3, Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03 Humanitäres

Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten – Grundsätze, August 2006, DSK SF009320187,

www.bits.de/public/documents/taschenkarte03-2006.pdf

Remembering and shaping the future: for a policy of common security

by Reiner Braun and Peter Brandt

From END Info 23 available here

More and more people have the feeling that we are living in a time of escalating confrontation and even the possibility of a great war again presents itself. Uncertainty shapes our daily life more and more. The statement of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that their ‘Doomsday Clock’ remains at ‘100 seconds to Midnight’, is a concise expression of these dangers threatening us all, especially - in the long term - the climate disaster, and directly the 14,000 nuclear weapons on earth.

Is there an alternative that a social and political majority - nationally and internationally – will support? An alternative that helps to ensure survival and ensure a better life? A strategy that combines historical experiences with answers to current challenges? As Willy Brandt, among others, put it: “Peace is not everything, but everything is nothing without peace”!

The political alternative is a policy of “common security” – a policy that is conservative and revolutionary at the same time. Conservative because it does not aim to change the social systems and political orders of the individual countries; it accepts socialism and capitalism, or whatever the rulers characterize their system. It recognizes the variants of an authoritarian, liberal and welfare state-regulated capitalism as well as a democratic or authoritarian constitution of non-capitalist states as systems that exist and which can only be legitimately changed only from within. In this way, it creates the prerequisites for peaceful competition between these systems in the first place.

It is revolutionary because it excludes war as the continuation of ‘politics by other means’, because it no longer allows this murderous method of ‘conflict resolution’, which has cost hundreds of millions of deaths over millennia and has raised the question of the very existence of humanity for more than 60 years. In other words, it raises humanity and the planet to a new level of coexistence based on elementary humanism.

The policy of common security can bring us closer to one of the great aims of humanity: a world without war!

Almost 40 years ago, common security was formulated as a concept in Olaf Palme’s report Common Security a Blueprint for Survival, written by an international group of experts. Next year it is to be updated with the participation of the International Peace Bureau and International TUC.

What are the basic principles of this still current concept?

- In the atomic age, security cannot be created by an individual state or in opposition to other states, but only together and in partnership

- War is no longer a political tool in the atomic age; all conflicts and controversies must be resolved peacefully, through dialogue and negotiation. Violent changes of borders, the appropriation of territory are excluded and state sovereignty and supranational unions remain untouched.

- Cooperation is the basis for peaceful coexistence, this must develop in steps and includes the development of trust. Cooperation encompasses all levels: economy, ecology, science, culture, sport. Consultations at all levels and joint crisis responses are part of this.

- Human rights are respected and their realization is repeatedly urged in negotiations and discussions - from all sides and in relation to all human rights: civic and social. However, human rights are not a fighting instrument in interstate disputes in order to label the other as “bad guys”.

- Armaments limitation and disarmament are indispensable. This always includes small first steps to demilitarization, equalization of troops and other confidence-building measures such as contacts between the military. Openness and verifiability of measures are essential. In the long term, exclusive military alliances like NATO should either be demilitarized into existing inclusive networks and completely redesigned (like the OSCE in Europe) or dissolved.

If the policy of common security was originally a Euro-Atlantic concept, it is now a global one and precisely for this reason it must be regionalized more intensively.

Very specific concepts are necessary for common security strategies for different regions of the world, not only for Europe.

The détente policy of the 21st century is unthinkable - this is also a further development compared to approaches from the 70s and 80s of the last century - without the peace movement as one of the large, cross-border social movements and without an international civil society. They are the engine for a new policy of détente, drive these developments forward and secure them against crises through comprehensive diplomacy from below.

The basic idea of the Palme Report is very simple: My safety is only guaranteed if the safety of my counterpart is also guaranteed. There is only security if it is reciprocal.

Disarmament - also a lesson from the 1970s and 1980s - is the indispensable “materialization” of détente policy. That is why disarmament is absolutely crucial. It could be decisively advanced through unilateral calculated steps, especially by those in the stronger position. In the northern hemisphere, that's NATO.

From an economy of war to an economy of peace

by Olof Palme

From END Info 23 available here

Speaking to the Socialist International in Helsinki in 1978, Olof Palme made a passionate speech for disarmament which was re-published in European Nuclear Disarmament, Bulletin of Work in Progress, No 1, 1980. Decades on, Palme’s speech is worth considered attention as both a historical record and as a message from the past for future generations.

* * * 

At our Geneva Conference in 1976 we stressed that “the chief object of international socialism is to substitute cooperation amongst peoples for confrontation between states.” The Socialist International recognized “the purpose of detente has been achieved and maintained through the effective participation of two super-powers” but that we “nevertheless refuse to acknowledge partition of the world between two immovable and opposing blocs that produce tension and run the risk of dangerous confrontation as a permanent fact of international relations. In the existing situation, lasting security for the world cannot be achieved merely through equilibrium between the power-blocs on the basis of shared spheres of influence. Nor can it be brought about by a balance negotiated between the super-powers alone.”

We considered that “the extension of detente must lead to greater co-operation between the nations, thus progressively reducing the sources of conflict and grounds for intervention in the great powers in fields that encroach upon the sovereignty and independence of States.”

Two trends in world politics are gradually eroding our prospects for a future of peace and justice. If unchecked, they could have disastrous consequences for [humankind] already within the next decades. One is the widening gap between rich and poor nations. The other is the arms race and the climate of confrontation and apprehension it engenders.

That rich nations grow richer while poor nations become poorer is intolerable from the point of view of solidarity and justice. But it is also intolerable because of the dangers inherent in such a situation of conflicts between the poor and rich, between north and south. The widening gap between rich and poor nations will inevitably lead to increased tensions between states and ultimately become a threat to world peace.

The arms race has now reached such levels that it is getting out of control. Intellectually one can perhaps afford the argument that there is no direct evidence of the relationship between armaments and the risks of war. In the nuclear age, complacency based on such a hypothesis becomes too risky a proposition. If the nuclear arms race continues unabated it might well become what Herbert York has called a “race to oblivion".

At the root of this gigantic arms race is the mutual distrust which has prevailed for quite a long time and which prevails between both superpowers and the nations committed to each. The policy of detente has partly dispelled this suspiciousness. When in this respect we speak of detente, it important to keep in mind that we are talking about relations between nations with vastly different social systems. Distrust among these nations can be further decreased or dispelled mainly in one way: through a dialogue, by broadening contacts, by cooperation in all possible areas. The greatest possible reciprocal openness is the only means we have at our disposal.

The conference for security and cooperation in Europe has laid an important foundation for continued efforts in this respect. Today there is a well-oiled apparatus for conferences and consultations. This should provide an incentive for all the parties of the International to go on working in this field. One of the parties of the Socialist International - the SPD - has, through its foreign policy, laid some of the most important cornerstones for a policy of detente. This entails an obligation, not only for the SPD, but for all of us who are affected by European security.

If we have a strength in this regard, it is in our ideas. We feel this strength. Only those who are weak and uncertain are reluctant to engage in discussion with those who have different views and ideas. A multitude of contacts among the various nations and peoples of Europe should be the next stage in the policy of detente. The dialogue should be elaborated into a many-facetted chorus. In this way, information and opinions can be exchanged and ideas tested against one another. This could lead to a further lessening of distrust. In the wake of this phasing out of distrust there is going to flow mutual confidence that national security can be created and maintained in ways far less financially detrimental and eternally deadly than the methods which prevail today in the military systems of all countries. We have to widen the concept of national security. A broad offensive to inject new life into all the elements of the policy of detente is thus the first point I would like to designate as basic to the disarmament efforts of the future.

My second point concerns the question of whether the arms race, and particularly the nuclear arms race and the related strategic weapons systems in general, are relevant, if the objective is to safe-guard national security. Alva Myrdal has maintained the theory, in her comprehensive work on disarmament, that the arms race is really just a consequence of a gigantic miscalculation. Developments in recent years have obviously confirmed this theory. The military expenditures in the world were estimated in 1977 to have amounted to close to 400 billion dollars. This means more than a billion dollars each day. These enormous expenditures stand in no kind of proportion to the increased security which they are intended to buy. In point of fact, they increase the threat to people’s security in all countries. The arms race is also intolerable because it represents a tremendous waste of human, material and technological resources for destructive instead of constructive purposes ...

But even if today we are facing a quantitative arms race of tremendous proportions, perhaps the qualitative arming is even more perilous. It seems there is no limit at all to what military research and development can cost. New weapons see the light of day, not because they are needed in any sense of the word, but because it is possible to develop and produce them. And if there is no strategy for their employment, then such a strategy is invented ...

Nuclear disarmament remains the most important objective. It is obvious that the two major nuclear weapons states, the Soviet Union and the United States, will have to take the lead in this disarmament process. That the powers have been able to achieve agreement on limitations of their nuclear arsenals must be regarded as an important victory for statesmanship and rationality. On the other hand, they have not been able to agree on any genuine measures of disarmament, and they have not been able to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty, long overdue. They have given solemn pledges to the world community to reach real results in their talks in nuclear disarmament. Impatience in the world community is growing, not least in view of the fact that other nations have been queuing up to acquire nuclear weapons and the chimerical status and security that go with these weapons.

As my third point, I would like to take up a special aspect of the nuclear arms race. The vast nuclear weapons arsenals on the European Continent pose a threat not only to their possessors and the countries allied with them. They pose a threat, as well, to all the peoples of Europe. All the ideas and every initiative which can remove or decrease these threats are to be welcomed. A former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Östen Undén, once presented the thought to the United Nations of a nuclear-free club some 15 years ago. This thought has continually been revised in various forms ever since, in international discussions.

In Europe there are no immediate or acute threats of conflicts of a military nature. But the disagreements between the great power blocs still cast their shadows across Europe. No tangible progress in the disarmament talks has been achieved during recent years. This is disturbing.

Thus Europe is no special zone where peace can be taken for granted. In actual fact, it is the centre of the arms race. Granted, the general assumption seems to be that any potential military conflict between the superpowers is going to start someplace other than in Europe. But even if that were to be the case, we would have to count on one or the other party - in an effort to gain supremacy - trying to open a front in our continent, as well. As Alva Myrdal has recently pointed out, a war can simply be transported here, even though actual causes for war do not exist. Here there is a ready theatre of war. Here there have been great military forces for a long time. Here there are programmed weapons all ready for action …

Today more than ever there is, in my opinion, every reason to go on working for a nuclear-free zone. The ultimate objective of these efforts should be a nuclear-free Europe. The geographical area closest at hand would naturally be Northern and Central Europe. If these areas could be freed from the nuclear weapons stationed there today, the risk of total annihilation in case of a military conflict would be reduced.

This would make it possible to fully exploit the international agencies to prevent, postpone and ameliorate the effects of a conflict. It would improve the possibility to prevent a nuclear war being started by mistake.

Here I would like, as a fourth point, to remind you of the negotiations which have been going on since 1973 in the Austrian capital on arms limitations in Europe. The risk that a conflict will be transmitted to our continent would be reduced if the weapons arsenals of Europe could be radically reduced. During the five years that these talks have been going in Vienna, however, no positive results have been achieved, so far. Instead, the negotiations seem to have more nearly been paralyzed. There has been no lack of concrete proposals but the paralysis is of political nature ...

This brings me to my fifth point. I firmly believe that it is imperative to start a process of disarmament for development, a process of redeploying the resources spent on armaments to civilian purposes. Two trends which threaten peace - the arms race and the growing disparities between rich and poor in the world - could be transformed into one process that would enhance the possibilities of peace.

The human, material, technological and financial resources spent on armaments constitute on immense potential reserve for development purposes, for a new international economic order.

The changes in the flow of resources which we are working to achieve - away from military expenditures over to constructive appropriations for development - present a challenge to our common sense and an incentive for radical initiatives in all countries. It is essential to talk over the various kinds of adjustment problems which can arise in the industrialized countries as well, when resources for research and development and for production are switched over from military to civilian ends. The structure of the arms industry should be investigated and an alternative use of military-industrial technology for civilian purposes promoted, in an effort to contribute toward a continued economic development which can be used to satisfy social needs. Studies of the economic and other consequences of such a changeover can facilitate disarmament talks …

Both at the international and national level we have to make the general public aware of the magnitude of the resources that are now devoted to armaments and the tremendous potential for development these resources represent.

Trade unions can play an important role in a process of disarmament. One of the greatest obstacles is the widespread misconception that disarmament. will lead to unemployment and a lower standard of living. I would like to stress here that the labour unions have a decisive role in working out plans for change in the employment structure and to make such a change acceptable to their members.

My emphasis on the need to inform and mobilize public opinion derives from my faith in the principles of democracy and in the sound judgment and reason of ordinary people. I believe that the vital issues of our time can be grasped by anybody who is in the possession of the basic facts. People need not be defenceless victims of technological progress. And I believe in particular that public opinion will react very strongly once it has been made aware of the contrast between the needs of the poor and the waste of resources represented by the arms race.

A strong and informed public opinion is also necessary in order to turn the tide. It is essential to underpin and strengthen political will in the effort to initiate the process of disarmament and development. It is now time to switch over from a world economy based on the threat of war to one dedicated to peaceful social construction and social needs, - in a word, from an economy of war to an economy of peace.

To establish peace in today's world is first and foremost a question of creating a just social order for all the world’s people. The responsibility for failing to economize the world’s resources lie with the rich countries who spend colossal resources on military weapons. It is these countries who must create an economy of peace. The change has to begin there. The change has to begin now.

* * *

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has an extensive archive of materials from the END initiatives of the 1980s. Get in touch to find out more.

Persistent objectors

by Tom Unterrainer

From END Info 23 available here

END Info 22 (Feb 2021) reported on a recent report from Chatham House, ‘NATO and the TPNW’ (page 5). This report is, available online, is worth closer examination in one particular regard: the matter of ‘persistent objectors’. The report states as follows:

While it is a general principle of international law that treaties do not create obligations for third states, it is also an accepted principle that a rule set forth in a treaty could, under certain conditions, become binding on a third state as a customary rule ... However, this is not an automatic process. Two distinct concepts are relevant here: the concept of so-called ‘specially affected states’, and that of ‘persistent objectors’ ... As the ICJ has explained, a lack of consent from specially affected states may have the effect of preventing the required general state practice from emerging, preventing the rule from coming into being in the first place. There is a strong argument that states with nuclear weapons and those in a nuclear alliance would be specially affected by a proposed ban on nuclear weapons. Even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence - so-called persistent objectors - will not be bound by it.

What does all this mean and what does it explain? It seems that the hope that the TPNW will create a decisive ‘normative shift’ in international law with respect to nuclear weapons is in question. What Steven Hill1 points out in his Chatham House report is that if a state or alliance of states persistently raise their objections to a treaty, then they can - in the terms set out in international law - prevent such a treaty from becoming ‘customary law’ or binding on states which have not signed up to the treaty. So whilst the TPNW will be ‘in force’ in those states which have ratified the treaty, ‘persistent objection’ on the part of the nuclear-armed states and allies could prevent a more general application of the treaty provisions.2

How to address this potential barrier? How to react to the ongoing insistence of the nuclear-powers that their possession of instruments of mass murder is in any way legitimate?

An important step is to understand that the TPNW will not steadily accrue widespread legal status through the ongoing workings and mechanisms of international law. The ‘persistent objections’ of the US, UK, NATO and whoever else must be met with organisation and mobilisation of great legions of persistent objectors on the streets, in the conference rooms, inside political parties and social movement organisations. We must continue to find creative and imaginative means to apply the concrete lessons of the TPNW, to mount sharp arguments against ‘nuclearism’, to sound the alarm about the manifold dangers presented by such weapons and the geopolitical strategies of their possessors.

There is much work to do.

Notes:

1 Hill, Steven (2021) ‘Nato and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Chatham House, London accessed at https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons

2 See Falk, Richard (2021) ‘Challenging Nuclearism’ in The Spokesman 147: Challenging Nuclearism, Spokesman, Nottingham for an extended discussion on this a related point

Call for action: For a nuclear weapon free Europe

The world stands at a crossroads. It is time for Europe to make strategic choices in facing existential threats. For two consecutive years, the Bulletin for Atomic Scientist have placed the Doomsday Clock at 100 seconds to midnight. Never has this symbolic clock been closer to a possible nuclear and climate nightmare. Nuclear weapon states are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. The US wants to deploy new B61-12 nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.

From END Info 23 available here

The COVID-19 pandemic has taught us that we must work together to overcome the two existential threats of the 21st century: nuclear war and global warming. Increased military expenditure reduces investment in social infrastructure, while extensive military exercises and operations create major carbon emissions, driving us closer to extinction in more ways than one.

For years the people of Europe have expressed their desire to be nuclear-weapon-free by calling for the removal of US nuclear weapons. Now they are pushing for their governments to ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). According to recent online surveys in 6 countries, between 77% and 89% of the population want their countries to join the TPNW.

We must work together in the light of an understanding that all lives on the planet are interwoven, rethink what we mean by protection, redefine ideas of defence and develop towards a ‘common security’. A nuclear weapon free Europe would be the most important step in the transition to a civil and shared security, abandoning the road of continuous militarisation.

We call on all citizens to organize against our possible extinction and to fight for a just, green and peaceful Europe, free of nuclear weapons, with security for all provided through other means. The situation is urgent. As the risks of nuclear confrontation spread from Europe, through Russia, the Middle East, China and the Korean peninsula, Europe must take a stand.

We appeal to everyone in Europe to act and to take part in a European month of action - September 2021. We ask social organisations, trade unions, environmental, youth and woman’s movements, north-south and political organizations, people of all faiths and persuasions to join, endorse, promote and support the appeal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe.

We call on European governments to:

- stop spending valuable resources on new nuclear weapons and their deployment

- end nuclear sharing

- sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

10 reasons why increasing the number of warheads is wrong

by Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d)

From END Info 23 available here

1. The UK is one of three official Depositaries for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition to administrative duties, UK is required to set high standards of conformity. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development & Foreign Policy appears to be in breach of the letter of the NPT and definitely in breach of the spirit.

2. One 100kt Trident warhead is sufficient to physically destroy hundreds of thousands of people along with the infrastructure of a small State. It would also inflict generations of radiation effects on all its neighbours. The previous limit of 180 warheads was sufficient to kill millions of people and cause such devastation as would lead to a nuclear winter and extinction of multiple lifeforms. An additional 80 achieves no more than doubling up on this and ensuring any surviving life forms are extinguished

3. It may be that the Government envisages using low yield (5 - 10kt) warheads against chemical and biological threats - even from NPT signatories. While these may be slightly less than Hiroshima’s blast and radiation effects – still being experienced 75 years later – their use could well trigger a nuclear exchange between third parties whose effects would be totally disproportionate to the reason for using them and replicate delivery of several 100kt warheads.

4. The threat of use of nuclear weapons in the past has not prevented non-nuclear warfare e.g. Korea and Vietnam. There is no reason to suppose that it would deter cyber or chemical/biological attacks or any other form of non-nuclear warfare.

5. The increase in warheads undermines the UK commitment to Article VI of the NPT and so significantly weakens the Treaty, i.e. ‘The haves can have more with impunity but not you’ is not a good message.

6. The implication that UK may use nuclear weapons to counter non-nuclear attacks may encourage non-nuclear weapon States to provide themselves with nuclear weapons to have similar enhanced protection.

7. The ‘Global Reach’ military ambitions of the recent Integrated Review exceeds the capability available, even after implementing its recommendations, because of the extreme cost of nuclear weapons.

8. Nuclear weapons are a very blunt Cold War era instrument entirely inappropriate for nuanced reaction to say Russian incursions in the Baltic or China in the Pacific. Neither country would seriously consider that UK would actually launch a nuclear attack against them and so would proceed knowing we lacked the conventional force to oppose.

9. UK professes to be a ‘rules based’ society. The targets at which a nuclear warhead could be lawfully fired and arguably be compliant with current international laws are limited to mid ocean or uninhabited desert - provided there is no prevailing wind.

10. The US Biden administration is contemplating reducing nuclear weapons and to be used on a ‘sole use’ and not first use basis i.e. only to deter/retaliate to a nuclear weapon attack. The UK policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ which, by denying nothing, embraces all, will conflict with the US. The risk is that technical/political support for UK Trident might be withdrawn. The US is so deeply embedded in UK Trident, from supply of missiles, warheads, targeting procedures and the launch system, that it has the means to render UK Trident inoperable if it so wishes.

Letter of protest

The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs sent the following letter to UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, in response to the warhead announcement.

From END Info 23 available here

In its integrated review of the national defense and foreign policy for the next 10 years published on March 16, the U.K. government announced that it would increase the cap of its nuclear warheads from the current 180 to 260.

With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on January 22, to develop, test, produce, possess, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons have all become illegal. The recent decision of your government runs counter to this global trend. On behalf of the only A-bombed nation, we strongly protest against, and urge you to retract the decision.

The 10th NPT Review Conference will be convened on August 2. What is required to do in the current world is to cooperate in tackling such imminent problems facing the humanity as COVID-19, climate change, wealth gap and poverty, human rights suppression and genderrelated issues. To that end, the implementation of the previously agreed commitments is called for, including “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” (2000) and “to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (2010). The five nuclear weapon states, including the U.K., should be held most accountable for their implementation.

According to an opinion poll in the U.K., almost 60% of the public supports the government signing up to the TPNW. You must respond to the voice of the majority of your people in good faith.

Warhead Alert!

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation initiated the following letter in response to the UK government’s warhead announcement. The letter was sent to Josep Borrel, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Stefano Sannino, Secretary General of the European Union External Action Service; Marjolijn Van Deelen, Head of Disarmament Policy at EEAS; David Sassoli, President of the European Parliament and to other politicians engaged in EU foreign policy. We will publish any responses in future.

From END Info 23 available here

18/03/2021

Dear ....,

If 180 warheads are sufficient to cause a world-ending nuclear winter and achieve the worst nightmare that any environmentalist could ever imagine, why would the UK need 260? The answer is to persuade the US not to delay or postpone the joint W93 warhead programme on which the UK’s ‘independent’ Trident missile submarines are totally dependent. The artificial justification is a thinly veiled suggestion that China - whose policy for nuclear weapons is significantly less aggressive than UK’s - might pose a nuclear threat. The UK’s expanding nuclear warhead programme undermines the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a time when the European Union and others are urging renewed compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. We repudiate this regressive move by the UK and urge proper compliance with the NPT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Yours sincerely,

Signatories:

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d) 2nd in Command Polaris submarine, commanded two other submarines and the Commanding Officer’s Qualifying Course

Commander Rob Green Former nuclear-armed aircraft bombardier-navigator

Denis Halliday Former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ireland

Julie Ward MEP 2014-2020, UK

Marian Pallister Chair, Pax Christi Scotland

Jeremy Lester Clerk (Chair) Quaker Council for European Affairs & Chair, Saferworld Europe

Ludo De Brabander Vrede vzw, Belgium

Reiner Braun Executive Director, International Peace Bureau, Germany

Colin Archer Secretary-General, International Peace Bureau (retired)

Professor Stuart Holland University of Coimbra, Portugal

Professor Steven Rose Emeritus Professor of Neuroscience, Open University, UK

Professor Andreas Bieler School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Axel Ruppert Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Brussels Office

Carol Turner Co-Chair Labour CND

Earl Turcotte Chair, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Canada

Tony Simpson & Tom Unterrainer Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Rae Street & Pat Sanchez Rochdale and Littleborough Peace Group, UK

TJ Milburn Chair, Exeter CND, UK

Christine Bousfield UK

Christopher Butler UK

Ulla Grant UK

Ian Hewitt UK

Till Geiger UK

Brian Winters USA

UK warhead announcement: Immoral, Illogical, Illegal

“We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons” claims the British Government in their ‘Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’: Global Britain in a competitive age. It is unclear quite how this sentiment fits with a renewed commitment to Britain’s nuclear weapon system and the announcement that the overall ceiling on nuclear warheads is to be increased: “the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.”

From END Info 23 available here

If the empty pledge on disarmament and the alleged imperative of Britain retaining a nuclear capability came as no surprise, the announcement that the long-established intent to reduce the overall number of warheads was to be dispensed with sent a shockwave across the planet. A further shocking element of the report comes in the following passage: “we reserve the right to review this assurance [that the UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against NPT state parties] if the future threat of ... emerging technologies ... makes it necessary.”

Immoral

The British public, like the vast majority of the world’s population, opposes nuclear weapons. Repeated polling has not registered majority support for UK nuclear weapons, and a recent survey found that 77% of the population agreed that all nuclear weapons should be abolished.

The British government is massively out-of-step with the population on this question, yet unknown billions of pounds have been pledged to manufacture instruments of mass-murder just days after nurses were subjected to what, in effect, amounts to a pay cut.

The current British government is a serial rule-breaker and the scrapping of intent to reduce the overall number of warheads fits into this pattern of conduct. Far from providing increased ‘security’ the British decision to not only retain nuclear weapons but to increase the number of warheads can only increase tensions and generate greater risks.

Illogical

At the time of the announcement, the British government made no effort to justify its decision beyond general statements about “adversaries”, “threats to stability” and the “evolving security environment”. In subsequent interviews the Secretary of Defence, Ben Wallace, claimed that an increased number of warheads was a response to alleged changes to Russian missile defence. When questioned, Mr Wallace could not explain how 260 rather than a smaller number of warheads would make a difference.

As the Russian government has pointed out, the British decision comes weeks after agreement was reached between the US and Russia to extend New START for a further five years: an agreement that will reduce the overall numbers of nuclear weapons. How does the British decision fit with the global trends? What does the US, on which Britain is dependent for the vast majority of its nuclear capability, make of the announcement?

Could the failure to adequately explain the need for more warheads be linked to the fact that there is no good reason? Or could it be that the real story behind this decision is being deliberately withheld? How does Britain’s lobbying of the US Congress over the W-93 warhead fit into the picture? Might Britain be planning to increase the number of Trident submarines on ‘Continuous At Sea’ patrol, which might make it necessary to have more warheads?

Does the shift in nuclear posture embodied in “reserve the right to review” and in the direction of travel detailed in the wider report suggest a potential ‘war fighting’ nuclear posture, rather than an alleged ‘deterrence’ posture? Might Britain need more warheads if such warheads are to be ‘useable’?

The basic lack of transparency on nuclear questions and the illogical stance offered by the government generates large numbers of questions, all of which demand closer examination.

Illegal

Britain is not only a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which demands ‘effective measures’ to end the ‘arms race’ (Article VI) but it is one of three ‘Official Depositories’ of the NPT. This status demands exemplary conduct and action from such states.

The decision to increase the number of warheads appears to be in breach of Article VI and Britain’s status and could, therefore, be illegal under international law. It will be left to international lawyers and the other parties to the NPT to decide whether or not this is technically the case, and it should be noted that several NPT signatories are already in breach. Whatever the material legal status, Britain’s decision will clearly act against the interests of non-proliferation and will surely induce other states - both nuclear armed and non-nuclear - to assess their own positions.

The TPNW and the V2 Rocket

by Joachim Wernicke

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

On January 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) came into force 90 days after the 50th of 193 UN member states had ratified it. As part of international humanitarian martial law, the treaty prohibits its participating states from any activity related to nuclear weapons. Following a request from the US government, the German government stayed away from the negotiations on the treaty and has so far refused to sign it.

There is a fundamental historic connection between the TPNW projecting the end of the nuclear weapons age, and – hardly noted – its roots at the Baltic seaside village of Peenemünde (Germany), the ‘birth place’ of the V2 ballistic rocket of World War II. There, in 1937, a new Army Research Institute had been established with the task of creating a long-range artillery rocket named A4. This was a new development, namely the official repeal of international law: The Hague Land Warfare Regulations of 1907 – with the German Reich as a member state – which forbade the bombardment of undefended residential areas. When German warplanes bombed southern England in World War I from 1917, the victorious Allied powers then rightly demanded that those who carried them out be extradited as war criminals. With its firing range of 300 km, the A4 rocket was an innovation as an artillery weapon. But due to its kilometer-wide hit spread, it was obviously militarily useless and could only be used for terrorizing the civilian population, i.e. for war crimes, not criminal misconduct by individuals, but for the first time as an official state program. This fact led to the later propagandistic renaming of A4 as V2, ‘V’ standing for Vergeltungswaffe meaning retaliation weapon. The V2 rocket (as with its twin, the V1 cruise missile) was only used against residential areas, mainly in England.

In World War II, the bombing of cities was perfected, initially by Germany, but then increased by Great Britain and the USA. A new aspect was the total destruction of cities by the large- area fire storm, with thousands of dead and injured, initially achieved with incendiary and high-explosive bombs, then in 1945 for the first time with nuclear bombs. ‘Humanitarian law’ seemed to have been forgotten.

Initially, the US had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. An immense arms industry had grown up there during the war. After 1945 it continued unabated, with the nuclear sector as an additional business area. Military budgets increased year-on-year. The air force, the navy and – in the end – the army competed for the allocation of funds. The Soviet Union under Stalin, which had been a war ally shortly before, served as a new enemy because the old enemy Hitler had been defeated. In 1947 the US Air Force first planned nuclear attacks against Moscow and other Soviet cities. War crimes had become the core of military strategy.

Stalin countered this with his own development of nuclear weapons. With the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the USA lost its monopoly. A nuclear arms race began. The Soviet military, without air bases on American soil, relied on the replication and further development of the V2 missile as a means of delivery for nuclear weapons, with the aim of a nuclear ICBM. At the same time, the US strengthened its air force and its global airbases. It was not until years later that they too succeeded with the ICBM, also a further development of the V2.

The nuclear explosive yields were increased on both sides in the 1950s. From the range of thousands of tons of conventional explosives (TNT) – as in the destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 – they rose to millions of tons. Such a bomb would have been able to completely destroy a metropolis like Moscow or New York, with death tolls in the millions. More and more nuclear-armed rockets and missiles replaced the manned nuclear bombers.

Generations since then grew up with the basic uncertainty that a nuclear war could wipe out all higher life forms on earth. Governments, democratic or not, advocated the belief that victory in nuclear war is impossible, so it would never happen. At the end of the 1970s, the number of nuclear warheads had reached an irrational peak of over 40,000, with over 95% in the arsenals of the USA and the Soviet Union.

In this situation, the humanitarian international law of war spoke up again in 1977, in the form of an Additional Protocol to the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1949: Indiscriminate attacks, i.e. attacks that cannot distinguish between civilians and the military, became prohibited. This is especially true for nuclear weapons. But their owner states refused to recognize this, and their entourage followed.

By 1980, advances in electronics had drastically reduced the hit spread of long-range weapons, down to several meters, regardless of the firing range. This was a sensational innovation: every shot was a direct hit. It made it possible for the first time to reliably hit and destroy deep underground command bunkers with nuclear bombs. Unlike in the vast United States, the Soviet command structure was (and the Russian one now is) locally concentrated in the greater Moscow area. A surprise attack, known as a decapitation strike, by a salvo of a few dozen rockets from Western Europe seemed technically possible. It was about a so-called medium range of about 2,000 km firing range, with ballistic flight times of about 10 minutes. For the attacked victim, this would be too short for a reliable assessment of the situation, let alone for commanding the type and scope of a counter-strike. So victory in nuclear war seemed possible.

The corresponding new US Pershing-2 missiles were deployed in West Germany – and nowhere else – from 1983. Open and unprotected in mobile forest positions in the Federal Republic of Germany, the missiles, being the most important targets, in the event of a Soviet attack would have been destroyed within minutes. Obviously they were only good for a surprising first strike: “Use them or lose them”.

The Soviet side countered this US deployment in Central Europe with new short-range SS- 23 nuclear missiles in the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with a flight time of only 5 minutes. A nuclear duel was armed, with the full risk of destruction of Central Europe. Electronic warning systems watched each other. A computer failure could have started a ‘limited nuclear war’. In 1987 the US-Soviet treaty to ban land-based medium-range missiles (INF treaty) eliminated this danger. In 1991 the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Russia as the legal successor and the heir to Soviet nuclear weapons.

The majority of states in the world were less and less willing to accept the threat to their existence from the nine nuclear-weapon states, including the USA in the lead, followed by Russia. In 1996 the UN Court of Justice (ICJ) declared the threat and use of nuclear weapons to be contrary to international law. The nuclear weapon states did not care. But in 2017 122 of the 193 states in the UN finally voted for a treaty (TPNW) that outlawed all activities related to nuclear weapons, including possession. As mentioned, this treaty has now entered into force, but only for those states that have ratified it. At that time there were 51 states, including Austria and Ireland. All nuclear weapon states and their entourage – including Germany – had stayed away from the UN negotiations. So far, the German government has refused to, against the will of the majority of its citizens. US nuclear weapons are still stored on German soil. With a German signature on the TPNW contract, that would be over.

The US military-industrial complex costs ten times more than the Russian one every year. Nevertheless, Russia is keeping up with the United States in terms of nuclear weapons, at the same absurd level of over 5,000 warheads, with the corresponding costs. That is difficult to understand, because the new US competitor, China, is declaredly not participating in the nuclear arms race. China considers its 20 times smaller number of warheads – around 300 – to be sufficient against the USA. Why doesn’t Russia do the same?

The nuclear duel of the 1980s is now returning to Central Europe. Since 1999 NATO has been advancing to Russia’s borders. In 2019, US President Trump quit the 1987 INF treaty banning land-based medium-range weapons. Since then, the US military has been procuring precisely such new long-range missiles in non-defensible hypersonic technology on a large scale, with ranges of at least 2,000 km, i.e. from Germany deep into Russia. The focus is on the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon of the US Army and the Conventional Prompt Strike missile of the US Navy. The US nuclear weapons laboratory Sandia is developing the model of a precise hypersonic warhead common to the Army and Navy. So how credible is the claim that the warhead will only be equipped with non-nuclear weapons? Is a decapitation strike against Moscow being considered again? The new US missiles should be ready for use from 2023.

From then on, the nuclear duel will probably be armed again.

In 2018 the American government published a new Nuclear Posture Review, with an emphasis on “low yield” (less than 20 kilotons, comparable to the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945). The US Defender Europe maneuver, the largest in 25 years, began in early 2020. It moved through Germany and Poland towards the Russian border. The corona pandemic stopped this marching earlier than planned. In another maneuver in August 2020, American B- 52 nuclear bombers flew over the non-NATO member Ukraine. A US naval base has been in operation in Ukraine on the Black Sea since 2017 (Ochakiv). All of this may be viewed as protecting Western Europe or as a preparation by the United States for war in Europe.

Russia reacted promptly to President Trump’s termination of the INF Treaty in 2019 by deploying SS-26 (Iskander-M) nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave. This area around the former German city of Königsberg in East Prussia was annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II. The small area is now sandwiched between the NATO states Poland and Lithuania. Why are the missiles not in the safety of the Russian heartland? Obviously because of the shorter flight time. A look at the map reveals what the rockets in Kaliningrad should be aiming at: The concentration of US military bases in West Germany around 1,000 km away, with a focus on Ramstein, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden and Bitburg, ballistic flight time from Kaliningrad around 7 minutes. The neighboring NATO states France, Denmark and the Czech Republic do not allow US military bases, as of course the neutral states Austria and Switzerland.

In order to destroy the deep underground US command bunkers, nuclear ground explosions at least “low yield” are required, because even the largest conventional bombs are too weak for this. In 2020, the Russian government published a new directive for the use of nuclear weapons. It can be read as a warning to Germany. In the German public, these facts have received little attention.

The SS-26 missile weighs 4.6 tons, with a 0.7 ton conventional warhead. The associated range is given as 500 km. A nuclear “low yield” explosive device weighs only a few tens of kilograms. A firing range of 1,000 km should therefore be possible from Kaliningrad – with the SS-26 or another type of missile from the Russian arsenal.

Will the American anti-missile system SM-3, which will be deployed near Slupsk (Poland) in the near future, be able to intercept rockets on the way from Kaliningrad to West Germany? No, this is not technically feasible, especially if the rockets maneuver only slightly during the flight.

At this point, Peenemünde comes into view as a symbolic place: Kaliningrad is located at the end of the former Baltic Sea test range for V2 rockets from Peenemünde to the east. It seems like an irony of history that over seven decades later Germany is threatened from there by nuclear missiles of a basically similar design to the V2, and not because of the German military, but on someone else’s account: namely because of the US Forces bases in the western part of the country.

The German signature under the TPNW, following the example of neighboring Austria, would end this threat. Not only will the 20 or so US nuclear airdrop bombs then have to be withdrawn from the Büchel airfield (Eifel): the US Armed Forces do not differentiate between conventional and nuclear components. With the German signature under the TPNW, the presence or transit of such conventional-nuclear forces on or over German territory would be prohibited in the future. This applies equally to the French and British military, because these two NATO states also maintain nuclear weapons. Incidentally, by the 2-plus-4 treaty of 1990 the area of the former (East-) German Democratic Republic has been declared a nuclear weapons free zone.

In the “heyday” of Peenemünde in the 1930s and early 1940s, there was still a general mood throughout Europe that a large state could not do without military defense. Today hardly anyone will deny that the densely populated Germany can no longer be defended militarily, not only in view of the state of the art of weapon technology, but especially in view of the highly centralized public supplies and, effective as “bomb amplifiers”, nuclear power stations and large chemical plants as well as the lack of any civil defense. Across all political forces in Germany today there has to be assumed accordance on one point: Under no circumstances any war weapon effects in Germany – by whomever, hostile or allied. Without the protection of the TPNW, however, this would not be achievable in Germany’s geographic location.

Peenemünde, located in what is now a holiday area, is home of a well visited technical-historical museum. The missile trail that once moved towards and which today might emanate from Kaliningrad presents meritorious occasion to make the restoration of humanitarian international law by the TPNW a public exhibition topic, precisely at the place where in 1937, as a worldwide precedent, the state organized dismantling of international martial law had begun.

Federal elections will take place in Germany in autumn 2021. The Green Party, which emerged in 1980 as a result of the wide public resistance against nuclear armament, is considered to be the likely coalition partner of the next German government. Will signing the TPNW be a non-negotiable coalition condition? Or will the temptation of ministerial posts be stronger than any principle?

Nuclear sharing: the facts

NATO isn’t particularly shy about stating the basic facts about its role with regards to nuclear weapons.

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

The ‘NATO Nuclear Deterrence’ fact sheet, available on NATOs website, states the following:

Three NATO members - the United States, France and the United Kingdom – have nuclear weapons.

The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the Alliance’s security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance.

NATO’s nuclear deterrence also relies on US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and supporting capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies. A number of European NATO members have dual-capable aircraft dedicated to the delivery of these US nuclear weapons. The United States maintains full custody of these weapons at all times. These “nuclear-sharing arrangements” predate and are fully consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [emphasis added]

From characterising the combined nuclear forces of the US, UK and France as ‘NATO’s nuclear deterrence’ to confirming that supposedly non-nuclear armed states can ‘deliver’ - in the euphemism favoured by advocated of nuclear weapons - NATO is proud to confirm the basic extent of its ability to wipe life from the surface of the planet.

What NATO is less keen to reveal are the locations and extent of the US nuclear weapons in Europe. So where are they, how many of them are there, why are they there and what risks to they present to local populations and to Europe as a whole?

Where and how many?

The location of these US weapons has been an ‘open secret’ for some time. More recently, NATO itself revealed the locations after accidentally posting a report on its website. Here’s a run-down:

Netherlands: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in The Netherlands at the Volkel airbase.

Belgium: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored in Belgium at the Kleine Brogel airbase. Belgium is also home to NATOs HQ.

Germany: Up to 20 nuclear bombs are stored at the Buchel airbase in Germany. Germany is also home to a large number of US armed forces.

Italy: Around 70 nuclear bombs are stored at the Aviano and Ghedi-Torre airbases in Italy. Some of these bombs were previously stored at RAF Lakenheath in the UK prior to their withdrawal in 2008.

Turkey: It is estimated that 50 nuclear bombs are stored at the Incirlick airbase in Turkey.

Total: up to 180.

Why are they here?

Dates and extent of deployment varies, but the presence of these weapons in Europe can be thought of in two ways: first, as a ‘hangover’ from the ‘Cold War’ and second, as a demonstration of the continuing centrality of nuclear weapons to NATO’s overall strategy for Europe and neighbouring regions.

In the case of Germany, it has been suggested that ‘nuclear sharing’ was initiated after threats from the German government to pursue their own nuclear weapon developments. The location of US nuclear bombs in Turkey is a clear consequence of the strategic importance placed on the region to the south of that country.

The presence of US nuclear bombs in Belgium, The Netherlands and Italy is clear demonstration that these states are closely tied into the US/NATO military alliance.

What are the risks?

Many people feel that the presence of such weapons creates a ‘target’ of potential aggressors. Moreover, nuclear material - in whatever form - is never ‘risk free’. The dangers of malfunction in an atomic weapons are all the more pronounced. This is why a growing number of people demand an end to ‘nuclear sharing’ and the removal of these bombs.

Such a move would be an important first step towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone across the whole of Europe.

NATO 2030: United for a new era

By Rae Street

From END Info 22 | February 2021. Download here

NATO recently commissioned a report on the future of NATO from ten experts appointed by the Secretary- General, Jens Stoltenberg. It opens with congratulations to themselves, as according to the authors, NATO is the ‘most successful alliance in history’. I guess it depends on how you define ‘success’. Provoking conflict by expansion? Not short on arrogance, the report claims that it is ‘indispensable’ with its ‘peace ensuring role’ in a world of ‘competing great powers’. Throughout the document there are references to ‘shared principles among the democratic institutions of the Atlantic community’. You might ask yourself about these shared values which include say from the USA positioning military bases in almost every country on the globe or looking to develop weapons in space or internally still in many states carrying out the death penalty.

The report identifies 13 challenges and threats of which top of the list are Russia and China. The whole report is steeped in Cold War thinking. Russia is a ‘declining power’ by ‘economic and social measures’ but it takes an aggressive stance and is ‘the main threat facing NATO in this decade’. An even bigger threat is China which poses ‘important challenges to our security’. There is also a need to ‘assess Russia and China cooperation’. While in no way being apologists for the regimes in Russia and China, talking up the military threats will not lead to stability in the world. The world this report says is characterised by ‘authoritarian states seeking to expand power and influence’. At the same time NATO is looking itself to further expansion: to bring in Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia into the alliance. It continues to make agreements with countries around the Pacific and Indian Ocean to face out China. The UK’s part in this will be to send an aircraft carrier to the Asia Pacific this spring, while the USA is increasing its military presence in the region. The US Trident nuclear armed fleet (Trident is ‘integrated’ into NATO) is now mainly based at Bangor on the west coast of the USA, having moved from the east coast, with China in its sites. There is also mention of the threat from the ‘South’. But nowhere is it made clear what this vague mention of the ’South’ means. Is that a reference to asylum seekers? It was NATO which was involved in wars against Libya, Afghanistan, in Iraq and Syria from where people now flee.

Even more chilling is the report on future of its nuclear forces. It proposes strengthening its forces in Europe on its eastern flank., providing them with ‘adequate nuclear capabilities, suitable for the situation created with the end of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces’. What is omitted is that it was the USA under President Trump which tore up the Treaty. In other words, the ten experts have asked the USA to speed up the deployment in Europe not only of the new B6-12 nuclear bombs, but also new medium-range nuclear missiles, similar to the 1980s Euromissiles.

The experts also want in future to ‘continue and revitalize nuclear sharing agreements’, which allowed non-nuclear countries – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey – to be ready for the use of nuclear weapons under US command. This has always been against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but as with all the other contradiction is the report, the experts claim they are committed to the NPT. The NPT states that the nuclear armed states should disarm in ‘good faith’. There is no good faith in NATO. Moreover, NATO blocked its member states from joining the negotiations for the UN Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which came into force on 22nd January thus making nuclear weapons illegal under international law. NATO cares not a jot for that – they claim it is not international law.

In the report there is a section entitled, Women, Peace and Security. But its idea of including women is to increase more women in the military exercises and operations. It ignores other aspects of the UNSC resolution 1325 which proposed more women in decision making on conflict, on conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace building. But then it is a military alliance which is not going to be genuinely concerned with conflict resolution even though at the end of the report there is a brief reference to solving conflicts peacefully. There is also a reference in the report to climate change. In future NATO wants to adopt ‘green technologies’. Yet another contradiction in terms. Surely expanding its military hardware, building new planes can only increase carbon emissions?

Last, but not least, there has never been a NATO report which didn’t demand more money from member states. The report is no exception. It is essential that all allies maintain their commitment, made in 2014, to increase their military spending to at least 2% of GDP by 2024. There is no acknowledgement of the fact that increasingly people round the world are looking to decrease military funding and redirecting the money to health, social welfare and the climate change emergency. More and more people can see that the replacement of Trident, costing the people of the UK £205 billion, can do nothing against the threat of the corona virus. But, of course, NATO would want more money as behind it stands the military industrial complex. War is good business. Member states should pay up to enjoy what the report calls ‘the benefits of being under the NATO umbrella’. That ‘umbrella’ is not a benefit to the world, but a grave danger.

First published in the Morning Star