Ukraine: this war must end

From END Info 40 - download here

Tom Unterrainer

This is an edited and expanded text of a speech given to an international meeting on the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine hosted by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Stop the War Coalition. A recording of the meeting is available on CND’s YouTube page.

The drivers and sparks for the war in Ukraine, including the role of NATO expansion and the war that was already taking place in the Eastern part of Ukraine – including Ukraine’s shelling of Russia-speaking majority areas – have been extensively discussed. We are aware of the role of Ukraine – and the larger ‘Eurasian’ corridor – in US strategy. NATO expansion, internal conflict in Ukraine (including ‘national questions’), long-standing US aims at influence – if they can get it, disruption is they cannot – in the ‘Eurasian’ corridor and US strategy towards Asia/China are some drivers of this conflict.

We understand that tectonic shifts are taking place on a geopolitical scale and we see many consequences. The world is no longer unipolar but the US and allies are still behaving as if it is. The US and allies seem prepared to continue taking risky and potentially deadly action in an ill-fated attempt reassert themselves on a global scale. Events in Ukraine have not progressed as Washington – and Moscow, for that matter – might have hoped. The situation in very dangerous indeed.

The global peace movement is clear – as it has been for the last two years – that the war in Ukraine must end. We are clear – as we have been from the word go – that we stand with all those who oppose this war: in the UK, across the world and we stand with those in Russia and Ukraine who have taken to the streets and made a stand against this senseless slaughter.

One of Bruce Kent’s last public acts on behalf of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was to deliver a letter to the Russian embassy, demanding the release of peace protestors, demanding an end to nuclear threats and demanding an end to the war. Part of the letter reads:

The movement for peace and against war is a global movement. From London and Washington to Saint Petersburg and Moscow, those who oppose war and strive for peace take to the streets to make their voices heard. The peace movement stands squarely with all those in Russia and beyond who have protested against the invasion of Ukraine over the past days. We defend their right to do so and insist that such a right is respected.

We demand the release of political prisoners including our friend, Boris Kagarlitsky, who has been imprisoned once again for his courageous actions. We demand the same for political prisoners everywhere: be they in Moscow or - as with Julian Assange - in Belmarsh Prison in London.

This war must end. It must end because the grinding misery of death and destruction cannot be allowed to continue. It must end because the people of Ukraine have suffered much, much more than enough. It must end because we must – we must – make every effort to reduce nuclear tensions. It must end before things escalate even further.

For the last two years, the board of experts at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists have set the hands of their Doomsday Clock to 90 seconds to midnight. Midnight is a metaphor for the complete destruction of humanity. This is the closest to midnight that the clock has ever been set.

The Atomic Scientists make their determination based on a detailed survey of the deadly risks faced by the whole of humanity. These include climate catastrophe, pandemic, emerging technologies and – centrally – the risk of nuclear war.

They warn that “the war in Ukraine and the widespread and growing reliance on nuclear weapons increase the risk of nuclear escalation”.

The early weeks of Russia’s invasion saw repeated threats of nuclear use and signs of increased readiness for nuclear use. Putin’s comments explicitly shattered what is called the ‘nuclear taboo’ – the idea that leaders of nuclear states should never directly threaten to use such weapons. The fact that United States Presidents and US officials and British Prime Ministers and British official have repeatedly made similar threats in the past seems to have been forgotten by some.

Nevertheless, combined with the facts of nuclear-armed US and NATO intervention, Putin’s disgraceful nuclear threats raised widespread alarm – and rightly so. Since these initial threats, Putin seems to have put a lid on his own threats, with the former Russian Prime Minister and similar now repeating such things. Why might Putin have made these threats and why might they have stopped?

Without doubt, Putin invoked nuclear threats for the same reason that Western leaders invoke them. We’re supposed to believe that nuclear weapons function ‘silently’ as some magical deterrent system. But the myth of ‘deterrence’ was only cooked up as a public relations excuse for nuclear weapons possession. If you examine the historical record, then you will find any number of occasions when US Presidents have used nuclear weapons – not in the sense of detonation but as a means to achieve other ends. For example, in 2002 George W Bush threatened a nuclear strike on Iraq if Iraq used its ‘non-existent’ weapons of mass destruction on American troops.

By March 2022, Russian occupied just over 25% of the Ukraine. By April, this figure fell to just under 20% following a number of disastrous – for Russia, at least – military blunders. The amount of occupied territory held at around this level for a few more months, then dropped to a figure of around 15-17% by November 2022. This is not how Putin expected the war to proceed. Hence the threats.

What happened next is that billions upon billions of pounds and dollars of military equipment poured into Ukraine from the US and NATO allies. Russia may have been able to adjust some of its previous military mistakes but the drones, missiles, tanks and other armaments deployed on by Ukraine have resulted in a stale-mate.

From November 2022 to January 2024 there has been approximately zero shift in the amount of territory occupied by Russia. All the billions of armaments, all that technology, all the support have not shifted things.

So the question is this: if either Russia or Ukraine imagines it can ‘win’ a war, what will it take to ‘win’? Even more weaponry? Even more deadly weaponry? How many dead Ukrainians? How many slaughtered on the battlefield? How much more destruction? A massive – unprecedented – escalation would be needed. Why? Isn’t Russia on the brink of economic and social collapse after the massive sanctions campaign against it? Will that not sort the mess out? No. Just look at the Russian economy. Yes, some Western foodstuffs and products are not available. Yes, inflation is high. But the Russian economy and Russian imports and exports have not ground to a halt.

Sanctions such as those imposed on Russia do not work. They have not worked. Those who impose them know it, scholars who study sanctions know it, we know it.

According to a recent report from the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Russia has adopted “an attrition strategy this is gradually exhausting Ukraine’s forces, draining American military stocks, and sapping the West’s political resolve.” They go on: “Sanctions have not crippled Russia’s war effort, and the West cannot fix Ukraine’s acute manpower problems absent direct intervention in the war.” Rather, for as long as this war continues Ukraine’s economic and social development will continue to stagnate to catastrophic levels. It will become more and more reliant on ‘aid’. The prospects for independence – political or economic – will diminish steadily over time.

Contrast Ukraine’s situation with Russia’s. Despite an enormous barrage of sanctions, Russia’s economy is – in fact – doing better than even the International Monetary Fund expected. Not just because it is still able to sell oil and has maintained economic relationships with enormous trading blocs such as China, but because it has been able to achieve a considerable internal economic reorganisation.

McDonald’s may have closed and Western European foodstuffs might have disappeared from the shelves, but the Russian cheese industry is thriving (to give just one example).

In a recent article re-published in Harpers magazine, the Italian journalist Marzio Mian quotes a Russian Sturgeon farmer, Sergeeva:

Sergeeva is well-travelled and known widely for her aquaculture expertise. She could get a job anywhere, it seemed to me, so why stay? “I was born here, I studied here, my husband is Russian, my son is Russian, I’m Russian,” she said. “I wouldn’t say I’m a patriot, and I don’t want to express my thoughts on Putin and the war. But I can assure you that my life hasn’t changed. Not in the least.” She blushed as she spoke, as if the subject were uncomfortable. “The Russians are reacting to the sanctions in an extraordinary way, even with a weak ruble and the inevitable inflation. The prices of essential goods have held steady. And now we’re consuming better and healthier products than before the war, even exceptional cheeses.”

As a consequence of these sanctions, the potential of non-Western dominated trade has been revealed. Sergeeva buys feed from Iran instead of the West. This is just the tip of the iceberg: similar stories emerge across the spectrum of the Russian economy. Is Ukraine’s economy and society developing in the same way? We can see the stark differences.

Much has been made of the decision to deploy Russian nuclear missiles to Belarus. Quite right too. We have warned against such a dangerous and potentially deadly proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We have also been campaigning and warning against the expansion of the US nuclear bootprint across Europe. This expansion includes plans to station US nuclear bombs at Lakenheath once more and the planned deployment of new F35 jets and new US nuclear bombs at sites across Europe.

Nuclear developments in Belarus and across Europe are similar in that plans for both pre-date the war in Ukraine. Belarus concluded a constitutional referendum removing its nuclear-free status two days before Russia’s invasion. Plans for Lakenheath, new nuclear-capable jets and new nuclear bombs have been in development for many years.

What is new is the intensity of these nuclear developments – including repeated calls to station US nuclear weapons in Poland and the latest, frankly ridiculous and dangerous, calls for a ‘Eurobomb’ by some German politicians. Add to the mix the fact that trillions of dollars are to be spent on not just upgrading but completely renewing US nuclear weapons systems. Every nuclear-armed state is rearming and upgrading. A new nuclear-arms race is in full swing.

In the middle of this, we have a war that could – for all the reasons outlined here and many others – escalate dramatically. This war, the war in Ukraine must end.

The only way out is diplomacy and negotiation. But this cannot be left to the US, UK or NATO member states. In fact, they should have nothing to do with such efforts. They should stand aside. Why? Because a nuclear-armed alliance with NATOs record has no credibility. What’s more, just take a look at how the UK, for instance, has been propping up and arming Israel’s genocide on Palestine. Look at the disgraceful shambles in the British Parliament. Look at the already-alarming dynamics of the upcoming US Presidential election. These people have zero credibility. They are not just unsuited and incapable. In fact, they are complicit. We know it. The non-nuclear world knows it. The global majority knows it.

But the non-Western global majority is not a bystander. Brazil has proposed negotiations. The BRICS countries have proposed similar. Countries from Latin America, across Africa and into Asia know that the very worst must be averted. They know that diplomacy and negotiation can end this war and remove the threats of nuclear escalation. We should give them our support.

All of which puts a special responsibility on the peace movements of Europe: we must explain the risks, explain the realities and combat propaganda aimed at undermining the efforts of those genuinely committed to a settlement in Ukraine.

We must resist the expanding nuclear bootprint and demand that our governments make way for a peaceful solution to the horrors in Ukraine, Palestine and elsewhere.

'Eurobomb'? No thanks!

From END Info 40 - download here

What has prompted recent statements from prominent German political figures and others that call - to one degree or another - for the creation of a ‘Eurobomb’? Such a ‘Eurobomb’ is imagined as an ‘independent’ nuclear weapons system developed, maintained and controlled by a coalition of European states. ‘Independent’ here means ‘independent of the United States’. The idea is not a new one, of course.

NATO’s 1957 ‘strategic concept’ was explicit about the central role of nuclear weapons in the ‘defence’ [sic] of Europe. The 1957 concept was itself a development of US President Eisenhower’s 1953 ‘New Look’ policy. According to Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neill (Partners in deterrence, p40):

...Einsenhower’s New Look policy ... envisaged maintaining the economic viability of the Western defence effort by substituting (cheap) nuclear for (expensive) conventional forces. The [North Atlantic Council] agreed to the introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to Europe in 1953, and to a general concept of using nuclear weapons for defending allied territory ... in 1954.

From this point onwards, nuclear weapons played a central role in NATO’s concept of ‘defence’ in Europe and became central to the development of relationships within the nuclear-armed alliance. To what extent did the German government, the German public and wider European society debate and discuss the implications of this new development?

In their ‘war-gaming’ of the use of nuclear weapons in the ‘defence’ of Europe, how many German lives were calculated to be ‘expendable’ for such ‘defence’? How many French lives? How much death and destruction was acceptable? If the 1954 decision was discussed in detail, it was certainly not done in public.

This changed in 1955: between 20 and 28 June of that year, NATO forces conducted a ‘field training exercise’ across Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and a section of France. Named Carte Blanche, the exercise modelled the ‘defence of Europe’ from an attack by Soviet forces. The ‘defence of Europe’ was now, following the 1954 decision, to be conducted with nuclear weapons. The outcome of the exercise indicated the ‘defence of Europe’ by nuclear means would involve the killing of 1,700,000 Germans and the wounding of 3,500,000 others.

The outcome of Carte Blanche became a matter of public discussion and debate in Germany. The population was understandably interested in and alarmed at the cost of ‘defence’ by such means. Have the German and other politicians now floating the idea of a ‘Eurobomb’ encouraged and facilitated similar debate and discussion? What would be the cost of ‘defending Germany’ by such means? Or do they consider other factors to be more important than the prospect of mass-killings?

1956 and the events surrounding Suez add a further dimension to our story. Waning colonial powers, including France and fascist Portugal, were pressuring for NATO to “take a more active interest, and perhaps active policy, outside Europe” (Timothy Sale, Enduring Alliance, p32) at the end of 1955. In this context, Germany argued that: “Wherever one of us loses, all lose”. The key element that united reaction to Carte Blanche and the pressures of late 1955 was a recognition of the obvious from NATO member states: that the ‘defence’ of Europe and the interests of European NATO member-states, including their colonial and post-colonial interests, was now in the hands of the United States. The events of October 1956 demonstrated this most clearly. Not only did the US not come to the aid of Britain, France and Israel in their military action against Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal but they “insisted that the British agree to a cease-fire and present a timetable for withdrawal or Britain would be denied access to the International Monetary Fund” (ibid, p33). That is: the US threatened to bankrupt Britain for ‘stepping out of line’. Why the US is not employing such threats against the genocidal government of Israel today illustrates the levels of sincerity on display in the Security Council and elsewhere. Following Suez, the German foreign minister declared that “NATO is dead for the moment.”

What to make of this declaration? According to a senior official of the German government, who we presume represented the settled view of that government, when the US acted in its own interest to put a stop to the Suez crisis NATO was “dead for the moment”. Contrast this to the outcome of Carte Blanche, where to protect its interests in Europe the US publicly declared its willingness to have millions of Germans killed and wounded. At this point, NATO was not “dead for the moment.” The fact that Germany had no direct interest in the French, British and Israeli colonial escapade in Egypt makes this even more startling.

By this time, Britain was already in possession of atomic weapons and with Prime Minister Eden out of the way, Harold Macmillan was able to quickly repair relations with Eisenhower (who he knew well). Other European NATO member states were not in the same position. Whereas Britain and the US concluded their Mutual Defence Agreement by 1958, cementing the end of anything like a truly independent foreign and military policy for the British, other European states who were not yet atomic powers in their own right had to contend with a changing landscape.

Both Britain and the US considered large deployments of troops in Europe to be overly burdensome. Why, when the ‘defence’ of Europe involved turning Germany into a nuclear battlefield, should so many troops be stationed there? As such, in 1957 NATO’s nuclear posture underwent another significant change to a situation where “sharing of nuclear hardware became a key element of the alliances strategic posture” (Partners in deterrence, p41). ‘Sharing’ did not amount to parity between the US and those states it ‘shared’ nuclear weapons with. For instance, a US Congressional committee visit to West Germany in 1960 observed “fighter aircraft loaded with nuclear bombs sitting on the edge of runways with ... pilots inside the cockpits and starter plugs inserted. The embodiment of control was an American officer somewhere in the vicinity with a revolver.” (ibid). This example and many others emphasised the degree to which European ‘defence’ was wholly reliant on the United States.

Such a reality, combined with US opposition to independent French plans, compelled France to work closely with Israel on the development of nuclear weapons:

Israel signed a secret agreement with then NATO member France, to cooperate in a program of nuclear research that would make Israel the world’s sixth country to possess nuclear weapons. Even here there may have been an indirect, unintended helping hand from the Eisenhower administration. In 1958, the U.S. enraged Charles de Gaulle by opposing French acquisition of nuclear weapons while publicly acknowledging that a special nuclear relationship existed between the United States and Britain.

(Stephen Green, Taking Sides, p157)

The story up to this point demonstrates the degree to which all European members of NATO had convinced themselves, against all moral reasoning and logic, to fully accept nuclear doctrines as a substitute for real security and defence. The story also illustrates the degree to which adherence to such a doctrine implied overwhelming reliance on US capabilities, with little encouragement for independent action. With the entry of France, with the aid of Israel, into the nuclear club there were now prospects for ‘independent’ initiative:

Greater desire for influence over the use of nuclear weapons was also shared by West Germany, which carefully coordinated cooperation with France and Italy to develop sovereign (European) nuclear capabilities while arguing for greater influence over nuclear use decisions in NATO ...

By the 1960s, the proposal for a sea-based [Multilateral Force] of nuclear ballastic missiles became central to transatlantic debates, as the US 

... looked to a new NATO force to counter what seemed to be an increasingly close alignment between Paris and Bonn. (Partners in Deterrence)

As we have seen, initiatives towards the development of an ‘independent’ ‘Eurobomb’ first emerged in a period of uncertainty over the actual levels of US commitment to the ‘defence of Europe’ [sic] and at a time when questions over levels of control emerged. What was true in the 1950s and 1960s seems to correspond to current developments.

A desperate and bloody war rages on the doorstep. NATO is expanding, the US nuclear-bootprint in Europe is expanding and intensifying. Europe is re-arming and re-militarising at an astonishing rate. To all intents and purposes, it would appear that within the questionable confines of what states understand to constitute ‘security’, Europe is meeting the ‘security challenges’ posed by recent events.

Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are to receive new, enhanced, US nuclear bombs. The orders for the new, nuclear-capable jets to carry them have been placed and are to be fulfilled. The United Kingdom looks sets to be home to US nuclear bombs once more. These steps surely meet the requirements for maintaining and bolstering the “ultimate guarantor of security”? So what has prompted these calls for a ‘Eurobomb’ and what does this suggest about the near future?

As in 1950s and 1960s, uncertainty around whether or not the US can or will meet its stated obligations as a NATO member in the ‘defence of Europe’ [sic] and questions around control of nuclear weapons have emerged. The source of this uncertainty and these concerns is threefold. First: the prospect of a second Trump White House, the record of his first administration and recent statements about NATO. Second: the fact that the current President, Joe Biden, and his administration seem unable to secure support in Congress for military aid. Third: the overwhelming signals of political instability emanating from Washington, which are linked to the first two concerns.

“NATO is dead for the moment” worried the German Foreign Minister following the Suez debacle. German, French and other foreign ministers thought the same during the first Trump administration. In a speech on 7 February 2020, French President Macron called NATO “brain dead”. Under Trump, US-NATO relations reached a nadir, with the President demanding huge commitments to military spending (now fulfilled) and a succession of bust-ups at NATO meetings. At one point, European leaders worried about “Westlessness”: how would the world cope without a unified, nuclear-armed military alliance such as NATO?

Johann Wadephul, a senior CDU (Germany) politician who now sits on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s political committee, responded to Macron’s 2020 speculations over ‘Europeanising’ France’s nuclear weapons with this claim: “We need to consider working with France on nuclear weapons. Germany should be ready to participate in this nuclear deterrent with its own capabilities and resources.”

As the US election campaign intensifies, the fragility of ‘European defence’ will become clearer and clearer. Since the late 1950s, European states have told themselves and the world that US nuclear weapons provide the ‘ultimate guarantor’ of ‘security’ [sic]. They have convinced themselves that the nuclear-armed NATO alliance is an essential, indispensable instrument to ensure the ‘security’ of the continent. Yet time and again, these shibboleths have collided with the concerns, priorities and ambitions of individual European states and with reality itself. This is not just a matter of over-reliance on the United States and its nuclear weapons. This is about the entire concept of ‘security’ with nuclear weapons at its core.

Such weapons are not a ‘deterrence’, they are an instrument of ‘compellence’. They compel those who rely on them, like NATO member states, to align themselves with the United States and as such they are subject to the particular interests of that country. They are also subject to the turbulence currently on display in the United States elections and the outcome of this election. Nuclear weapons compel politicians of all stripes to accept the idea that the ability to unleash nuclear genocide is a reasonable foundation for ‘security’. They seek to compel others with the threat of genocide. At a time of sharp nuclear tensions, the myth of ‘nuclear based security’ compels moves towards a proliferation of nuclear capabilities when what Europe and the world needs is more robust non-proliferation and genuine moves towards abolition.

Speculation around a ‘Eurobomb’ exposes the foolishness of ‘nuclear security’.

Lakenheath: evidence and dangers mount

From ENDInfo 39

Evidence is mounting that the United States plans to station nuclear bombs in the UK once more. Documents analysed by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), a US-based organisation, note plans for the construction of a “surety dormitory” at the Lakenheath airbase. According to Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda of the FAS:

“Surety” is a term commonly used within the Department of Defense and Department of Energy to refer to the capability to keep nuclear weapons safe, secure, and under positive control.

This latest news follows information obtained by Kristensen last year, which showed the inclusion of the UK on a list of US nuclear storage sites in Europe. This list was connected to funding proposals to upgrade and improve nuclear storage facilities.

Perhaps the clearest evidence that the US intends to return nuclear bombs to Lakenheath is the stationing of two squadrons of the new F35A aircraft at the base. It has been argued that these aircraft were designed specifically to carry the a new range of nuclear bombs, the B61-12s. Why else would so many nuclear-capable aircraft be stationed at Lakenheath if not to carry nuclear bombs?

The British media has finally taken note of these developments, with national newspapers, radio and television stations reporting on developments. Not every media outlet voices opposition to these developments but a recent survey conducted by the YouGov polling agency recorded that of those questioned, a mere 7% ‘strongly support’ the plans. 16% expressed some support, whilst 20% oppose and 39% ‘strongly oppose’ the plans. This is a clear majority of those surveyed - a representative sample of the British population - opposed to returning US nuclear bombs to Lakenheath. This level of opposition should encourage further and more vigorous protest action.

What do the politicians have to say about these developments? Very little, so far. This should be surprising as the plans to date have been developed without consultation, deliberation, opportunities for dissent or opposition within Britain’s ‘democratic’ bodies. Why is this? Why, when asked, have British and US representatives uttered the same claim that they can “neither confirm nor deny”?

Part of the explanation is that what the nuclear-armed states call their ‘posture’ relies heavily on ‘keeping the enemy guessing’. Such a ‘posture’ could make sense in a game of cards but it seems particularly foolish when the ‘wrong guess’ could lead to the extermination of life on the planet.

Another part of the explanation is the existence of the 1958 UK–US Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). This agreement regulates the nuclear relationship between the UK and the US. As John Ainslie has shown (see Spokesman 153) the UK is entirely dependent upon the US for the maintenence and upgrading of nuclear weapons systems. As such, in any agreement like the MDA, it is clear who has the upper hand.

The MDA regulates and controls a whole number of factors associated with nuclear weapons technology. One of these is ‘secrecy’. Speaking of which, the MDA has undergone a number of renewal processes, the latest of which is to conclude by the end of 2024. The process by which the renewal takes place and the lack of accountability or debate in the British parliament are deeply concerning. As is the 2004 legal opinion obtained by BASIC, which argued that renewal of the treaty contravenes Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits signatories to pursuing nuclear disarmament. The MDA does the exact opposite of this: it encourages the maintenence of nuclear weapons systems.

The MDA is just one of a whole series of agreements and treaties that allow the for a close nuclear relationship between the US and UK. For how much longer will the secrets endure?

Quite predictably and as anti-nuclear campaigners have warned, Russia has interpreted the re-deployment of US nuclear bombs at Lakenheath as a threat. A spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, told reporters that they view the deployment as an “escalation”. In ‘nuclear strategy’ an escalation on one side is usually met with escalation by the other side. What will Russia do? We hope that they will show restraint given the already sharpened nuclear tensions.

As we wrote in END Info 32:

Even without the massively increased nuclear tensions that have been developing over the past few years, and which have become even more acute over the past months, our opposition would be sharp.

We know that even in the most stable of times, increasing the US’s nuclear bootprint would create instability. We are not living through particularly stable times.

We know that regardless of other circumstances, a nuclear storage site and an airbase for nuclear capable bombers becomes a target for a nuclear strike. We need to make everyone aware of this risk and link it to all of the other very good reasons for opposing nuclear weapons.

We know that every new nuclear development brings with it new risks, new dangers and new threats in local, regional, national and international contexts.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has a day of action on 23rd September. See www.cnduk.org for more information.

Nuclear Responsibility

Tom Unterrainer. From ENDInfo 39

The following speech was made via Zoom to the GENSUIKIN (Japan) World Conference on 5 August 2023 to mark the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Tom was asked to update the Japanese movement on recent developments in the UK.

Greetings and warmest wishes to our friends in the Japanese peace and nuclear disarmament movement. Let me express our admiration and gratitude for the courageous and ongoing work of the Japanese movement, which conducts its international campaign from the only country to be attacked with atomic weapons. As we all know, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 are a stain on the history of humanity and serve as a reminder to us all of the deadly - murderous - power of atomic and nuclear weapons. I am humbled and honoured to be addressing you today. Together, we say ‘Hiroshima and Nagasaki: never again!”

The Preparatory Committee of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty convened in Vienna, Austria, at the start of August. In her opening address to the PrepCom, Izumi Nakamitsu - UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs - warned of an arms control regime that is crumbling and that “there is nothing to replace it.”

When something “crumbles” it breaks apart into smaller and smaller pieces. As we know, things - be they atoms, cake or international treaties - do not break apart into smaller and smaller pieces by magic. Forces are applied, deliberate actions are taken.

Just as the decision to unleash atomic destruction on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a cold, calculated and deliberate process the fact that the treaties, agreements and initiatives painstakingly constructed over decades have been steadily undermined, scrapped and sabotaged is a consequence of a cold, calculated and deliberate process.

The ‘conveyer belt’ commenced with George Bush Jnrs withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile treaty and the subsequent stationing of ABM systems, and continued through to Donald Trump’s conduct and the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the ‘Iran Deal’ and similar treaties and agreements. The global system designed to control the spread of nuclear arms lies in tatters and of the two main international treaties still standing - the already-mentioned NPT and the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons - there are substantial issues.

I want to focus on the part played by the United Kingdom in generating these issues but in so doing, it will be necessary to address the close military partnership with the United States - in which the UK plays a very junior role - and the workings of the nuclear-armed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In touching on these things, it will be clear that recent decisions emanating from this relationship and from NATO work to: undermine the NPT and TPNW; contribute to, rather than reducing, the acute nuclear tensions faced by the world; destabilise the Asia Pacific region.

First: news the potential return of US nuclear bombs to the UK emerged without fanfare, discussion, debate or the opportunity for dissent within Britain’s democratic institutions. When the British government was asked to account for this potential development, it gave the following non-reply: “The government is unable to comment on US spending decisions and capabilities, which are a matter for the US. It remains longstanding policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.”

News of the development only emerged following close examination of the 2023 US Department of Defence budget, where the UK was added to the list of countries where US nuclear storage sites were to be upgraded. This information appeared in a small footnote in the budget. The Lakenheath airbase was the place where the US Air Force previously stored nuclear gravity bombs. These were finally removed in the mid-to-late 2000s after a long campaign. Unlike the secrecy surrounding the nuclear storage facilities, news that the US was to deploy a new generation of nuclear-capable F-35 fighter bombers to the base was promoted. The new F-35s and the new generation of B61-12 nuclear bombs act as one system. The new bombs are not conventional free-fall bombs, they have accurate guidance systems, a new ‘steerable’ tail-fin and they have a ‘dialable’ nuclear payload. These are the type of bomb that military strategists and politicians refer to as ‘usable’ or ‘battlefield’ weapons. What does this development amount to if not nuclear proliferation? The US nuclear boot print in Europe is expanding and such developments undermine the NPT.

Second: the continued opposition of nuclear-armed states and states within the nuclear-armed NATO alliance to the TPNW is not just a matter of these countries expressing their continued desire to hold the threat of nuclear annihilation over the planet, but is a deliberate move to prevent the TPNW from ever becoming customary international law. These countries are “persistently objecting”, which - in international law - is a mechanism by which states not only ensure the non-applicability of a law within their own territory but which attempts to ensure that a law never achieves the status of ‘customary international law’. This deliberate undermining clearly demonstrates the actual intentions and thinking of those states - like the UK and US - which claim to uphold and defend the norms of a democratic world order. When it comes to nuclear questions, the only thing they defend is their own capacity to unleash nuclear genocide. I’m not sure that “crumbling” quite describes this dynamic!

The new alliance between the UK, US and Australia- AUKUS - clearly demonstrates the intent of two nuclear armed states to proliferate nuclear technology, thus undermining their stated commitments. The intention is to provide Australia with nuclear-powered but conventionally armed attack submarines. The nuclear reactors on board these submarines will contain weapons-grade Uranium. Under the AUKUS agreement, Australia will be responsible for processing and storing nuclear waste. Quite apart further question of who or what these submarines are supposed to attack - and the consequences of stationing such attack submarines in the region - is the fact that nuclear technology for military purposes is spreading. This is clearly not in line with the NPT let alone a commitment to a stable world order.

None of the developments mentioned can be separated from the global picture. They cannot be separated from US policy and they cannot be separated from NATO’s posture - which now extends to the Asia Pacific region, some enormous distance from the North Atlantic! These developments relate directly to the broader dynamics of European remilitarisation, already underway before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the so-called ‘tilt to Asia’ instigated by President Obama.

It is the responsibility of the international peace movements to sound the alarm and mobilise with energy, determination and creativity to halt and reverse the spiral towards disaster.

Anti-Nuclear Action

Editorial Comments, Tom Unterrainer

From ENDInfo 39

As we have reported on and argued for some time, the risk of nuclear use is posed more sharply now that at any time since the opening of the atomic age in 1945 and certainly since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. During this second event diplomacy, negotiation and the intervention of international figures such as Bertrand Russell succeeded in averting the worst possible outcome. In 2023 the Global South has spearheaded attempts to bring about a cessation of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Efforts at negotiation and diplomacy not only seem absent from the agenda of the major Western powers but, as the record shows, they have set themselves in opposition to all such efforts to date. The peace movements are working to change this.

Christopher Nolan’s film, Oppenheimer, came to the screen in this period of acute nuclear tension. Part of the films narrative relates Oppenheimer’s opposition to the development of the Hydrogen Bomb in contrast to his commitment to developing the Atomic Bomb. Nolan’s rendering of this important aspect of the story moves from interactions between Oppenheimer and Edward Teller – the major proponent of the Hydrogen Bomb – to stark contrasts between the two personalities. The scene in the film that covers the Trinity Test shows Oppenheimer ‘up close and bunkered down’ to this first detonation of an Atomic Bomb. We see him peeking through a small viewing apparatus and our ears are engulfed with the murderous rumble of the detonation. The experience is very disturbing both mentally and physically, given the volume and intensity of the sound in a cinema setting. In contrast, Teller views the detonation from a safe distance: he sits in a deckchair, sun lotion slavered over his face and dark glasses in place. The two experiences are starkly different and speak to starkly different attitudes towards what had been created. Teller dreamed of ever-greater destructive power. Oppenheimer imagined that the Atomic Bomb would open the way to peace.

In Chapter V of his Has Man a Future? (Spokesman), Bertrand Russell writes of ‘Scientists and the H-Bomb’. He notes of Oppenheimer:

When the American Government first proposed to set to work constructing the H-bomb, Oppenheimer, who had been the main agent in the construction of the A-bomb, opposed the new project. The authorities were outraged ...

There are those who may think that there was an inconsistency in being willing to make the A-bomb, but unwilling to make the H-bomb. The A-bomb was made in time of war when it was supposed (mistakenly, though with good reason) that Hitler was on the verge of discovering how to make it. The making of the H-bomb was undertaken in time of peace, when it was certain that, if the project were proceeded with, the USSR would have it about as soon as the United States, and that it could not be a means of victory to either side.

Unlike the Atomic Bomb, the Hydrogen Bomb has not been detonated in wartime (which is not the same as claiming that it has “never been used” - see Daniel Ellsberg, Spokesman 155). Oppenheimer’s opposition to the Hydrogen Bomb and the consequences of his admirable actions in this respect resonate with another scene in the film where, just before he is to meet with President Truman (the “don’t bring this cry baby in here again” scene), Oppenheimer is accosted in the hotel lobby by Leo Szilard.

Szilard conceived of the nuclear chain reaction in 1933 and assisted Einstein in writing the infamous 1939 letter to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt that kick-started the Manhattan Project that Oppenheimer was to run. It is worth knowing that Edward Teller was consulted on the contents of this letter. The Einstein-Szilard letter suggested the possibility of constructing an Atomic Bomb and indicated that Nazi Germany was already working on such a device. Fast-forward six years and Nazi Germany is defeated and no such bombs are in evidence. What could Szilard do but attempt to take action against the monster he helped to produce?

Szilard accosting Oppenheimer in the film only hints at the lengths that the former went to in order to prevent the use of the Atomic Bomb. Together with other ‘Atomic Scientists’, Szilard petitioned Truman to commit to not bombing Japan (see Spokesman 154). The petition was ignored. Szilard spent the remainder of his life engaged in action against nuclear weapons.

How and why Szilard and others drew different conclusions to Oppenheimer over the Atomic Bomb is a matter of psychological speculation. Whatever their differences on this question, both were haunted by the knowledge of what they unleashed with Szilard’s ­­1949 short story My Trial As A War Criminal and similar stories demonstrating the depth of feeling on the matter.

This byway into the question of ‘Anti-Nuclear Action’ might make sense – if only in a clumsy sense – by thinking about the views and actions of Teller, Oppenheimer and Szilard in the specific circumstances 1945. Might Edward Teller represent that extreme section of current opinion (and influence) that actively promotes the role of nuclear weapon developments, the threat of nuclear use and the centrality of such threats to maintaining political and military dominance?

Would the Oppenheimer of 1945 be a sensible analogy for those who recognise the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction to the future of humanity but who imagine, for whatever reason or combination of reasons, that they are in some way essential for what is termed ‘security’ or as a ‘deterrent’ to an evil enemy?

Could Szilard stand for those who see the heart of the matter and who take action against nuclear weapons and attempt to make our ‘Oppenheimers’ see sense?

Or is it the case that the reality of the nuclear threat today and the world-ending consequences of a nuclear war – in contrast to the detonation of two atomic bombs – are so extreme that the examples of Teller, Oppenheimer and Szilard are inadequate for our purposes? It might be speculated that of the three, only Teller could see in 1945 the future he helped create. He steered a steady course throughout all these developments and up to his death in 2003 at the age of 95, happy – in all likelihood – with the results. Russell was certainly not a fan of Teller, with whom he appeared on a televised debate in 1960. Recalling the debate in his Autobiography, Russell writes:

I was inhibited by my intense dislike of Teller and what I felt to be disingenuous flattery. I came away from the BBC studio feeling that I had let down all those who agreed with my point of view ...

In the same way that the stark and evident risks of climate catastrophe pose existential threats, today’s sharp nuclear tensions and the consequences of nuclear use also pose existential threats of a type probably unimaginable to Oppenheimer and Szilard in 1945. In his recent work, Human Extinction: A History of the Science and Ethics of Annihilation (Routledge, 2023), Émile P. Torres charts the development of how thinkers understood the implications of the atomic bomb. He writes:

There was, in the years following WWII, almost no explicit talk of what Russell would later, in 1954, call “universal death,” i.e. total annihilation.

By 1961 Russell was writing on the ‘Long-term Conditions of Human Survival” (Has Man a Future?, Chapter XI, Spokesman). Russell argued that we cannot ‘un-invent’ nuclear weapons but that the risks of such weaponry and the ‘innovations’ that modern science make possible – such as the invention of a ‘Doomsday Machine’ that could kill all life within days – necessitates decisive political action on a world scale to put such weapons out of use: effective abolition (though he did not use this phrase). In the same way that climate activists understand the need for such global action and link their efforts at direct action to this goal, anti-nuclear activists must begin to do the same. We have no Szilard’s or Russell’s to come to our aid and only the wide-spread combination of people, groups and movements can link global concerns to local action and vice versa. ‘Anti-Nuclear Action’ should be back on our agenda.

United States: Strategic Bases in the Far East

From END Info 38 (From the archives…)

First published in tricontinental 39, Year IV, June, 1969.

On February 7, 1965, U.S. imperialism began bombing North Viet-Nam thus systematically intensifying its war of aggression in Viet-Nam. Shortly before that, on January 27, Rear Admiral Collins of the U.S. Marine Division stationed on Okinawa, in an interview with Mr. Williams, A.P. news reporter, stated:

“The war in South Viet-Nam must be ended some time. Part of the landing forces of the Marines are always in service on the sea and can be deployed in South Viet-Nam quickly; and even the whole of the 3rd Marine Division could be sent in five days if so ordered.

lf the Marines were to be sent there, they would engage in operations in the Delta zone to the south of Saigon, Saigon city, the cities of Danang and Hue in the northern province.”

(The Ryukyu Shimpo, January 28, 1965).

At the very time the “bombing of the North” was started, the Marine Corps and the Missile Hawk Battalion were sent to Danang. From that time Okinawa has been turned more and more into an advance base for the U.S. war of aggression in Viet-Nam.

Illustrating how the U.S. bases in Okinawa have been used for the war of aggression in Viet-Nam, the then High Commissioner Watson, one year after the beginning of the “bombing of the North” said:

“The U.S.A. has an interest of grave concern in Okinawa. Okinawa is still a base for the defense [read “aggression”] of Southeast Asia, as well as a key military base for the war in Viet-Nam. The military bases in Okinawa are very important for the defense of the U.S.A., Japan and other allied countries of the West Pacific. This was shown in the quick release of troops and munitions from Okinawa to Viet-Nam.”

(Testimony at the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, March 23, 1966).

Then what importance does the U.S.A. attach and what evaluation does it give to Okinawa in its Far East strategy, including the war of aggression in Viet-Nam? U.S. Army Deputy Under Secretary Holt pointed out the strategic position of Okinawa as follows: “Okinawa is situated in the center of an arc beginning from Japan, Korea in the north, to Southeast Asia through Taiwan.”

In order to make use of this strategic position for its aggression in Asia, what did the U.S.A. do with Okinawa as the keystone? In order to answer this, we must look at the series of military pacts which the U.S.A. has set up.

At the Stockholm Tribunal (May, 1967) and the Copenhagen Tribunal (November, 1967) initiated by Lord Bertrand Russell and participated in by conscientious thinkers and scientists from all over the world, the crimes committed in the war in Viet-Nam by U.S. imperialism were completely laid bare, and at the same time, the crimes of the Japanese Government as an accessory were exposed to the light of day.

A series of military pacts which the U.S.A. has concluded (and which the U.S.A. has forced Japan to join) constitute the military and political tie-up in the U.S. Far East strategy. In these pacts Okinawa is regarded as the keystone.

Following is the list of military pacts in order of signing and effectuation.

1. San Francisco “Peace” Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Signed Sept. 8, 1961. Effectuation Apr. 28, 1952

2. Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S.A. and the Republic of the Philippines. Signed Aug. 30, 1951. Effectuation Aug. 27, 1952

3. Peace Treaty between Japan and the “Republic of China” (Taiwan). Signed Apr. 28, 1952. Effectuation Aug. 5, 1952

4. Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S.A. and the “Republic of Korea”. Signed Oct. 1, 1953. Effectuation Nov. 17, 1954

5. Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S.A. and the “Republic of China” (Taiwan). Signed Dec. 2, 1954. Effectuation Mar. 3, 1955.

6. Japan – “R.O.K.” Treaty. Ratified on Nov. 12, 1965 in the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet. Ratified on Doc. 11, 1965 in the House of Councilors of the Japanese Diet.

As stated, the U.S.A., through Article 3 of the San Francisco “Peace” Treaty, acquired “the right to exercise all and any power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction,” which means the right to occupy Okinawa and to establish U.S. military bases there. And through the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty which was concluded and effectuated at the same time, the U.S.A. has acquired the right to establish U.S. military bases and station U.S. Armed Forces in mainland Japan.

An investigation team of the. U.S. House Committee on Armed Service (led by Melvin Price) studying the problem of the military use of land in Okinawa, summarized in the form of “Price Recommendation” the results of its investigation (June 13, 1956) in which it was bluntly said:

“We stay in Okinawa because Okinawa forms an inseparable part of our defense [read “aggression”] on a global scale. The fact that U.S.A. maintains bases in Japan and the Philippines as in other parts of the world depends upon the continuous existence of our friendly governments.

On the Ryukyu Islands, in accordance with our national policy of course, we can make a plan for long-term use of our advanced military bases in a chain of islands the Parties (U.S.A.) as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other (South Korea)”

[This] means the territory which the U.S.A. considers to be placed under the administrative control of the “Republic of Korea.” When viewed from all angles, such territory can mean nothing but the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Accordingly, this Treaty as concluded with the view to attacking that part of Korea north of the 38th parallel, using Okinawa as the keystone.

Defense Deputy Undersecretary Bundy testified as follows, based upon the experience of this Treaty which was partially invoked.

“The value of Okinawa bases was fully proved during the Korean War and at the time of crises around the Taiwan Straits which have often been repeated.”

(May 9-10; 1962, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services).

APPLICATION SPHERE OF U.S. TAIWAN TREATY

“For the purpose of Article II and V, the terms ‘territorial’ and ‘territories’ shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction.”

(Article 6, Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of China).

Clearly, Okinawa is included. What cannot be over­looked are provisions which appear next to this.

“The provisions of Article II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.”

What is meant by “mutual agreement”? On December 10, 1954, a week after the Treaty was signed, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of the U.S.A. and Foreign Minister Yeh Kung Chao of the “Republic of China” exchanged the following letters:

“The Republic of China shall have inherent right for defense over all territories which are and shall be placed under her control at present and in the future.”

The “territories ... which may hereafter be under the control of its Government” can only mean the People’s Republic of China, judging from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek is using the slogan of “counter­offensive against the Continent.” And the Treaty stipulates that Chiang Kai-shek invokes the right of defense against the People’s Republic of China, this “right of defense” is nothing but a synonym for “aggression” through U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek joint operation.

APPLICATION SPHERE OF JAPAN-TAIWAN TREATY

This is not a treaty which was directly concluded by the U.S.A. As can be judged from the date of its signing and effectuation, this is a Treaty which was urged by the U.S.A. to be hurriedly concluded between th, Governments of Japan and the Chiang Kai-shek clique on the very day when the San Francisco “Peace” Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty came into force.

Already in this Treaty, the role of accomplice which is now being played by the Sato Government of Japan in the U.S. war in Viet-Nam, has appeared in a most plainspoken form. An exchange of notes from the Chiang Kai-shek Minister to the Government of Japan on the same day as its signing laid bare its aggressive character as follows:

“In regard to the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan) signed this day I have the honor to refer, on behalf of my Government to the understanding reached between us that the terms of the present Treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China (Taiwan), be applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of its Government.”

“All the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be under the control of its Government” (The “Republic of China”) can mean nothing but the Continent of China or the People’s Republic of China as also indicated in the U.S.-Taiwan Treaty.

This Japan-Taiwan Treaty is a military pact by which the Government of Japan, which is obliged to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces of Japan in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, is also bound to launch U.S.-Japan-Taiwan joint operations in the future for armed intervention against the People’s Republic of China.

APPLICATION SPHERE OF JAPAN-R.O.K. TREATY

The series of military pacts which the U.S.A. has concluded (in this case has forced Japan to conclude) are completed with this Treaty. That is because the circle of military pacts which have been separately concluded, in which Okinawa is a military keystone, is completed with this Japan Treaty. It is in this sense that, as has often been said, the Japan-South Korea Treaty has in fact established NEATO (North East Asia Treaty Organization).

No sooner had the Japan-South Korea Treaty been concluded than the Government of Japan established its Consulate in South Korea, and dispatched a military attaché of the Self-Defense Forces. It is by now clear enough that these constitute the Armed Forces of Japan.

It is well-known that the Government of Japan, on the eve of Japanese imperialist aggression against China which developed into the Pacific War, had dispatched armed forces on the pretext of the protection of Japanese residents. And different from the pre-war situation, South Korea has been turned into a massive military base of U.S. Armed Forces. Accordingly, by the conclusion of this Japan-South Korea joint operation by which the Self-Defense forces of Japan can be sent to South Korea for an attack on that part that lies north of the 38th parallel.

The time when the ratification of this Treaty was forces through by the Government of Japan by emergency measures including introducing police forces into the Diet building, was from November to December 1965, at the same time as the U.S.A. had stepped up its war of aggression in Viet-Nam.

Taken together, these facts show that U.S. imperialism has hurriedly made a plan for launching aggression against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is in a hurry to gain further cooperation from the Government of Japan for this purpose, while stepping up the war in Viet-Nam ever more intensively.

Thus, the stronghold for U.S. imperialist preparation for all kinds of adventurist policies, through which it is escalating the war of aggression in Viet-Nam and expanding the war into other parts of the world, is the military base of the U.S. Armed Forces in Okinawa, that is the occupation of Okinawa.

*tricontinental was published in Spanish, English and French by the Executive Secretariat of the Organization of the Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OPSAAAL)

Comments on China’s GSI in relation to nuclear issues

From END Info 38

Tom Unterrainer

The is an expanded version of a contribution to a recent panel on the GSI Concept Paper organised by the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU). A recording of the panel can be viewed here.

I want to focus on nuclear weapons questions as they relate to the Global Security Initiative but in so doing, it would be wrong to conceive of nuclear risks as entirely separate from the general security issues that the GSI seeks to address. I’d go further and say that eliminating the existential risks posed by the prospect of nuclear use is a central aspect of any coherent approach to security.

Priority 3 of the concept paper addresses nuclear questions and opens with a reaffirmation of the 2022 joint statement of five nuclear-armed states, China included. This statement was, of course, a reaffirmation of a similar statement by Reagan and Gorbachev in the 1980s: “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

Since the January 2022 statement, rather than a reduction in nuclear risks the world is faced with the most acute set of such risks since the opening of the atomic age.

As evidence, we need look no further than the decision of the Atomic Scientists to set the hands of their ‘Doomsday Clock’ to ’90 seconds to Midnight’. This cautionary metaphor – signalling the perils we all face resulting from the combined dangers nuclear war, climate catastrophe and technological threats – has never been as close to ‘Midnight’ as it is now. The Atomic Scientists were clear about the contribution of nuclear threats, arising from the terrible events in Ukraine, to their decision.

It goes without saying that if the proposals contained in China’s GSI were to become the norm through which states and groups of states interacted on the global stage, then we would expect to see a drastic ‘winding back’ of the minute and second hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’.

But, of course, such proposals as those contained in the GSI are not a ‘new departure’ for China. If you trace the public statements of leading spokespeople from the time of China’s emergence as an atomic and nuclear power in the 1960’s, through to the 1980s – when the concept of ‘Common Security’ was promoted by progressive forces in Europe – through to the wording of the GSI, a certain continuity of thought and concern is overt.

For example, China’s test of an atomic bomb on 16 October 1964 was not accompanied by jubilant, boastful or threatening public statements. Rather, official statements and the communique issued by Premier Chou En-Lai struck a note of regret.

China’s initial statement reported: “The Chinese Government has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. If this had been achieved, China need not have developed nuclear weapons. But our proposal was met with stubborn resistance…” The statement further made clear that: “The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons”, a statement of a ‘No First Use’ policy which remains central to China’s nuclear posture to this day. Worthy of note is the fact that the US and UK, for instance, repudiate a ‘No First Use’ commitment. This statement also proposed:

“That a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as the first step, the summit conference should reach agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones nor against each other.”

Chou En-Lai’s communique to world leaders, sent on the 17 October 1964, reiterated this proposal and explained that – to quote – “China’s mastering of nuclear weapons is entirely for defence and for protecting the Chinese people from … nuclear threat.”

It could be argued that Chou En-Lai’s attempt to rationalise China’s attainment of nuclear weapons capability is similar to rationalisations employed by every state that has achieved nuclear weapon capabilities. This argument is not completely false, in my view, but China’s continued arguments for nuclear abolition and proposed mechanisms to achieve this – before and after 1964 – are a matter of record.

It is also a matter of record that China had been repeatedly threatened with nuclear attack, first by Truman in 1950, then by Einsenhower in 1953 and again-and-again throughout the 1950s. The UK National Archives report that the British Government considered issuing the threat of nuclear attack against China in 1961. As the record also shows these nuclear threats came not only from the West, but also from the Soviet Union during the nadir in relations with China.

It is probably true to say that of all the threats issued by nuclear-armed states, more have been issued against China than any other nation.

China has made repeated efforts to advance proposals for and potential roads towards nuclear disarmament, from before and up to 1964, through to the 1982 UN Special Session on Disarmament right through until today. In the intervening six decades, China’s internal development has been staggering and the dynamics of global relations and global power have shifted to a similarly staggering extent.

All of which makes the consistency in approach to nuclear risks worthy of note.

But as interesting and instructive as the historical record is, we live in the here-and-now where nuclear risks are abundant. Priority 3 of the GSI concept paper – together with the general framework proposed in the document – offers a number of straightforward measures that could drastically reduce these risks.

The GSI calls for a strengthened “dialogue and cooperation between nuclear-weapon states to reduce the risks of nuclear war”. Today, in place of such dialogue and cooperation, we have the trading of nuclear threats and an apparent breakdown in dialogue. Ending these threats and commencing proper discussion is vital.

It further calls for safeguarding of the “international nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the” Non-proliferation Treaty. All the main nuclear powers are signed up to the NPT and all of them have work to do to ensure compliance with it.

Importantly, the GSI proposes active “support [for] the efforts of countries in relevant regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones”. Such active support would not only mirror mechanisms included in previous approaches to ‘Common Security’ but would activate proper consideration of those countries which have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – 68 of them so far, from Antigua and Barbuda to Vietnam – each of which have established nuclear-weapon-free zones on their territory.

A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. China’s call for a system of “international cooperation on nuclear security” and a “fair, collaborative and mutually beneficial international security system” would be an important step forward. The question remains: how soon can progress be made on this call? This question is pressing, as the following two examples illustrate.

US/NATO Strategy

The United States and the nuclear-armed alliance within which it plays the dominant role (NATO) have a clear orientation to China. This orientation is demonstrated by the record of US involvement in the region that pre-dates Obama’s ‘tilt to Asia’ by some decades.

The immediate features of US strategy can be seen in such things as a series of diplomatic visits to Taiwan, billions of dollars of military ‘aid’ to that same country and repeated bellicose statements from US officials.

These features signal a much deeper and more worrying strategic intent. Why worrying? Because when taken as a whole the increased spending, enhanced military presence and increase talk of China as a ‘systemic threat’ strongly suggest a strategy that leads to war.

The record on NATO’s shifting and developing stance on China largely tracks that of the US. It is notable that the various disruptions to US/NATO functioning evident under the Trump presidency did not fundamentally disrupt this tracking. If anything, NATO more firmly displays ‘Trumpist’ policies now than it did when he was in office. If disaster is to be averted then policies and approaches very much like those contained in the GSI must be adopted.

As global nuclear tensions increase, China - along with all other nuclear-armed states - is increasing its nuclear capabilities. As we have seen China first developed nuclear weapon capabilities in an atmosphere of nuclear threat and as it did so, it expanded existing efforts at nuclear diplomacy. China is not responsible for the current nuclear tensions and is functioning at a time of enhanced rhetoric and military activity directed against it. Yet compare and constrast the coverage of China’s expanding nuclear capabilities to the almost complete lack of coverage given to the deployment of new, enhanced US nuclear capabilities in Europe.

In the place of efforts to strip pacifist clauses from Japan’s constitution; the AUKUS alliance; tens of billions on further militarizing China’s periphery; and repeated accusations the US and NATO must recognise what growing numbers of states in the Global South recognise: security is indivisible.

Belarus

Why did Belarus remove nuclear-weapon-free status from its constitution following a referendum? Why has President Lukashenko made repeated warnings that Russian nuclear weapons could return to Belarus? Why is Russia now set to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus once again?

As documented in END Info 37 [Editorial comments], these developments did not happen by magic. Nor did they happen because Lukashenko and Putin are singularly unpleasant people. The developents unfolded over a number of years as a direct consequence of repeated threats to move US nuclear bombs into Poland and as a feature of longstanding US strategy in Eurasia. Rather than adopt an approach to ‘security’ in Europe focused on reducing tensions and threats, with a clear understanding that security is indivisible, the US and NATO have developed an approach to ‘security’ in Europe that multiplies risks. Had an approach like that outlined in the GSI been adopted, things would be very different indeed.

Conclusions

China’s Global Security Initiative should be carefully considered and discussed. Even a brief survey of world events indicates the pressing need for a different set of security arrangements from those currently pursued by the US and NATO allies.

Nuclear tensions and nuclear risks are more sharply posed than ever. If humanity is to survive these tensions and risks then new thinking and new approaches are required. The alternative is too horrible to contemplate.

Proffering Chinese Wisdom: China’s Global Security Initiative Paper

From END Info 38

Dr Jenny Clegg

This text was presented as a contribution to a recent panel on the GSI Concept Paper organised by the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU). A recording of the panel is available to view here.

At a critical moment for the world, with the war in Ukraine threatening to spiral out of control, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, took a dramatic step forward with the announcement of the 12-point proposal on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis [see The Spokesman 154: Eurasia in the World]. Just three days earlier, China released a concept paper on its Global Security Initiative that provided clarification on the rationale behind the 12-point proposal. Almost entirely escaping the superficial attention of the Western media, it sets out to explain the aim of the GSI to seek to ‘eliminate the root cause of wars and improve global security governance’.

There has been much angst-ridden speculation in the West in recent years over China’s emergence as a more powerful global actor. What then does this concept paper tell us about China’s intentions as a world leader? In such uncertain times, what solutions are put forward or is this just another self-serving agenda as with any other power?

Is this China making an opportunistic grab for power as it sees the West’s leadership apparently failing? Is the aim to counter NATO, which last year set out its own Strategic Concept identifying China as a security challenge, subverting the rules-based international order? Or does the document merely regurgitate the usual foreign policy rhetoric – a case of old wine in new bottles as one Western commentator put it?

The GSI: background and principles

The GSI was first introduced at a forum for Asian dialogue in 2022 and is best understood as part of a series of initiatives along with the Global Development Initiative put forward at the UN Summit in 2021 to advance the right to development; and the Global Civilisation Initiative launched in March 2023 just after the GSI concept paper, advocating mutual learning. These three proposals frame Xi Jinping’s aim to bring ‘Chinese wisdom’ to the world negotiating table.

In the wider world, thinking on security has broadened out to cover not just matters of war and peace, but also issues of economic security, climate change, pandemics and human rights. At first sight, China’s document appears as a quick skate over a broad list of concerns citing also numbers of organisations and initiatives mostly associated with China itself. This makes the document look decidedly Sinocentric. However, it needs a deeper dive to understand its holistic approach.

The theme is co-operation: starting with principles offered as a basis for re-centring the UN and increasing its role. These are principles drawn from history.

Surprisingly, the first three elements of China’s concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security are drawn directly from the original conceptions of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which from 1975, in opposition to NATO’s Cold War division and the spiralling nuclear arms race, sought to create a new security order for Europe, inclusive of the USSR.

The OSCE concept of common or indivisible security – the idea that the security of one country should not come at the expense of another – is incorporated here into the GSI vision, and indeed into the 12-point proposal on the Ukraine crisis, as an alternative to the Cold War notion of security through military ‘deterrence’ or bloc confrontation.

Here in the paper is also the Reagan-Gorbachev principle which ended the nuclear arms race in 1985 with the words: a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

At the same time, China’s conception integrates the five principles of peaceful coexistence – principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, equality, and mutual benefit – which have served as the basis of China’s foreign policy over the decades. Agreed first by Mao and Nehru in 1954, these paved the way for the Bandung Conference in 1955 where African and Asian states, newly emerging from colonial rule and under pressure from the Cold War, sought to protect their independence and avoid war through collective non-alignment.

For China also the UN Charter, as the concept paper states, ‘embodies the deep reflection by the people around the world on the bitter lessons of two world wars’.

Drawing as it does from historical experiences of the wider world, the concept paper is far from Sinocentric.

Meanwhile the fourth element of the concept – ‘sustainable security’ – incorporates China’s long-standing conception of the dialectic between peace and development: peace is essential for development, but development also contributes to resolving conflicts ‘eliminating the breeding ground for insecurity’.

Security as a process

Moving on to the actors, the nation-states, there is another dialectic here between major powers and regional formations.

Clearly good relations between major powers are a necessity for world peace, not least in reducing the risk of nuclear war. The concept paper looks to the major powers to set an example in complying with the UN Charter and, when conflicts occur, their role should be to ’support consultation on an equal footing’, facilitate peace talks, and to ‘encourage conflicting parties to build trust, settle disputes and promote security through dialogue’.

China is often criticised as having a hierarchical world view which privileges big powers; however, it seems quite obvious that major powers have more responsibilities in preserving peace.

At the same time, the paper gives considerable space to enumerating regional contexts each with their own specificities regarding security: ASEAN with its distinctive approach of consensus-building amongst politically diverse members; the Latin America-Caribbean zone of peace; African countries and the need to strengthen their ability to safeguard peace independently; the need for Middle Eastern states to construct a new security framework with the international community taking practical steps towards a two state solution to the Palestinian question; the security of the Pacific Island states in relation to the threat from climate change.

Regions then can be seen to have their own focal points of security cooperation, with major powers respecting their contexts, stepping in with support where necessary to facilitate these processes.

The absence here of any mention of the EU, US or Japan suggests China is looking to the Global South for momentum. Security-building then can be envisaged as a process, not only from the top-down with responsible actions taken by major powers but also from the bottom-up, region by region, bringing regional organisation into the multipolar balance alongside the major powers.

The point here is to grasp the dialectic between the international and the regional. So, for example, in the case of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, China was able to offer a platform free from outside interference for the final stages of a process begun by regional actors themselves. In the case of Russia and the Ukraine, what major powers can do in terms of nuclear arms control could have a bearing on resolving the dispute.

The Security Agenda

On the contents of cooperation, the paper ranges widely from digital and information security to terrorism; from biosecurity to outer space. By finding complementary points of cooperation, countries can form closer partnerships as the building blocks of a peaceful and secure world order.

The recent Xi- Macron agreement ran to some 50 points; similarly, the Xi-Lula agreement. The ill-judged stance of the US and UK governments to deal with China – to confront, compete and cooperate – only concedes cooperation on climate change, ruling most of the GSI list off-limits.

So to answer the question: ‘does China act to further its own self-interest?’, the answer is yes. But from China’s view, creating a safer world is not about selflessness and generosity: if one’s interest is invested in a deal, one is more likely to keep to it. That is surely what common security is about. The challenge is to find those points of mutual interest to build peaceful cooperation.

Cultural relativism and universalism

China’s approach also looks to eliminate ‘the root causes of conflict’. So, for example the root cause of the Sudan fighting surely lies in desertification and land shortage. For China, NATO expansion lies at the root of the Ukraine crisis. Whilst international law is seen as underpinning the UN system, with morality and justice also taken as fundamental, China’s pragmatic search to get to the bottom of a dispute seeks to break through rebarbative cycles of blame and accusation. For Ukraine, this may be the hardest thing: people understandably want retribution.

From the Western perspective the law is absolute, but for China, how the universal is applied varies from context to context according to local conditions. At the same time, Western law-making is designed to uphold private property and individual rights, while China also lends weight to public property and collective rights. How are such disputes and differences over the law to be resolved? Is China to be cast as rule-breaker? The Global Civilisation Initiative with its approach of mutual learning might otherwise enable ways to be found of managing differences.

Conclusion

The paper then demonstrates China’s method or wisdom: a holistic approach focusing on the dialectics of global security, seeking out the interconnections and key links of the processes; the importance of summarising the lessons of history; and contextualising the universal in the particular, the international within the regional.

There are no concrete solutions to be found here: China is just beginning to learn how to be a global power – it is early days.

The point is first to understand what security is. For China then it is not simply a matter of treaties and international laws requiring compliance but a historical process, working through the interactions between the international and the regional, the piece-by-piece of bilateral cooperative partnerships, the hard work of development over the long term.

China’s GSI initiative represents an essentially state centric view – missing is the role of international mass movements for peace and against war. These were to prove a powerful force indeed, uniting in opposition to the nuclear arms race in the 1980s and then in opposition to the Iraq war in 2003. Today the pursuit of human security has become more fragmented into single issue campaigns, also covering poverty as well as human rights and of course climate change. Now some of us in the peace movement are talking about the need to rethink security, more holistically re-applying the common security approach.

Questions remain: how can peace movements mobilise behind positive state initiatives and how are we to make people-to-people relations more effective in promoting the mission of international peace?

Dr. Jenny Clegg, vice-president of the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU), CND National Council member

Knife sharpening at the NATO summit

From END Info 38. Translated from vrede

Ludo De Brabander

The NATO meeting in Vilnius on 11-12 July initially announced itself as a regular transitional summit between that in Madrid (June 2022), where a major New Strategic Concept was adopted, and a yet-to-be-scheduled anniversary summit in 2024 to mark the 75th anniversary of the military alliance. The new geopolitical reality resulting from the ongoing war in Ukraine is changing the nature of the summit. It is expected that Vilnius will provide a major boost to European militarization.

Not so long ago things were rumbling in NATO’s internal kitchen. US President Trump called the military alliance “obsolete”. According to French President Macron, NATO was even “brain dead”. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, propelled NATO into a seldom-seen display of unity. In the words of the same President Macron , “the war provided the electric shock needed to give NATO greater strategic clarity”. The military alliance also boasts growing popularity, at least according to recent polling commissioned by NATO. In 2022, an average of 72% of all respondents supported their country’s membership in NATO, up 10% from 2020. The number of respondents who think their country’s military spending should increase (as requested by NATO) has risen from 28% to 40% over the same period .

It is undeniable that Moscow’s war policy – which NATO invariably calls “unprovoked”, but which cannot really be dissociated from Russia’s frustration with NATO’s enlargement policy – strengthened the military alliance. The centre-left government of formerly neutral Finland – which shares a long border with Russia – applied for membership (in 2022) and was granted membership in record time. Sweden is also expected to join soon.

NATO has succeeded in showing a united front over military support to Ukraine and the sanctions policy against Russia, even though there are different views within the organization about the nature of arms transfers to Ukraine and possible future membership of that country to NATO.

It also seems that most NATO member states will still meet the promised 2% target for military expenditure (2% of Gross Domestic Product, GDP) within a few years. This target was agreed at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, but at that time until more recently it was unthinkable in several member states that military budgets would increase substantially, given the abysmal state of government budgets following the COVID crisis.

A number of important decisions will be taken in Vilnius that will further encourage the militarization of Europe.

Ukraine

At the NATO summit in Bucharest (2008), the administration of US President George Bush pushed for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. That was against the will of countries such as Germany and France. The then French Prime Minister explained that this would upset the balance of power in Europe. The compromise then consisted of the fact that Ukraine could in principle become a member, but that the associated procedure (the ‘membership action plan’) was not started. Russia saw this as endangering the presence – based on an agreement with Ukraine (Kharkiv Pact) – of its Black Sea fleet on the strategic Crimean peninsula. The issue was also very sensitive among Russian nationalists who see Kyiv as the cradle of Russian civilization. Moreover, if Ukraine were to join NATO, Russia would suddenly have to share a long border with the Western military alliance.

Six years later, shortly after the ‘Euromaidan’ change of power in Kiev – which was unfavourable to Russia – Moscow chose to annex Crimea. This caused suspicion among the Eastern European NATO member states, which united shortly after this annexation in the Bucharest-9. They are striving for the rapid integration of Ukraine into NATO. In Vilnius they will insist that there is a timeline for this and that corresponding concrete steps are agreed. Several powerful allies, the US, France and Germany, however, are on the brakes.

Washington wants to continue to give priority in the short term to the structural expansion of military support to Ukraine. The issue of Ukrainian membership should be put on hold for now as part of a future agreement to end the war. Most countries agree that Ukraine cannot join while it is still at war with Russia, in order to prevent Article 5 of the NATO treaty from coming into effect. That article obliges the other member states to take military action if one of the NATO members is attacked, which would entangle the entire NATO in a war with Russia.

At a meeting in Oslo of NATO foreign ministers in early June 2023, the plan was put on the table to upgrade the existing NATO-Ukraine committee to a new NATO-Ukraine Council with accompanying security guarantees and substantial funding. The Ukrainian army must also be further converted to NATO standards.

In addition, a consensus will also be sought in Vilnius on the expected outcome of the war. Ukraine and a number of NATO member states see it as the ultimate goal that Russian troops should be driven out of the entire territory. Other NATO member states think this is a vain hope. A common approach must be agreed in Vilnius, including what Ukraine’s best possible negotiating position should be.

Swedish membership

Finland and Sweden were accepted as candidate members at the NATO summit in Madrid in 2022. One country caused difficulties: Turkey. Ankara demanded that both Scandinavian countries end their alleged support for “terrorist” Kurdish movements, extradite their members and end the arms embargo they maintain against Turkey. The presence of political opponents in Sweden, in particular, was a thorn in Turkey’s side.

The three countries involved signed a three-page trilateral agreement that reduced the Kurdish question to a “terrorist problem”. Finland soon got the green light from Ankara. Although Sweden has since tightened its anti-terror legislation and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasized that Stockholm has fulfilled its commitments in the agreement, Turkey continues to be uncooperative. Ankara seems to want to get as much out of the closet as possible. The US is eager to welcome Sweden as its 32nd member by the summit in Vilnius and appears to be working behind the scenes on a deal that would include the Turkish purchase of 40 new F-16 fighter jets – a purchase that has so far been blocked by the US Congress. In mid-April, shortly after Turkey approved Finland’s NATO accession, Washington paved the way for the upgrade of F16 aircraft already in Turkish possession.

Rising military expenditure and reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank

In 2014, NATO leaders decided that each member state should aim to spend 2% of GDP on military spending within ten years. For the time being, only 7 Member States meet this standard. A number of other countries are expected to join the list this year and next.

Wherever NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg goes, he not only insists on this obligation, but also insists that it will be agreed in Vilnius that the 2% standard is not a ceiling, but a minimum target. While NATO member states collectively account for more than half ($1,052 billion in 2022) of global military spending – or spending 13 times more than Russia ($86 billion in 2022) which already spends more than 4% of with its GDP (partly a result of the war against Ukraine) – Stoltenberg believes that is too little to meet the threats of a world “that has become much more dangerous”.

Financing Ukraine’s war effort against Russia requires significant budgets and military investments. The necessary resources must also be found to further strengthen NATO’s Eastern European flank. At the NATO summit in Warsaw (2016), it was decided to move to an ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’ by deploying four multinational combat battalions in Poland and the Baltic States. Four more were added after the Russian invasion of Ukraine (in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia). At the NATO summit in Madrid (2022) it was agreed to raise the battalions to the level of a brigade. A brigade usually consists of several battalions and is more widely equipped.

In Vilnius discussion will probably focus on the implementation of this decision, in particular which country contributes which and how many troops. In Madrid it was also decided to significantly increase the manpower of the ‘Rapid Response Force’ from 40,000 to 300,000 troops. These are troops that can be deployed in the short term. This measure has yet to be put into practice, which will require enormous additional budgets and commitments from the Member States.

The Swedish Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently stated in a report on global military spending that in 2022 Western and Central Europe spent the most since the end of the Cold War on their military devices. It is expected – based on promises and public statements – that tens of billions more will be added in the coming years.

Nuclear weapons

In Vilnius it will undoubtedly also be about ‘nuclear deterrence’. The laboriously built nuclear disarmament regime that came into being at the end of the Cold War and shortly afterwards has been almost completely phased out in recent years. In 2002, the US renounced the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which imposed limits on the construction of a missile shield in order not to break the nuclear balance. From 2007 onwards, the US deployed a missile shield in Poland and Romania at NATO level, which is gradually being expanded with a system from the sea. In 2019, President Trump also ended the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which banned the production of long-range missiles, after accusing Russia of violating it. In reality, the US President thought that China should also be included in such a treaty to ban short and medium-range missiles.

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the threat of nuclear war in Europe has suddenly become very real. The Kremlin broke a nuclear taboo by repeatedly threatening to use nuclear weapons. In February 2023, Moscow also announced its withdrawal from New Start, the last bilateral nuclear treaty with the US that limits the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed. At the end of May 2023, Russia also signed an agreement with Belarus for the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. According to Russia, this is a response to the growing threat from NATO on its borders. Russia also legitimizes this development by referring to the presence of US nuclear weapons in European host countries that have been there for 60 years.

In the margins of the NATO summit in Vilnius, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group will meet to discuss NATO’s nuclear threats and capabilities. This happens at a time when the US is fully engaged in deploying new high-tech tactical nuclear weapons (B61-12) in European host countries (including Belgium) within the framework of NATO’s nuclear division of tasks. They are there to replace old types of B61 nuclear bombs.

Poland has already announced that it wants to become more closely involved in NATO’s nuclear policy and to indicate in covert terms that it is prepared, if necessary, to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory. Hardliners of military think tanks are arguing in favour of cancelling the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) in advance, which contains agreements on military-political and diplomatic relations and in which the parties have entered into a number of commitments, such as the NATO promise not to deploy nuclear weapons in new Member States, ie. in Eastern Europe. The question is whether and to what extent the door will be opened in Vilnius to a strengthening or expansion of NATO’s nuclear arsenal in Europe.

China

In Vilnius, NATO’s global ambitions, especially in Asia, will be extended. A meeting is planned with partners from the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. The four countries mentioned were invited to the NATO summit in Madrid for the first time in 2022.

The new Strategic Concept approved there talks about “systemic challenges” that would emanate from China. In the previous Strategic Concept of Lisbon (2010) there was no mention of China. According to NATO, there is a “systemic competition” with China that challenges “our interests, security and values”. NATO is particularly concerned about the rapprochement between China and Russia that threatens to “undermine the rules-based international order” in light of numerous illegal military interventions (such as against Iraq in 2003), CIA coups and the excesses of the global ‘War On Terror’ (Guantanamo). This makes for a rather hypocritical passage in NATO’s Strategic Concept.

China is also accused of controlling technological and industrial strategic positions and using a “wide array of political, economic and military tools to expand its global footprint and project power.” The pot blames the kettle.

In April, the NATO Secretary General emphasized the importance of partnership with the four countries involved in the Indo-Pacific region. He left no doubt that NATO’s security role is global: “In a more dangerous and unpredictable world, it is even clearer that security is not regional, but global,” said Stoltenberg . The Madrid Strategic Concept already made it very clear that the Indo-Pacific region is important to NATO, “since developments in that region may have a direct impact on Euro-Atlantic security.”

The military buildup by the US and its allies in the Asian region threatens to add fuel to existing tensions. For example, China has reacted with great dismay to US diplomatic and military actions in Taiwan. Last year, the US approved the sale of $1.1 billion in arms to the island. The arms shipments are part of a military purchase list that Taiwan provided to the US in 2019 worth $17 billion. At the end of last year, the US decided on a financial package worth $12 billion (half in donations, half in loans) to finance Taiwanese arms purchases in the US. It is an often used technique to subsidize one’s own military industry.

Most countries, including the US and all other NATO member states, do not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan under the ‘One China Policy’. Chinese claims to the island are usually recognized, but also not officially recognized. For decades, there has been a consensus between China and the US to maintain the status quo and ambiguity about Taiwan. With the growing arms deliveries and diplomatic visits from the US to Taiwan, this seems to be changing.

In attempting to curtail and contain ‘overly ambitious’ superpowers such as China, NATO’s global ambitions will also undermine the role of the United Nations, which, according to the Charter, is the priority organisation for maintaining peace and security in the world. The Vilnius summit will underscore the global ‘glory days’ of NATO member states, that increasingly seem to want to take the law into their own hands.

We need some European ‘peace noise’

From END Info 38

Guido van Leemput, The Netherlands

Guido van Leemput delivered the following speech at CND’s most recent demonstration at the Lakenheath airbase (20 May 2023). Guido has organised protests at the Volkel base in the Netherlands where US nuclear bombs are stationed under NATO ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements.

In my younger years there was serious political and military tension in Europe; a Cold War with an Iron Curtain right across Germany. In addition, there were many Western troops in West Germany. Every young man was conscripted. One of them was me. Partly under pressure from the European civilian population – the peace movement – the Cold War came to an end without the dreaded nuclear war.

Now, some forty years later, the situation is much worse. There is a major war going on in eastern Europe, involving all European countries. We hear the swearing of soldiers, the rumble of cannons, the roar of missiles, the threat of nuclear power plants as a dirty bomb, the crying of children, mothers, fathers.

We hear the sadness and noise of war.

Russia has attacked Ukraine and all other countries are supplying weapons to Ukraine. An end is not in sight. There are many layers to this war and escalation is the engine of exacerbating the war and its effects. It is necessary that this war ends as soon as possible.

At the same time as the bloody war in Ukraine, a new Cold War has begun. With the erection of a new iron curtain on the border of NATO members from Finland in the north to Romania in the south. We have a new arms-race. Russia has been threatening to use nuclear weapons for fifteen months now.

In addition, there are plans to place more nuclear weapons in Europe. Russia wants to place tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian MIG bombers in Belarus and the US is working on the placement of new nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In Germany, in Belgium, in Italy, in Türkiye, the US is planning new nuclear weapons of all the same type. Even in your country, the Americans would like to place new nuclear weapons. In fact, they want that to happen here in Lakenheath

A few words on nuclear sharing with Belarus. The background to the placement in Belarus is the constriction of that country to Russia. It is about the silent battle that is going on for the Kaliningrad exclave, which must be supplied by rail from Belarus through the Suwalki Gap, as it is called in NATO-language. That was a problem last year when Lithuania declared the EU boycott against Russia to also apply to Kaliningrad.

That Lithuanian boycott was withdrawn under pressure from the EU, but it proves the vulnerability of the forward Kaliningrad post to Russia. I fear that tensions over Kaliningrad will rise in the coming years. They are all afraid of each other and that fear is mounting.

Modernization of nuclear weapons in Western Europe was actually planned even before the conquest of Crimea, with the introduction of the F-35. All this is an armament spiral that interferes with, and influences others and it is mirrored in the behaviour of other states.

After the cancellation of numerous treaties, such as the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, this is very worrying. As in the 1980s, it is the wish of the vast majority of the European population that the number of nuclear weapons be reduced. There is therefore every reason to work on a strong international peace movement.

I will tell you a bit about the situation in The Netherlands. Until the 1990s, the Netherlands had six different nuclear weapon tasks and at least four different nuclear weapons storage sites. After the Cold War, five nuclear weapon tasks ended, but one remains. That is the Air Force nuclear weapon task of the F-16. The F16 has since been replaced by the F-35.

At the moment there are probably still twenty American nuclear bombs at Volkel Airforce Base in the North Brabant province. They are of the type B-61 and they are so-called free-fall bombs. The United States will soon exchange these bombs for new nuclear bombs, the B61-12. This bomb has new technical capabilities. The main difference is that the bombs get a new tailpiece. This allows the B61-12 to aim at a target approximately three times more accurately than its predecessor the B61. This makes the B61-12 the first controlled free-fall bomb in the US nuclear arsenal. In addition, compared to the B61, this new bomb has the ability to drill into the earth before it is detonated.

The B-61-12 lowers the threshold of use, because the bombs could be used against smaller targets with more precision. This suggests that the damage and humanitarian suffering can be limited. This is very worrying: they are still nuclear bombs, which would cause many civilian casualties and long-term damage to human health and the environment. Then there is the risk of stupid accidents. However, the nuclear bombs do increase the risk of nuclear incidents. And that was before the age of artificial intelligence. The misuse of artificial intelligence is an additional reason to dismantle nuclear weapons.

Earlier this year there was a report that a nuclear weapon accident had happened at Volkel. A photo had surfaced of a damaged B-61-11 nuclear bomb with ‘patches’ over the nose. The Federation of American Scientists determined that the photo was taken at Volkel. The Dutch government denied everything and asked the Americans what had happened. The Americans reported that it was an exercise, and nothing was said about Volkel. Nothing wrong. Calm down folks.

There have been sustained peace actions over the last 60 years in Volkel and in major Dutch cities against nuclear weapons. Since the 1960s. The actions varied from small and radical and massive. There were bicycle tours, vigils, civilian inspections to check exactly where the nuclear weapons were, there were large demonstrations and small ones. There were petitions, pressure groups and parliamentary questions. At the parliamentary level, there was even a motion passed against nuclear weapons.

There are two paths to the same goal. First, the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). That treaty entered into force in January 2021. We advocate that our governments help strengthen this treaty. Second, Peace Actions. An example: from August 4 to 10, during the commemoration of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a peace camp will be held at the base in Volkel. The peace camp of 4 August in Volkel focuses not only on nuclear disarmament, but also on the connection between the army and climate destruction. The F-35 and F-16 fighters at Volkel emit more than 10 tons of carbon dioxide per flight hour, while they practice how to bomb the world in the next war with new, even 'better' nuclear bombs. Opinion polls show time and time again that the majority of the Dutch population does not want US nuclear weapons stationed.

We must get rid of the permanent threat of nuclear war. Europe cannot be safe without nuclear disarmament. It is necessary to work towards a nuclear-weapon-free Europe via the steps mentioned. It's about time. Let's start immediately.

In the light of the bloody European history, of the bloody war in Ukraine and under the conditions of a new nuclear arms race, it is urgent to have more action, bigger actions, internationally coordinated peace actions against the madness of war and the madness of nuclear destruction.

It is necessary to speak out about the modernization of nuclear weapons. That is why a lot of attention is needed, a lot of noise too, not just noise in parliaments, noise in newspapers, but also with pressure from the peace movement.

A European peace noise!!

$82,900,000,000 per year, $157,664 per minute...

From END Info 38

Editorial Comments, Tom Unterrainer

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) report Wasted: 2022 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending, was recently published. This report details the obscene and deadly dimensions of global spending on nuclear weapons in 2022. The headline figures are as follows:

USA: $43.7 bn per year, $83,143 per min

China: $11.7 bn per year, $22,219 per min

Russia: $9.6 bn per year, $18,228 per min

UK: $6.8 bn per year, $12,975 per min

France: $5.6 bn per year, $10,603 per min

India: $2.7 bn per year, $5,181 per min

Israel: $1.2 bn per year, $2,226 per min

Pakistan: $1 bn per year, $1,967 per min

DPRK: $589 million, $1,221 per min

As can be seen from these estimates, the total expenditure on nuclear weapons by the US exceeds that of all other states (China, Russia, UK, france, India, Israel, Pakistan and the DRPK) combined. What does this indicate?

It is understood that all nuclear-armed states are in the process of enhancing, renewing or expanding their abilities to unleash megadeath. It is widely recognised that in addition to the amounts spent on nuclear weapons, additional billions of dollars are spent on new ‘conventional’ weapon systems and a process of rapid militarisation. Taken together and understood in the context of shifting global events and power - Ukraine being the starkest example - there are clear indications that an arms-race is underway.

The US is the dominant power within the nuclear-armed NATO alliance. All NATO Member States, with the exception of France, are members of the ‘Nuclear Planning Group’. France considers its nuclear-weapon systems to be wholly ‘independent’. In Britain, the government claims that it controls an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’, but it is clear that in both technological and command-and-control terms, the British system is reliant on the US [see The Spokesman 153: Bairns not Bombs for John Ainslie’s analysis].

Whatever France claims for its nuclear-weapons-system, as a NATO member it shares and helps to shape the nuclear-alliances’ posture which, as recent strategy documents have made clear, is primarily directed against China and Russia. As such, it makes some sense to view the spending of the US, UK and France as one, especially when contrasting totals.

NATO states spent a total of $56,100,000,000 on nuclear weapons in 2022. This is approximately 4.7 times the amount spent by China and approximately 5.8 times the amount spent by Russia. Russia and China are not in a nuclear alliance or any other kind of military alliance but if their nuclear spending is bundled together then NATO spending outstrips it 2.6 times. Does such a comparison justify the amounts spent by China and Russia? Obviously not. Every dollar spent on nuclear weapons is a dollar spent on the potential destruction of humanity. But comparing total NATO spending on nuclear weapons with the amounts spent by those states identified as primary adversaries offers more than a rudimentary statistical comparator. It implies a state of affairs best described by the term ‘overkill’; it contextualises the increased nuclear spending of non-NATO states and it indicates that what is left of the non-proliferation and nuclear arms control regime is under severe strain. This is a deeply worrying situation.

‘Nuclear overkill’ describes a situation where a nuclear-armed state has more than enough nuclear weaponry to completely destroy an ‘adversary’. It is the case that the US and Russia hold such an ‘overkill’ capacity in that they are not only capable of wiping each other off the map but have sufficient capacity to end all life on this planet. Much of this capacity was embedded in their nuclear systems during the last Cold War. Despite these established capacities, the US spent $43.7 bn in 2022 and Russia spent less than a quarter of that. What is all this money being spent on? How much of it is spent to maintain existing nuclear weapons and how much is spent on developing new nuclear weapons and associated systems?

Nuclear weapon abolitionists will not be the only people looking at these figures. Ideas that pass themselves off as ‘nuclear deterrence strategy’ imply that it would be ‘logical’ for those who spend one quarter of the amount that the US spends on nuclear weapons to attempt to close the gap. If parity of spending proves impossible, then spending as much as possible above and beyond the obscene amounts already spent ‘makes sense’. The absence of a stable and fully operational disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control regime makes such a course of action all the more likely.

Of course, it is worth remembering that the scrapping of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty were instigated by George Bush Jnr and Donald J Trump, US Presidents. Let us also remember that Joe Biden, US President, has done nothing to revive these or similar treaties.

Non-nuclear armed states, especially those viewed as adversaries by the US, may look at this list of spending and conclude that they, too, should become nuclear powers. Isn’t this the ‘logic’ and implication of such obscene spending and the mythology that nuclear weapons are the “ultimate guarantor of security”.

Where does this end? At worst, ‘overkill’ and the arms race it drives could result in the total destruction of humanity: megadeath and planetary destruction. At best, if this continues, then each of the nuclear states will be left sitting on enormous stockpiles of world-ending devices that will not and can not feed the hungry, house the homeless, cure the sick, educate our children or do anything else of use.

This waste must stop.

Biden's Nuclear Posture Review

From END Info 37

Tom Unterrainer

Key Points

● Biden’s NPR is a renouncement of most of the pledges made during his Presidential campaign in relation to nuclear weapons.

● Biden’s NPR demonstrates a significant degree of continuity with Trump’s NPR, which was met with widespread condemnation. Biden’s NPR has avoided similar condemnation to date.

● The continuity operates at two levels:

(1) declaratory policy and equipment;

(2) geopolitics.

● Specifically, Biden’s NPR:

(1) Maintains US declaratory policy with minor changes in language;

(2) Rubber-stamps a multi-billion-dollar modernisation of the US nuclear arsenal;

(3) Green-lights the development of Trump’s proposed W76-2 ‘low yield’ nuclear warhead, despite Biden previously describing it as a “Bad idea”;

(4) Cancels Trump’s plan for a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile;

(5) Asserts the need for arms control but fails to outline a programme to advance the progress of such controls;

(6) Re-asserts that Russia and China are the main targets of any potential US nuclear use;

(7) Offers a dangerous picture of the role of US nuclear weapons at a time of acute nuclear risk.

● Biden’s NPR should be understood as dangerous and intimately connected to the sharp nuclear risks faced by humanity. We should pay particular attention to Biden’s NPR and US nuclear policy in general given the close nuclear alliance between the U.S. and UK and the membership of both in the nuclear-armed alliance, NATO, and with respect to the AUKUS agreement.

Context

A ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ is a process undertaken by the United States to determine the role of nuclear weapons in what the government and military term a ‘security strategy’. The process results in the release of a document, also referred to as the ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ [NPR], outlining the position. The first NPR was approved by President Bill Clinton and published in September 1994. A further four such processes have been undertaken and the outcomes published (not always in full, eg. 2002: Bush) since this date (2002: Bush, 2010: Obama, 2018: Trump, 2022: Biden).

NPR’s emerged in the ‘post-Cold War’ world when it might have been expected that the role of nuclear weapons would steadily diminish. This was not the case. Each and every NPR since 1994 has demonstrated the central role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy: from the alleged ‘deterrence’ function of such weapons to direct threats of use, including in response to non-nuclear attacks.

Background to Biden’s NPR

In 1990, then-U.S. Senator Biden claimed that the “military rationale for ‘first use’ [of nuclear weapons] has disappeared.” This was an early indication that he might be prepared to take a different approach to nuclear questions than the established norm. Thirty years later, candidate Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs “that the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring and, if necessary, retaliating against a nuclear attack. As president, I will work to put that belief into practice” [March 2020].

In the intervening three decades Biden served variously on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as Vice President of the United States under President Obama. During his time in the Senate, Biden voted for war in Iraq (1991), the former Yugoslavia (including the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2002).

Obama

As Vice President, Biden supported President Obama’s early claim to be committed to a “world without nuclear weapons” [Prague Speech, April 2009] and subsequent declarations of alleged progress towards a “world without nuclear weapons” [Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, March/April 2016]. The 2010 NPR, released a year after Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize and two days before the US and Russia signed New START, promised significant reductions in nuclear weaponry and ruled out nuclear responses to non-nuclear attacks. At the same time, Russia warned of the risks associated with deploying ‘missile defence’ in Europe and the likely consequences of such systems [the US ‘Aegis Ashore’ system is now deployed in Poland and Romania]. Obama’s NPR recognised that China’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller than those of the US and Russia but criticised China for a “lack of transparency” that raised questions about overall “strategic intentions”. From 2009 onwards the Obama administration pursued a ‘pivot to East Asia’ [see 2012 policy] and away from the Middle East in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis where China’s intervention demonstrated its emergence as a world power and the failure of ‘nation building’ efforts in the aftermath of the illegal invasion of Iraq.

Obama’s welcome words about nuclear disarmament, the achievements represented by New START and the JCPOA and restraint on the development of new nuclear weaponry notwithstanding, the reality of Obama’s NPR was that it continued to assert a primary role for nuclear weapons in the US geostrategic outlook. It did nothing to fundamentally shift perspectives or introduce checks and restraints, as Trump’s 2018 NPR amply demonstrated.

Trump

Kate Hudson, CND General Secretary, wrote of Trump’s NPR at the time:

“the lid is being taken off the restraints on both new-build and nuclear weapons use. The most significant element of the review is commitment to a whole new generation of nuclear weapons, with the emphasis on low-yield, often described as ‘usable’. It should be pointed out here that the bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki are technically low-yield in today’s parlance, so we are not talking about something small. The excuse underpinning this approach is supposedly that there are no real options between conventional weapons and all-out nuclear war, and that there should be more rungs on the ‘escalatory ladder’ … the increase in stated circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used is a cause for significant concern. This includes against a group that ‘supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices’, as well as against ‘significant non-nuclear strategic attacks,’ including attacks on ‘civilian population or infrastructure’.”

If Obama’s NPR was a ‘disappointment’ for many sympathetic observers, then Trump’s NPR was acutely alarming for everyone concerned about the future of humanity. Trump’s overall nuclear posture was not confined to the terms set out in the 2018 Review but encompassed the steady and deliberate undermining and destruction of a whole series of treaties and agreements that fundamentally destabilised the ‘nuclear order’. Trump’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty, JCPOA (‘Iran Deal’) and Open Skies Treaty constituted a ‘Bonfire of Treaties’.

How to explain this disastrous approach? In the 2018 NPR the United States made the following ‘commitment’ to ‘Strengthening Deterrence in Europe’:

“The United States will make available its strategic nuclear forces, and commit nuclear weapons forward deployed to Europe, to the defense of NATO. These forces provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America and are the supreme guarantee of Alliance security. Combined with the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, as well as Allied burden sharing arrangements, NATO’s overall nuclear deterrence forces are essential to the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture now and in the future.”

The bulk of ‘analysis’ in Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review was given over to highlighting the ‘risks’ posed by Russia in particular and the growing ‘risks’ associated with China’s rise as a global power. The commitment to maintaining the ‘availability’ of US strategic nuclear forces as the “supreme guarantee of Alliance [NATO] security” – above and beyond the nuclear capabilities of Europe’s two declared nuclear powers – emphasised once more the degree to which the US continued to dominate the European defence and security agenda via its status as ‘superpower’.

The text of the Nuclear Posture Review, Trump’s highhanded conduct at the 2018 Brussels NATO summit and his unilateral withdrawal from the INF Treaty are rendered comprehendible by simple acknowledgement that the U.S. had enjoyed the status of an unrivalled hegemonic power – sole superpower status – since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Trump took reckless measures to shore up the U.S. position in response to the emergence of rival centres of global power. U.S. strategy aimed at destabilising global norms in an attempt to re-write the “rules” in their own favour. As the global situation develops from a unipolar to a multipolar order, as the risks of nuclear confrontation grow and in the absence of countervailing political will – governmental or otherwise – the U.S. has continued to assert itself in this manner. This means that NATO as an organisation and individual NATO member states continue to be subjects of U.S. dominance. In the context of a substantially expanded and expanding NATO, which pushed to the borders of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union against previously stated intentions of the organisation, the dominance of the U.S. within NATO structures pointed European states and their armed forces towards an increasingly confrontational posture.

If there was a clear ‘rupture’ between the Obama and Trump NPR in terms of the development of particular categories of weapon, the declared terms under which such weapons would be used and the overall language employed to talk about nuclear issues, there is some detectable ‘continuity’ in terms of ‘geopolitical’ approach. Such continuity is more obvious when Biden’s NPR is considered.

Biden’s posture pre-NPR

Biden as Presidential candidate and in the first few months of his Presidency put some effort into differentiating himself from Trump on nuclear questions. For example, during the 2020 campaign Biden sharply criticised Trump’s initiative for the W76-2 lower-yield nuclear warhead. He called it a “bad idea” and warned that it would make the US “more inclined” to use nuclear weapons.

Biden followed up on his March 2020 pledge on “sole purpose” use of nuclear weapons [ie. confirming that they would only ever be used in retaliation for a nuclear attack on the U.S. itself] by appointing a number of arms control specialists – people known to be sympathetic to such an approach – to the official body responsible for drafting a new NPR.

Even if any new NPR would, by default, continue to promote the centrality of nuclear weapons in the overall U.S. strategy, a commitment to scrapping the W76-2 and precise clarity on use threshold – “sole purpose” or “no first use” – would have been major events.

Outside the precise configuration of a new NPR, Biden had scope to undo some of the damage inflicted upon the ‘nuclear order’ by Trump’s “Bonfire of Treaties”. In the early months of his Presidency, he could have attempted to resurrect the INF and re-join the JCPOA process. There were reasons for optimism but none of this came to pass.

Not only did Biden make no efforts related to the INF and JCPOA – neither of which would have required Congressional approval ie. efforts could have been made by Presidential initiative alone – but Leonor Tomero, who Biden had appointed to oversee the NPR process, was sacked by the Department of Defense. According to a report in Politico (September 2021) Tomero was:

“a leading voice for nuclear restraint on Capitol Hill and in the think tank community, who was appointed to oversee the Nuclear Posture Review that will set the administration’s atomic weapons policy and strategy.

But officials with more traditional views on nuclear weapons, who promote a status quo agenda to include modernizing the land, sea and airborne legs of America’s nuclear arsenal, did not take kindly to Tomero’s progressive ideology, according to 11 current and former defense officials, as well as others with insight into the debate.

One current U.S. official who works on nuclear issues, when asked about Tomero, said he considers some of her positions dangerous in the face of Russian and Chinese nuclear advancements.”

In early 2021 the U.S. and Russia agreed to begin work on extending the life of the New START Treaty. Announcing the agreed extension, the US State Department commented that “President Biden pledged to keep the American people safe from nuclear threats by restoring US leadership on arms control and non-proliferation”. These words, from Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, make it sound like New START functions to only limit Russian nuclear weapons and that such US weapons are somehow a threat to no one. Around the time of the announcement, Elisabeth Eaves asked ‘Why is America getting a new $100 billion nuclear weapon?’ in the pages of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. She went on:

“America is building a new weapon of mass destruction, a nuclear missile the length of a bowling lane. It will be able to travel some 6,000 miles, carrying a warhead more than 20 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It will be able to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single shot. The US Air Force plans to order more than 600 of them.” (8 February, 2021)

Why, indeed? What or who was to be the target of such new missiles? Where were they to be stationed? …

The immediate consequences of the shift demonstrated by Tomero’s removal and similar developments can be detected in the U.S. refusal to engage with requests from Russia and more widely towards the end of 2021 for negotiations and diplomacy aimed at reducing nuclear tensions. The consequences can also be detected in the repeated insistence of Biden officials that previously bipartite treaties such as the INF should be modified to encompass China.

Examined from a distance and in light of subsequent developments, 2021 can be seen as a year in which nuclear and related tensions were slowly but surely ratcheted up: a year where opportunities for diplomacy were rejected, a year where brinkmanship determined all.

Biden’s NPR

After much delay – the result of internal strife within the US establishment and more significantly, perhaps, the awful events in Ukraine – Biden’s NPR was finally published on 27 October 2022. It was released to the US Congress in March 2022 and received lengthy deliberation. The publication of the NPR followed the release of the U.S. National Security Strategy [NSS] on 12 October 2022. These two publications are significantly interrelated. President Biden writes in the NSS that:

“We have … reinvigorated America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships to uphold and strengthen the principles and institutions that have enabled so much stability, prosperity, and growth for the last 75 years …

The United States will continue to prioritize leading the international response to … transnational challenges, together with our partners, even as we face down concerted efforts to remake the ways in which nations relate to one another.

In the contest for the future of our world, my Administration is clear-eyed about the scope and seriousness of this challenge. The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit …

This is a 360-degree strategy grounded in the world as it is today, laying out the future we seek, and providing a roadmap for how we will achieve it …”

This statement alone registers the degree of geopolitical continuity between the outlook of the Trump and Biden administrations. Of course, this continuity stretches back to the Obama administration and before. Why? For the obvious reason that U.S. strategy maintains the necessity of overwhelming global influence and dictates that all measures must be taken to maintain such influence.

In the light of Iraq and subsequent U.S. policy – never mind the horrors of U.S. policy from the detonation of Atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the murderous persecution of war against Korea, the war crimes inflicted on the people of Vietnam, to countless instances of military intervention across the world – it can be hard to stomach all these lies about the US as ‘defender of democracy’. Yet this is what you have to stomach if you read such documentation!

The NPR documents the basics of how the U.S. seeks to ‘defend democracy’ and the ‘rules based global order’ by threatening and preparing for nuclear megadeath. In this respect, Biden’s NPR maintains continuity with all previous such documents. According to its authors, Biden’s NPR:

“reaffirms a continuing commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent [sic] and strong and flexible extended deterrence [sic]. Strategic deterrence [sic] remains a top priority mission for the … [DoD] and the Nation. For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrence [sic] effects that no other element of U.S. military power can replace. To deter [sic] aggression and preserve our security in the current security environment, we will maintain nuclear forces that are responsive to the threats we face.”

Shortly before this statement – which opens the 2022 NPR – was released, Biden told the world that:

“I don’t think there’s any such thing as an ability to easily use a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon.”

As Daryl G. Kimball points out in Arms Control Today (December 2022):

“Nevertheless, [Biden’s] NPR, released two weeks after his ‘Armageddon’ remark, leaves open exactly that possibility.”

Biden’s NPR can be judged under three main headings: (1) declaratory policy, (2) equipment and upgrades and (3) geopolitical posture.

(1) declaratory policy:

Biden’s NPR is a sharp repudiation of every message and signal sent out during the Presidential election campaign and subsequently. There has been no shift to a “sole purpose” or “no first use” stance, rather there has been a return to Obama-era language. Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda from the Federation of American Scientists (27 October 2022) write:

“The NPR reiterates the language from the 2010 NPR that the ‘fundamental role’ of U.S. nuclear weapons is to ‘deter nuclear attacks’ and only in ‘extreme circumstances.’ The strategy seeks to ‘maintain a very high bar for nuclear employment’ and, if employment of nuclear weapons is necessary, ‘seek to end conflict at the lowest level of damage possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its Allies and partners.

Deterring ‘strategic’ attacks is a different formulation than the ‘deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack’ language in the 2018 NPR [Trump], but the new NPR makes it clear that ‘strategic’ also accounts for existing and emerging non-nuclear attacks.”

So rather than clarify the terms on which the U.S. would consider using nuclear weapons, Biden’s NPR plays around with language. His NPR claims that a:

“thorough review of options [was conducted] for nuclear declaratory policy, including both no-first-use and sole purpose policies, and concluded those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk.”

Do the authors of Biden’s NPR – or Biden himself – think the world would be a more or less safe place if China, which maintains a ‘no-first-use’ posture, switched to an opaque posture? Biden’s NPR does not seek to explain why it would be risky to adopt a clear policy and it does not seek to explain why others should abandon such a policy. In fact, the type of policy embodied in Biden’s NPR – and replicated by the British, for example – carry enormous risk because they amount to a ‘first use’ policy.

(2) equipment and upgrades:

In reaffirming commitment to modernising the NC3 system – ‘Nuclear Command, Control and Communications’ – Biden’s NPR is effectively continuing with the same nuclear modernisation programme as the Obama and Trump administrations. Obama, Trump and now Biden committed the U.S. to vast expenditure in an effort to ensure U.S. nuclear dominance: the technical capability to launch a nuclear attack at any time and against any target, enhanced by a highly flexible and integrated monitoring, targeting and communications system alongside extensive nuclear arsenals. Registering this continuity illuminates decisions within Biden’s NPR.

Biden’s decision to discontinue manufacturing the proposed ‘sea-launched cruise nuclear missile’ [SLCM-N] despite sharp opposition in Congress and elsewhere and the decision to retire the B83-1 nuclear bombs appear as positive developments. However, the new missile and B83-1 have only been cancelled due to the overwhelmingly negative decision to go ahead with Trump’s “bad idea” [Biden’s words], the W76-2 “low-yield” warhead and other measures. Here’s how Kristensen and Korda describe things:

“In justifying the cancelation of the SLCM-N, the NPR spells out the existing and future capabilities that adequately enable regional deterrence of Russia and China. This includes the W76-2 …, the globally-deployed strategic bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, and dual-capable fighter aircraft such as the F-35A equipped with the new B61-12 nuclear bomb.”

Kristensen and Korba further describe the expanding nuclear boot-print in Europe:

“The [NPR] also notes that ‘[t]he United States will work with Allies concerned to ensure that the transition to modern DCA [dual-capable aircraft] and the B61-12 bomb is executed efficiently and with minimal disruption to readiness.’ The release of the NPR coincides with the surprise revelation that the United States has sped up the deployment of the B61-12 in Europe. Previously scheduled for spring 2023, the first B61-12 gravity bombs will now be delivered in December 2022, likely due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Putin’s nuclear belligerency. Given that the Biden administration has previously taken care to emphasize that its modernization program and nuclear exercises are scheduled years in advance and are not responses to Russia’s actions, it is odd that the administration would choose to rush the new bombs into Europe at this time.” [emphasis added]

‘Odd’? The ‘oddness’ can be rendered comprehendible if the geopolitical dimensions of current events – and the central role of nuclear weapons and nuclear threats in geopolitics – are taken into account.

(3) geopolitical posture:

If Biden’s NPR ‘falls short’ of the promises he made during the presidential campaign, this should come as no surprise. From a refusal to resurrect the INF Treaty and JCPOA, the development of AUKUS, refusal to engage with comprehensive nuclear talks with Russia beyond extending New START [now undermined by Russia’s suspension of cooperation], pressure on Japan to ditch pacifist aspects of its Constitution, the deployment of nuclear-capable aircraft to Europe, news of the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to Britain, winning European states to massive expenditure (‘Trumpian’) on the nuclear-armed alliance [NATO], ongoing opposition to the TPNW etc etc … it is clear that he is as committed to nuclear weapons as all other U.S. Presidents have been. Not only that, but it is clear from the NPR that nuclear weapons and U.S. nuclear weapon policy are at the heart of Biden’s posture – continuous from previous administrations – with regards to Europe and Asia.

Conclusions

Biden’s NPR is best viewed as a continuation of previous nuclear postures and even where some degree of ‘rupture’ is in evidence, such ‘rupture’ simply reinforces existing overall postures.

Of particular note is Biden’s decision to repudiate his previous stance and to advance the development of ‘low-yield’ nuclear warheads. With this decision, Biden has signalled that the U.S. considers nuclear weapons to be ‘practical’, war fighting devices.

At a time of heightened nuclear risk, Biden has decided to contribute to a vast increase in nuclear tensions. Refusing to clarify use policy and deploying/developing ‘useable’ nuclear weapons systems demonstrates a posture just as reckless and potentially deadly as that assumed by Trump.

Biden’s NPR makes explicit the fact that Russia and China are the intended targets of any nuclear use. Such plain facts coincide with and illustrate the potentially deadly implications of U.S. policy in Europe and South-East Asia.

Depleted Uranium: Deadly, Dangerous and Indiscriminate

From END Info 37

Britain’s announcement that it will deploy Depleted Uranium (DU) weapons to Ukraine is a dangerous escalation that will do nothing to aid the people of that country. Rather, the opposite could be the case.

There have been a large number of studies detailing the very dangerous health and environmental impacts of the military use of DU, yet Great Britain - along with other states which possess and use DU - refuse to openly acknowledge the risks. One particularly unpleasant example of this was reported in the British press in 1999, following the use of DU in Kosovo (see Felicity Arbuthnot, ‘Depleted Uranium Warning Only Issued to MoD Staff’, Sunday Herald, August 1 1999). British MoD personnel were warned to stay away from areas where DU had been used unless they were wearing full radiological protective clothing. The same warning was not given to returning Kosovans who wanted nothing more than to go home. Why the difference in attitude?

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) website refers to two studies (M A Mcdiarmid et al, Environ. Res. A 82 168-180 (2000) and G J Macfarlane et al, The Lancet 356 17-21 (2000)) on the impact of DU on service personnel. Specifically, these studies relate to soldiers who had fragments of DU embedded in their bodies. This is a curious state of affairs given the enormous number of individual studies, evidence and reports detailing the risks associated with inhaling or ingesting DU dust and contaminants. Why are the only studies cited related to chunks or splinters of DU embedded within the bodies of soldiers?

The US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, a department of the Center for Disease Control, explains the chemically toxic effects on kidneys and lungs resulting from the inhalation of DU, the fact that DU can enter the water system and food chain and that it can travel large distances. The US is concerned about DU ‘at home’ but not on battlefields on the other side of an ocean.

There must be an immediate moratorium on the deployment and use of DU weapons until a full, long-term and independent epidemiological study on the locations where DU has been used is completed. The UN General Assembly is right to demand - as it did in 2007 - for greater transparency of the use and clean-up of DU weapons. It is worth noting that the UK, US, France and Israel voted against this Resolution.

It is sometimes suggested that DU is a ‘nuclear weapon’ in the same bracket as fission and fusion devices. Although DU is a ‘nuclear material’, there is no nuclear fission or fusion when these weapons are used. Rather, when fired DU burns at over 3000 degrees centigrade and becomes a ‘ceramic uranium aerosol’ that has special properties on impact - ie. it does not deform in the same way as other materials, meaning it can puncture heavy armour. However, DU produces microscopic fragments which are radioactive and chemically toxic that are distributed over the area surrounding impact and which can spread far and wide. It is these particles that produce long-term health and environmental effects.

The use or potential use of such weapons in Ukraine should alarm the people of that country, who have surely suffered enough as a result of this war. DU poses significant health and other concerns and could do further damage to an already damaged country.

Bomb damage

From END Info 37

According to a new report by Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists (‘Was There a U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accident At a Dutch Air Base?’, 03/04/23, fas.org/blogs/security/2023/ 04/volkel-nuclear-weapon-accident), evidence has come to light that suggests an accident involving a B61 nuclear bomb took place at the Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands. The Pentagon strenuously denies the idea. Kristensen writes:

A photo in a Los Alamos Laboratory ... student briefing from 2022 shows four people inspecting what appears to be a damaged B61 nuclear bomb ... If the image is indeed from a nuclear weapons accident, it would constitute the first publicly known case of a recent nuclear weapons accident at an airbase in Europe.

Volkel is one of several bases across Europe that house US nuclear bombs under ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements. Other bases are stationed in Belgium, Italy, Germany and Turkey. Under ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements these bombs are not only stored in non-US territory but in ‘peace time’ they are guarded by US forces. The US trains ‘participating country’ airforce personnel to drop these nuclear bombs and in the event of nuclear war, ‘participating country’ aircraft will be loaded with the bombs.

The actual arrangements and command systems involved in nuclear sharing are at best opaque and at worst completely baffling. One example of this is highlighted by Kristensen who writes:

Most people would describe a nuclear bomb getting bent as an ‘accident’, but U.S. Air Force terminology would likely catagorize it as a Bent Spear ‘incident’, which is defined as “evident damage to a nuclear weapon or nuclear component that requires major rework, replacement or examination or re-certification by the Department of Energy”. The U.S. Air Force reserves “accident” for events that involve the destruction or loss of a weapon.

However you choose to describe the damage done to this B61 bomb, there are a number of questions that require urgent examination. For instance: how many ‘incidents’ or ‘accidents’ have there been at nuclear sharing bases over the past decade? Are these frequent events or very rare indeed? How did this damage occur? Was it due to technical or human error? How often are there instances of technical or human error at nuclear sharing bases? Was there any damage to the nuclear warhead on this B61? How frequently are nuclear warheads damaged at nuclear sharing facilities? What are the potential consequences of such damage? What arrangements are in place to deal with any such consequences? How often are these arrangements activated?....

The list of question could go on and on but no matter how many questions are asked and no matter how often such questions are asked, the US and NATO countries involved in nuclear sharing are unlikely to answer. There is a veil of secrecy over the whole enterprise, which makes the prospect of the continuation and possible expansion of US nuclear weapon storage in Europe very troubling indeed.

The US is currently deploying a new range of B61-12 nuclear bombs to Europe. It looks possible that such bombs will also be deployed to the UK. The anti-nuclear movement is building opposition to these and related developments.

Finland joins NATO, Sweden waits for permission: lessons of a nuclear alliance

From END Info 37

Tom Unterrainer

On Tuesday 4 April, 2023, Finland officially joined the nuclear-armed NATO alliance. In so doing, Finland formally repudiated decades of independence and non-alignment. The formal proceedings accompanying Finland’s accession to NATO gave no sense of the drastic turn of events:

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

Secretary Blinken, Minister Haavisto, it is a pleasure to welcome you both here today, because this is an historic day. Soon we will be welcoming Finland as the 31st member of our Alliance, and we will raise the Finnish flag outside of this building. But before we do that, there are some formalities that we have to ensure are done in the right and proper way, so Secretary Blinken please hold the floor.

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken

Well, Secretary General, Mr. Minister, I am delighted to report that - just a few moments ago - that Turkiye deposited with me, on behalf of the United States, Turkiye’s ratification of the instrument of acceding to the protocol for Finland’s accession to NATO. And with the receipt and submission of that protocol, I can say that the protocol is now in force.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

Thank you so much. This is great news, Secretary Blinken. And with that, I can actually then hand over to you, Minister Haavisto, the formal invitation on behalf of all Allies, for the Republic of Finland to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. So, please.

Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto

Thank you.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

And then at the same time I also invite you to deposit your documents of accession to the US Government, here represented by Secretary Blinken.

Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto

Thank you, Mr. Secretary General, thank you Secretary Blinken. Now that I’ve got this invitation, it is my great pleasure to deposit with the Secretary of State of the United States of America Finland’s instrument of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. Please, Secretary Blinken.

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken

Thank you very much. Well, with receipt of this instrument of accession, we can now declare that Finland is the 31st member of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

Congratulations!

Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto

And since we are now a member of NATO we have a very important task, and the task is actually to give to you for the deposit also our ratification for Swedish membership. This is our first act as member state.

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken

I am delighted, delighted to receive this on behalf of Finland. Thank you.

Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto

Thank you.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

And then we welcome Finland to the Alliance, and we also appreciate that you have agreed also to invite Sweden. So, this ends this moment and then we will continue outside the building in just a moment. So, thank you so much.

The ceremony over, NATO’s land border with Russia doubled in an instant. It will not have escaped the notice of Russia, the primary target of the vast majority of US nuclear weapons and the target of US bombs stationed in Europe under NATO ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements, that it was US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken who declared “Finland as the 31st member” of NATO. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg was on hand to offer his congratulations. All of which makes clear two things: the central - determining - role of the United States in NATO and the very real dangers presented by Finland’s accession to the nuclear-armed alliance.

Such a move would be escalatory at the ‘best of times’. All must know that these are not the ‘best of times’. Nuclear tensions are at their greatest in decades, war rages in Europe. NATO is not just expanding its geographic boot-print in Europe but is extending it across the globe, with a particular focus against China. This is what Finland has rejected independence and non-alignment for: to go to war for the United States and its priorities. What are these priorities? Certainly not peace and security in Europe. The priority is to bolster and if possible enhance US power in the face of emerging alternative powers.

What of Sweden? Why did this country not join at the same time as Finland? After all, they too rejected independence and a wonderful record of seeking peace, disarmament and diplomacy to declare themselves for the nuclear-armed, US dominated alliance. Finland’s first act as a NATO member was to “deposit also our ratification for Swedish membership.”

On March 22 2023, the Swedish parliament voted 269-37 to approve accession to NATO. As of the end of March 2023, both Turkiye and Hungary have declined to ratify Sweden’s membership. Sweden is being made to wait to be allowed to join NATO, which presents itself as the defender of ‘democracy’ and an ‘international rules based order’ by two countries with, at best, tenuous claims to ‘democracy’ and ‘rules’ of any kind. This makes them a natural fit for NATO and as an ally of the United States but it does not make for a good fit for Sweden, which has a much better record on such questions. So whilst the Hungarian President continues with racist and anti-democratic methods at home and the Turkish President continues his war against the Kurds (to name just one ‘issue’), it is Sweden that is excluded from the nuclear-armed alliance.

Of course, the original members of NATO included fascist Portugal and ‘colonial’ Britain and France which continued to perpetuate outrages across their colonies.

So much for ‘democracy’ and ‘rules’. But who can speak of such things in the context of an organisation committed to the prospect of global nuclear annihilation, megadeath and genocide? Finland has sadly joined the club of hypocrites.

Time for Europe’s nuclear-weapon-free zone

From END Info 37

Editorial comments, Tom Unterrainer

More nuclear brinkmanship

The 2022 Belarussian constitutional referendum, conducted three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (27 February 2022), resulted in the renouncement of nuclear-free status. The referendum was met with wide-spread internal opposition and the day of the referendum itself was marked by anti-war protests across the country. The elimination of nuclear-free status was only one of several measures intended to solidify President Lukashenko’s power.

If the timing of the referendum was mere coincidence, its outcome – along with Lukashenko’s support for Russia’s invasion – is of major significance. Take, for instance, these comments from Lukashenko on the day of the referendum:

“If you (the West) transfer nuclear weapons to Poland or Lithuania, to our borders, then I will turn to Putin to return the nuclear weapons that I gave away without any conditions”.

Did Lukashenko pluck the idea that the US might station nuclear weapons in Poland out of thin air? Or were such prospects on the table? You need look no further than the Twitter feed of the US Ambassador to Poland in 2020 to see that Lukashenko’s statement was not without foundation. It is worth noting that although the US Ambassador at the time, Georgette Mosbacher, has been replaced with Mark Brzezinski the Tweet raising this suggestion remains in the public domain.

The context in which such messages were sent was a growing opposition to the presence of US nuclear bombs in Germany and the refraction of this opposition through the Social Democratic Party. As we reported in END Info 15 (May 2020), Rolf Mützenich – SPD leader in Bundestag – publicly criticised the stationing of US bombs in the country:

“Nuclear weapons on German territory do not heighten our security, just the opposite ... The time has come for Germany to rule out a future stationing.”

The suggestion that US nuclear bombs could or should be move eastwards to a state bordering Belarus (and Ukraine) was a direct response to this mood in Germany at the time.

Despite the change in the Belarussian constitution and Lakashenko’s warning at the time of the change, US nuclear weapons have not arrived in Poland or Lithuania and Belarus remains free from Russian nuclear weapons. This does not mean that the matter is settled.

On 31 March 2023, Lukashenko took to the airwaves to deliver an hour-long speech to the nation. Among his comments was the following:

“Putin and I will decide and introduce here, if necessary, strategic weapons, and they must understand this, the scoundrels abroad, who today are trying to blow us up from inside and outside ... We will stop at nothing to protect our countries, our state and their peoples.”

These comments were reported in the press as a direct indication that Russian nuclear weapons would be stationed in Belarus. In an October 2022 interview with the Gazeta Polska weekly, Polish President Andrzej Duda is reported as saying:

“There is always a potential opportunity to participate in the nuclear sharing programme ... We have spoken with American leaders about whether the United States is considering such a possibility. The issue is open ... this would not be a nuclear weapon under the control of Poland. Participation in nuclear sharing does not imply having your own nuclear weapon”.

Duda’s comments were made in a new context, one where there is now no political will and a much-diminished mood in society to remove US bombs from Germany.

What appears to be happening with these repeated, reckless and frankly terrifying threats to proliferate nuclear weapons is connected to what Zbigniew Brzezinski (father of the current US Ambassador to Poland) termed the ‘Critical Core of Europe’s Security’ (see map) and the proximity of Belarus and Russia to this ‘Core’. As Ken Coates noted in his Foreword to the new edition of Bertrand Russell’s Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare:

“America’s diplomatic efforts are not disinterested, and follow the perceived interests of the American Government. This interest has been bluntly stated, in 1997, in respect of Ukraine, by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his blueprint for American Policy, The Grand Chessboard. It sees American power as dependent on the establishment and maintenance of hegemony over Ukraine, which is defined as part of the critical core or ‘geopolitical pivot’ of ‘American primacy’. (2001)

Such an analysis does not let Russia ‘off the hook’ with respect to its criminal actions in Ukraine. Nor does is excuse each and every aspect of Lukashenko’s conduct. But it does illustrate the fact that the US has long recognised the strategic centrality of control over Ukraine. It also highlights the degree to which the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe and the conduct of the nuclear-armed NATO play a central role in furthering US strategic aims. Lastly, it helps to give context to the brutal and dangerous realities of nuclear brinkmanship on the European continent and the degree to which such nuclear brinkmanship translates into US efforts to extend influence into ‘Eurasia’.

Each and every step – verbal, constitutional or actual – towards the ‘eastward’ or ‘westward’ deployment of nuclear weapons escalates the already significant nuclear tensions and nuclear risks faced by humanity.

In place of such escalation, Europe needs a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The 2016 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) working paper, A Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Europe: Concepts-Problems-Chances, outlines a number of such objectives: 1. Security objectives in the narrow sense, 2. Political-symbolic objectives and 3. Adapting defence policies to the political situation in Europe. More detail is given within each of the three objectives, as outlined below:

1. Security objectives in the narrow sense

Confidence-building in the regional neighbourhood: “All states in the region are loyal parties to the NPT, and for many of them, membership goes beyond compliance and involves active promotion of the spirit and letter of that treaty.” Acting upon Action Point 9 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference would build and reinforce trust amongst regional signatories to the NPT, and would signal to neighbours – Russia in particular – that no threat is posed.

Irreversibility and Stability: The creation of the NWFZ in Europe would be the result of a legally binding, verifiable and therefore “hard to revoke” arrangement.

Immunizing the region against the consequences of a nuclear confrontation: “one objective of any NWFZ has always been to protect the region concerned against becoming a nuclear battleground”.

2. Political-symbolic objectives

Strengthening the non-proliferation regime: Developing a NWFZ in Europe would mean signatories to the NPT acting on the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Such an act could only reinforce existing arms control and disarmament regimes.

Fostering nuclear disarmament: “Sub-strategic nuclear weapons are today one of the most nagging issues for nuclear disarmament … A NWFZ in Europe would intend to, eventually, cover an area in which NATO’s sub-strategic nuclear weapons are presently sited and to stimulate adequate reciprocal concessions by Russia concerning her capabilities in the same weapons category”.

Helping delegitimize nuclear weapons/provoking debate: As the PRIF study points out, the legitimacy of nuclear weapons as an issue of debate has never been “dormant”. There have, however, been identifiable periods when debate and discussion adopted a much higher pitch than usual. The stark threats posed to the continuation of the INF should be an opportunity for the debate to gain traction and the proposal for a NWFZ in Europe can only boost such debates.

3. Adapting defence policies to the political situation in Europe

“One of the most frequently heard observations by non-Europeans is the disconnect between the nuclear constellation and the political situation in Europe. The relation between the West and Russia is not without disputes and occasional tensions … but the idea of a war against each other sounds still far-fetched.”

Developments since the PRIF study was published now make it much easier to imagine war, even nuclear war, breaking out between “the West and Russia”. Further, the general political situation in Europe has deteriorated markedly in the years since the PRIF study, much ‘adaptation’ of defence policies is already underway. The development of plans for the NWFZ in Europe would add something definitively more positive to the current debate and could unleash an all-too-necessary political counter-dynamic to the current direction of travel.

An important aspect of any proposal for a NWFZ in Europe is that it would, in fact, benefit from being part of a international system of such zones. In his indispensable study, Security without Nuclear Deterrence, Commander Robert Green notes:

“Every year since 1996 the UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution introduced by Brazil calling upon the states parties and signatories to the regional NWFZ treaties ‘to promote the nuclear weapon free status of the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas’, and to explore and promote further cooperation among themselves.”

The first conference of states already participating in NWFZs took place in Mexico in April 2005. The declaration adopted by the conference reaffirmed a commitment to the “consolidation, strengthening and expansion of NWFZs, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the achievement of a nuclear weapons free world.” So not only do signatories to the NPT share a commitment to establish NWFZs, but existing such zones are committed to their expansion.

This leaves the rather important question of ‘who’, or ‘what’, will have the capacity to drive forward the call for the NWFZ in Europe. European peace movements can and must answer this question. A united European peace movement, dedicated to nuclear abolition and NWFZ’s, is needed now more than ever.

Nuclear dangers

Thinking globally, acting locally

From END Info 36 DOWNLOAD

Tom Unterrainer

The 22 January 2023 marked the second anniversary of the coming in to force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

To date, 68 nations have ratified the Treaty and work to increase that number continues. This work stretches from the offices of diplomats and international politicians to the streets of Yorkshire cities, towns and villages where CND members promote the idea of nuclear ban communities. The Treaty itself has significance beyond the prohibition of nuclearism in those states that have ratified.

It is remarkable - and telling of the role played by nuclear weapons - that it took more than three quarters of a century after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a United Nations treaty to codify prohibition into international law. Every time an additional nation rejects nuclearism and ratifies the TPNW, the world takes another step towards nuclear abolition.

For me, and many others, the TPNW has a significance beyond the incremental steps. The whole process of drafting, coordinating, winning support and signatures for and ratifications of the TPNW was a process of geopolitical significance: it was a full-frontal rejection of the dominant idea that the retention and development of nuclear weapons is a prerequisite for global security.

Driving this full-frontal rejection were nations that have been and continue to be exploited, diminished and oppressed in the name of nuclearism and the global order which is characterised by it: the nations where the United States, Britain and France and others tested their nuclear weapons; the nations where the basic materials of the nuclear warhead were extracted; the nations which have experienced intergenerational damage and which carry the legacies – in the earth, in their bodies – of the nuclear age. It is noteworthy that Japan, the only nation where atomic weapons were detonated on a civilian population, opposed the TPNW.

As Richard Falk put it: “The enormous fly in this healing ointment” - the TPNW – “arises from the refusal of any of the nine nuclear weapons states to join in the TPNW process". Not only did the nuclear armed states refuse to join the process, so did members of the NATO nuclear alliance. They were joined by countries like Japan, which maintain close relations with the United States.

These states did not simply refuse to join in with the TPNW and ignore it: a coordinated and determined effort has been made to stop nations from ratifying and to systematically undermine the legal status of the Treaty.

For instance, the presence of member and soon-to-be members of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance at the First Meeting of State Parties (1MSP) of the TPNW raises a number of questions. First amongst these is: what were they doing there?

Was this a sign, as some hoped, that NATO member states were finally ready to positively engage with the project of nuclear abolition? No.

NATO and NATO-aligned states took the opportunity of their observer status and the speaking rights afforded to them to either challenge the TPNW itself or to promote fallacies around nuclear weapons.

Norway’s statement to 1MSP is explicit:

Norway is attending this conference as an observer. This is not a step towards signing nor ratifying the TPNW, which would be incompatible with our NATO obligations. Norway stands fully behind NATO’s nuclear posture.

The Netherlands struck a similar note:

.…this is not the first time we have participated in the TPNW discussions. We would like to remind delegations of our participation in the 2017 negotiations leading up to this Treaty, including offering concrete suggestions to make the TPNW a more broadly acceptable and credible disarmament treaty - not only to us but also possibly to other NATO Allies – which were unfortunately rejected.

Here, The Netherland’s not only objects to the TPNW but points out that it has been objecting since 2017! They have been ‘persistently objecting’ to the TPNW from the very start. The first prize for clarity, enveloped in a cloud of dire hypocrisy, is awarded to Germany, which stated in its address to the 1MSP that:

As a member to NATO – and as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance -, … Germany cannot accede to the TPNW, which would collide with our membership in NATO including nuclear deterrence. As non-member to the TPNW we are not bound by its provisions, nor do we accept the claim that its provisions are applicable under customary law – now or in the future.

It is almost as if, like me, the German Foreign Office did an internet search of ‘persistent objector’ and crafted their statement to the 1MSP in order to precisely comply with the definition. What is this ‘Persistent objection’ about?

According to a 2021 Chatham House report:

While it is a general principle of international law that treaties do not create obligations for third states, it is also an accepted principle that a rule set forth in a treaty could, under certain conditions, become binding on a third state as a customary rule ... However, this is not an automatic process. Two distinct concepts are relevant here: the concept of so-called ‘specially affected states’, and that of ‘persistent objectors’ ... As the ICJ has explained, a lack of consent from specially affected states may have the effect of preventing the required general state practice from emerging, preventing the rule from coming into being in the first place. There is a strong argument that states with nuclear weapons and those in a nuclear alliance would be specially affected by a proposed ban on nuclear weapons. Even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence - so-called persistent objectors - will not be bound by it.

What does all of this illustrate?

Firstly: that the nuclear armed states and their allies in the nuclear-armed alliances will not easily give up their nuclear weapons. This is why campaigns like CND have a vital role to play and why we have to approach the problem from a number of directions: international law, political and mass action.

Secondly: that those who most consistently preach the gospel of ‘international law’ and promote their own version of a ‘global rules based order’ do so hypocritically, deviously and in their own interests.

In his recent book, The Last Colony – A tale of exile, justice and Britain’s colonial legacy, Philippe Sands writes:

In 1945, Britain and the United States had committed themselves to a rules-based international order, then they flaunted the rules. They committed themselves to …[a] vision of decolonisation and human rights, then shredded their own commitments.

What is Sands referring to specifically? What does it have to do with nuclear weapons? Quite a lot, as we shall see.

Six thousand miles from here are a group of islands which the British government refers to as the British Indian Ocean Territory – or BIOT for short. These islands may be more familiar as the Chagos islands.

In 1965 the United Kingdom split the Chagos islands from Mauritius. It did this in direct contravention of United Nations rules, which made clear that the process of decolonisation should not involve splitting or removing territory. The UK acted illegally.

The Chagossians demanded the right to self-determination. This right is enshrined in the UN Charter. Britain refused their demand: again, illegal under international law. Instructively, this same right to self-determination – as enshrined in the UN Charter – was invoked by Britain to legally justify its actions during the Falklands War. The Chagossians were entitled to ask why such a right pertained for white Falklanders but not for themselves.

Over and over again, Britain ignored the plight of the Chagossians – a people who had been ripped from their land, transported across oceans and left to suffer.

Britain inflicted suffering, injustice and worse on the Chagnossians in contravention of international law whilst presenting itself as a champion of a ‘global rules based order’.

It was not until 2017 that things started to change for the Chagossians, who refused to give up the fight. In June 2017, the UN General Assembly voted 94 to 15 to ask the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the legality of the initial separation. On 25 February 2019, the ICJ ruled 13-1 that the UK was under obligation to reverse the separation: to give Chagos back. It took until 3 November 2022 for James Cleverely, the British Foreign Secretary, to announce the UK’s willingness to begin negotiations for a return: but with one condition – the continued operation of the airbase at Diego Garcia.

Diego Garcia is an enormous airstrip for the United States. It is the place from which bombing raids on Iraq and the wider Middle East were launched. As Philippe Sands explained in one of his earlier books, Diego Garcia was also used as a torture site. It is ‘British territory’.

Just how did the United States end up with an enormous airbase on territory stolen by Britain in the middle of the Indian Ocean – all in contravention of international law. How was the United States allowed to use this stolen territory to launch an illegal war on Iraq? How was the United States allowed to use this stolen territory to conduct torture?

There exist a series of agreements and treaties between the United States and the United Kingdom made in the aftermath of the Second World War allowing for the use of UK bases by the US military. The Lakenheath airbase is another such example.

We’re told that this is ‘RAF’ Lakenheath but it is no such thing. It is a US base. The F35 aircraft that are stationed there are American. The pilots of these aircraft are American. The B61 nuclear bombs that look set to be stationed there are American.

The only thing ‘Royal’ about the place are a smattering of British personnel on the gates.

The return of US nuclear bombs to Lakenheath will be done without fanfare, without discussion, deliberation or the opportunity for dissent within official politics.

There has been no official statement and when asked, the British government equivocates. If Chagos is the last British colony, what does that make Lakenheath?

Nuclear developments have always happened under a veil of secrecy, from the initiation of the British atomic programme by the 1945 Atlee government to the announcement in Boris Johnson’s Integrated Review that ‘transparency’ over these issues will end.

The existence of nuclear sharing sites across Europe – something everyone knew about – was only officially confirmed when someone working at NATO in Brussels accidentally uploaded the wrong document onto their website!

The expansion of the nuclear bootprint – which is how I characterise developments at Lakenheath – would be very dangerous at the best of times. It is potentially deadly in the current circumstances.

In January 2022, the Permanent 5 – the five nuclear armed states with a permanent seat on UN Security Council issued a statement that said: “Nuclear war can not be won and must never be fought.” They echoed a similar statement from Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev that many of you will recall from the 1980s.

How sincere was this statement? Quite apart from the demonstrable hostility of the P5 to the TPNW and their ongoing failure to uphold the basics of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which they claim to hold so dear, we have witnessed a number of deeply troubling developments:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has massively increased nuclear tensions.

The ‘taboo’ on threatening nuclear use has been drastically undermined: not just by Putin’s public announcements – although these are the most high-profile – but also by the United States.

A totally inadequate response to these events: No effort to reduce nuclear tensions, no effort to end the war by diplomacy and negotiation.

We’ve seen repeated public speculation about how nuclear weapons could be used, debates around ‘tactical’ vs ‘strategic’ weapons all of which creates a normalisation of the murderously abnormal.

Rather than rolling back on the worst excesses of Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review, Biden’s version looks eerily familiar.

So, what to do about it? Think globally about our problems and understand what it all means. Act locally to raise the alarm, spread the message but – importantly – to work decisively towards removing each and every roadblock to peace.

Text of a talk given at the Yorkshire CND AGM, January 2023.

First Steps Towards Secure Peace

From END Info 36 DOWNLOAD

Bertrand Russell

Chapter 8 of Has Man A Future?, first published in 1961 – as global tensions built between the USA and USSR in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis – and re-issued by Spokesman Books in 2001.

The first steps towards the attainment of secure peace, like the first tottering steps of an infant, will almost necessarily be small and doubtful. In this chapter, I want to consider, not all that is desirable, but all that might conceivably be achieved by negotiators in a not too distant future.

The first thing that is needed is a different atmosphere in debates between East and West. At present these debates are conducted in the spirit of an athletic contest. What each side thinks important is, not the reaching of agreement, but its own victory either in a propaganda performance for the rest of the world or in securing from the other side concessions which might tilt the balance of power in what would be considered a favourable direction. Neither side remembers that the future of Man is at stake and that almost any agreement would be better than none. Take, for example, the long-drawn-out negotiations for the abolition of tests. East and West have always agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons to new Powers would increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Both sides have agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons to new Powers is imminent. Both sides have agreed that a ban on nuclear tests would help to prevent this spread. From these premises, both sides have felt, not that tests must stop, but that whichever side is in question must seem to wish to stop them. The negotiations began hopefully with a joint declaration of the scientists of East and West that a test anywhere could be detected by the other side. Thereupon, the American Government announced that it needed to make underground tests and that these could easily pass undetected. After some years of negotiation this obstacle was overcome. The Soviet Government thereupon announced that the necessary inspection should not be directed by one man representing the United Nations, but by three men-one East, one West, and one neutral - and that they should only act when there was unan­imity. As was to be feared these manoeuvres on the part of America and Russia made the years of nego­tiation fruitless and led to the resumption of tests by Russia. One cannot but conclude that neither side has been sincere in pretending to wish that tests should cease by agreement.

If any progress is to be made with any of the problems that cause East-West tension, negotiators must meet, not in the hope of outwitting each other, or of prolonging the dangerous status quo, but with an absolute determination that agreement shall be reached. It must be accepted that an agreement is not likely to be wholly palatable to either party. The aim should be to reach agreements which do not alter the balance of power, but do diminish the risk of war.

I can see only one motive which can lead to this change in the attitude of negotiators. This motive will have to be consciousness on both sides of the futile horror of nuclear war. At present, each side thinks it necessary for success in the war of nerves to pretend that it might win. And not only for success in the war of nerves, but also to lure its own citizens to their death by promises which Governments must know to be deceitful. One side announces, ‘We might win a hot war’; the other side retorts, ‘We shall obliterate you’. Such statements tend to promote warlike fury in whichever side is threatened. If any steps towards peace are to be achieved, both sides will have to recognize that they face a common peril and that the true enemy is not the other side, but the weapons of mass destruction which both sides possess.

If this is recognized on both sides, the problem becomes a quite different one. It is no longer the problem of outwitting the other side, or of persuading one’s own side that it is capable of victory. The first problem will have to be to find acceptable steps, however small, which can prove that fruitful negotiations have become possible.

There is a considerable amount of rhetoric, both on the warlike and on the peaceful side, which, whatever its intention, is not likely to lead to the desired result. We have formerly considered the rhetorical war propaganda embodied in the slogan, ‘Liberty or Death’, but there is an opposite slogan invented by West German friends of peace: ‘Better Red than dead’. One may guess that in some sections of Russian public opinion there is an opposite slogan: ‘Better capitalists than corpses’. I do not think it is necessary to inquire into the theoretical validity of either slogan since I think it out of the question that the one should be adopted by Western Governments or the other by the Governments of the East. Neither slogan presents justly the problem which East and West alike have to face. Given that military victory by either side is impossible, it follows logically that a negotiated detente cannot be based on the complete subjection of either side to the other, but must preserve the existing balance while transforming it from a balance of terror to a balance of hope. That is to say, co-existence must be accepted genuinely and not superficially as a necessary condition of human survival.

Perhaps the first step should be a solemn declaration by the United States and the USSR, and as many other Powers as possible, that a nuclear war would be an utter disaster to both East and West and, also, to neutrals, and that it would not achieve anything that East or West or neutrals could possibly desire. I should hope that such a declaration could be made sincerely. Both sides know that what it would say is true, but both sides are caught in a net of prestige, propaganda, and power politics, from which, hitherto, they have not known how to extricate themselves. I should like to see the neutrals taking the lead in achieving such a declaration, and I do not see how either side could incur the odium of refusing to sign.

The next step should be a temporary moratorium, say for a period of two years, during which each side would pledge itself to abstain from provocative actions. Among provocative actions should be included such measures as interference with the freedom of West Berlin, or interven­tion by the United States in Cuba. It should be agreed that United Nations observers, as impartial as could be found, should decide whether an act is provocative.

During the two years moratorium, various preliminary steps should be taken with a view to making subsequent negotiations easier. There should be on both sides a discouragement of vehement hostile propaganda and an attempt by means of greatly increased cultural contact to diminish the popular view in East and West of West and East as melodramatic monsters of wickedness. Steps should be taken to lessen the danger of unprovoked or unintended war. At the present time, each side fears an unprovoked attack by the other, and each side has a vast system of detection by which it hopes to discover such an unprovoked attack a few minutes before it occurs. Each side’s methods of detection are fallible and, therefore, each side may believe itself about to be attacked when nothing of the sort is occurring. If it believes this, it will order what it supposes to be a counter-attack, but what, to the other side, will appear merely unprovoked aggression. This is a mutual nightmare, caused by tension, but immensely increasing it. It is hardly possible that tension should be very seriously diminished while both sides live under the threat of ‘instant retaliation’, which may well be, not retaliation, but response to a mistake. It is by no means easy to see what can be done about this situation when it has once been allowed to grow up. Nuclear disarmament, of course, would solve this problem. Not long ago the danger might have been much alleviated by abolition of launching sites, or, if that were thought too extreme a measure, by making the launching sites temporarily unavailable. But, since the introduction of submarines provided with nuclear weapons, launching sites have lost a good deal of their dominant importance. The diminution of the danger of unintended or accidental war has become a technical question of much complexity and, short of nuclear disarmament, it would seem that only palliatives are possible. If a detente is genuinely desired on both sides, a technical commission composed of East and West in equal numbers could be appointed to diminish this danger, but what exactly it could recommend, it is difficult to decide, and it must always be remembered that palliatives are unreliable and that nuclear disarmament affords the only genuine protection against this danger.

There should also be an attempt on both sides, on the one hand, to increase mutual knowledge of each other’s case, and, on the other hand, to disseminate information as to the disastrousness of a nuclear war should it take place.

The main work to be performed during the moratorium would be an agreement to appoint a Conciliation Com­mittee consisting of equal numbers of members from East and West and neutrals. I think such a Committee, if it were to perform its work efficiently, would have to be small. It might, for example, consist of four members from the West, four from the East, and four neutrals. It should - at least at first - have advisory powers only. whenever it did not succeed in reaching unanimity, the opinions of both majority and minority, with the reasons for them, should be made public. Its decisions should be governed by certain principles. Of these, the first and most important should be that the pro­posals as a whole offered no net gain to either side, since, otherwise, there would be no chance of their being agreed to. For example, Russia should cease to jam Western radios provided that they abstained from virulent hostile propaganda. The second principle to be adopted should be to seek ways of diminishing dangerous friction in areas where this is occurring - as, for example, between Israel and the Arab world, or between North and South Korea. A third principle - which, however, should be subordinate to the other two-would be to allow self-determination wherever possible. There are limits to what can be done in this direction since the Russians would not agree to its application in their satellites, and it is doubtful whether the United States would agree unreservedly as regards Latin America. As regards Formosa, I have never seen any account of the wishes of the inhabitants or any suggestion by either East or West that respect should be paid to their wishes. Until the world is much less tense than it is at present, the principle of self-determination, desirable as it is, will have to give way, here and there, to considerations of power politics. This is regrettable, but is, I fear, unavoidable if agreement is to be reached between the Great Powers.

There is another matter of very great importance which should be dealt with during the moratorium, and that is the reform and strengthening of the United Nations. UNO ought to be open to every State that wishes to join it, not only China, which is the most urgent, but also East and West Germany. The problem of Germany, however, is very special, and I shall have more to say about it in a later chapter.

UNO is defective, not only because it excludes certain countries, but also because of the Veto. UNO cannot lead on towards a World Government while the Veto is retained, but, on the other hand, it is difficult to abolish the Veto while national armaments retain their present strength. On this point, as in the matter of Germany, the question of disarmament has to be decided before any satisfactory solution is possible.

It is because of the imperfections of UNO that an ad hoc Conciliation Committee would, at first, be a better body than UNO for initiating schemes of conciliation. One may hope that, if such a body, while still having only an advisory capacity, did its work wisely, it might, in time, acquire such moral authority as would make its proposals difficult to resist and would give it, in embryo, an influence that might facilitate the ultimate establishment of a World Government. The great advantage of such a body would be that the neutrals would hold the balance between East and West, and, if they thought proposals by one side more reasonable than those by the other, they could give the majority to the side they thought best on the particular issue in question. One would hope that the neutrals would be sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other. Moreover, if one side, but not the other, was in danger of encountering neutral opposition - as would be bound to happen to either side occasionally -this would tend to promote moderation on both sides. The desirability of appealing to neutrals would tend to soften the acerbity of both East and West in discussions, and to generate, gradually, a world-wide point of view, rather than one confined to this side or that. Moreover, where there is a deadlock between East and West, there is better hope of a wise compromise solution being suggested by the neutrals than by either of the contesting parties of East and West. These are, perhaps, the most important things that neutrals can do towards the promotion of sanity.

It is largely because I believe that it is neutrals who will have to play the most important role in the preserva­tion of peace that I should wish to see Britain leaving NATO and trying to inspire wise action by a neutral bloc. National pride causes most Britons to think that such action would seriously weaken the West, but this is not the view of authoritative American orthodox experts. Also, paradoxically, it would make it more probable, not less, that some Britons might survive. But the most important argument for British neutrality is the help towards world peace that Britain could do as a neutral, but cannot do as a member of either bloc.

I have not dealt in this chapter either with disarmament or with territorial questions, but only with such prelimin­ary steps as might lessen the hostility between East and West. Both disarmament and territorial questions will be considered in the ensuing chapters.

Anti-nuclear news

From END Info 36 DOWNLOAD

‘Spy balloons’ and Spy Domes

Over the course of two or three days, much of the anglosphere media dedicated itself to the story of a Chinese balloon - or ‘Spy Balloon’, as some reports labelled it - that was making its way across the United States landmass.

According to some reports, the balloon was as large as a ‘20 storey building’ (Sky News, 07/02/23) so regardless of whether or not it was actually a ‘Spy Balloon’ it was hardly designed for stealthy operations. After some days of coverage, the United States armed forces eventually found an opportunity to shoot the balloon out of the sky.

Debris has been recovered and is currently being analysed to determine the actual function of the equipment carried by the balloon. We should assume that detailed examination will confirm the nefarious purposes of the device.

Amidst the excitement, fear and condemnatory coverage generated by this Chinese balloon very little - perhaps nothing - was said about the extensive US spying operations and installations that pepper the globe. Many of these operations and installations have a direct connection to the infrastructure of the US nuclear weapons capability.

Menwith Hill (pictured), located 7.7miles west of Harrogate, Yorkshire, UK, is an example of one such installation. Rather than using a balloon or some other rudimentary device for its spying and monitoring activities, the US has been granted permission to station a series of enormous domes on this rural and otherwise beautiful landscape.

According to the Menwith Hill Accountability Campaign (themhac.uk):

Menwith Hill is the largest intelligence-gathering, interception and surveillance base outside the US. It has many roles which are generally for US interests only (diplomatic, military and economic) – being the hub of the ECHELON global surveillance system. However, in May 2013 an unknown and very important whistle blower called Edward Snowden disclosed thousands of top secret documents which revealed the extent of the intelligence gathering and surveillance on us all by the NSA/CIA (with the help of GCHQ). Menwith Hill is mentioned several times in the documents.

The base is unaccountable, secretive and out of control of the UK government. After Edward Snowden revealed thousands of documents there have been many articles in the press about the lack of scrutiny by Parliament of US bases in general and in particular the NSA especially at NSA/NRO Menwith Hill.

We don’t see many stories about Menwith Hill and related US bases in our media. Perhaps we’d hear more about them if a balloon - Chinese or otherwise - was ever blown off-course and found itself hovering above them.

Perhaps American forces would be swifter in shooting down such a balloon over Yorkshire than over the United States.

John LaForge imprisoned in Germany, January 10, 2023

Nukewatch’s John LaForge is currently serving 50 days in a German prison for his part in actions aimed at removing US nuclear weapons from Germany. Before entering prison he was joined by other activists that have endured jail time for their anti-nuclear protests in a zoom meeting. Ongoing coverage of John’s imprisonment can be found at nukewatchinfo.org/johns-jail-updates/.

Extract from John’s first letter from prison:

January 15, 2023

This month has three important political anniversaries, anti-war and anti-nuclear holidays if you will, events I’ll celebrate privately for a change, since I’m temporarily cooling my heels in a German prison on the west end of Hamburg. It’s not that I killed or robbed very many people, but I have acted contemptuously toward the court system here and have refused to cooperate with its deeply corrupt and thoroughly dishonest protection of the nuclear weapons establishment.

Because Susan Crane and I had the gall to occupy the top of a nuclear weapons bunker that holds U.S. hydrogen bombs here in Germany, and then refuse to apologize by paying a fine for trespassing, the court has decided that seven weeks in this modern prison ought to mend my ways, or at least discourage other abolitionists...

The nine-member thermonuclear cartel, like a gang of coldblooded mobsters, acts outside and above the law by rewarding their judicial, police and prison authorities for the cover they provide, authorities who then wink and pretend that the protection racket is necessary and that the Bomb is legal.

Maybe our marching, our rebellion and the law of nations can’t denuclearize the cabal of atomic weaponeers. Maybe the nuclear mobsters won’t re-direct their war chests to useful purposes before they run our earthly train off the rails. But then nothing changes unless we demand it.

John LaForge, Billwerder Prison, Hamburg

Munich Peace Conference: More diplomacy instead of more weapon deliveries!

The International Munich Peace Conference begins on February 17, 2023. It traditionally takes place as an alternative event with qualified content to the Munich Security Conference. Under the motto "Shaping peace and justice - NO to war!", the lectures and discussions are about initiating a paradigm shift towards more diplomacy and negotiations instead of more arms deliveries.

“It was always difficult to bring the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table. The political will seems to have been lacking so far, because both Russia and Ukraine and the NATO that supports them are still hoping to gain ground on the battlefield," emphasizes Dr. medical Lars Pohlmeier, Chairman of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), one of the organizations from the sponsoring group of the Munich Peace Conference. "Chancellor Olaf Scholz's term 'Zeitenwende' has meanwhile arrived in international politics. He suggests that something has finally changed, that there is no going back to peace and security. That's wrong. Disarmament treaties and building trust, starting with small steps, are always possible. Armistice and peace negotiations are always between political opponents, not friends. Even now, Russia and Ukraine are negotiating daily about wheat deliveries from Ukraine. A more peaceful world with justice is possible if the political will is there.”

“The hope that a complete victory over Russia is achievable due to more and more arms deliveries is also doubted by military officials like US General Mark Milley. That's why we need more diplomacy instead of more arms deliveries," Pohlmeier continued.

The sponsors of the Munich Peace Conference criticize the lack of willingness for non-violent conflict resolution and diplomatic initiatives. For example, no representative of the Russian government was invited to the Munich Security Conference, allegedly so as not to provide them with a platform for propaganda. As a result, no (informal) diplomatic talks between Russia and NATO states or Ukraine are possible at the security conference, the peace conference organizations complain.

"Unfortunately, this rigid militarism once again confirms the need for demonstrations against the 'security conference' and the alternative event, the International Munich Peace Conference," says Maria Feckl, organizer of the peace conference. "At this year's peace conference, representatives of civil society (including the last generation) will have the opportunity to contrast their political priorities with the war course and the armament mania of the 'security conference'." There will also be a workshop on the concept of social defense and lectures on war interests and war narratives using the example of Afghanistan and Ukraine.

Press release from IPPNW Deutschland

NATO to meet in Vilnius

The next scheduled NATO summit will take place in Vilnius, Lithuania, in June 2023. The No To NATO - No To War network is actively considering options for a counter-summit and a series of activities around this time. Keep an eye on www.no-to-nato.org/ for the latest news and notices of planned activities.

Iraq: 20 years on

Lies, war and the ‘rules-based order’

From END Info 36 DOWNLOAD

T[ony] B[lair] gave me assurances when I asked for Iraq to be discussed at Cabinet that no decision made and not imminent.

Clare Short, Diaries, 9 Sept 2002

Mr Blair was ‘economical with the truth’ in his assurances to Clare Short, a member of his cabinet. He was likewise economical with Parliament, the press and the people of his country. Papers leaked to the Daily Telegraph (18 Sept 2004) and further papers published by the Sunday Times (1 May 2005) [collected in The Dodgiest Dossier, Spokesman 2005] make this clear. The lies were not simply about the point at which he and his closest allies had decided - along with the Bush Administration - to wage war against Iraq but about the basis for such a decision. As Ken Coates noted:

These papers showed in graphic detail how weak was the pre-war evidence for attacking Iraq ... The briefing papers made the bald claim that ‘the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy’. They reveal that the British Government knew that there was no major threat from weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and they also knew that the claim that Iraq had links with al Qaeda was ‘frankly unconvincing’.

Ken Coates, The Dodgiest Dossier

Despite the “frankly unconvincing” claims, the lack of evidence, the absence of UN consent, divisions in the ‘international community’ and an enormous global anti-war movement and its heroic efforts to avert the very worst, the very worst unfolded. The US and UK went to war against Iraq.

In short order, the toll of Iraqi deaths rocketed as the bombs and rockets rained down. Destruction was unleashed upon the land and two decades on, the legacies of war and occupation leave their mark.

Ken Coates relentlessly analysed the roots, conduct and outcomes of events in Iraq. In his pamphlet, Tony Blair: The Old New Goes to War, Coates writes: 

The enforcement of international law is commonly not advanced by the outbreak of war. When the war itself is arguably illegal, this perception applies with redoubled force.

He then details cases of torture, the undermining of the United Nations and breaches of the Geneva Conventions which, in addition to the death-toll and destruction, reveal much about those who claim to ‘uphold the rules-based order’.

Jack Straw - who served as Blair’s Foreign Secretary - told a House of Commons Select Committee (4 March 2003) that:

... you are right it is the United States which has the military power to act as the world’s policeman, and only the United States. We live in a uni-polar world ... We will reap a whirlwind is we push the Americans into a unilateralist position in which they are the centre of this uni-polar world.

This uni-polar moment is over. The US, in desperation to maintain influence, continues to act recklessly and dangerously. The UK and other NATO members show no signs of dissent. What new horrors are planned in the name of a ‘rules-based order’? Where will this end?